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vIntroduction to the series Why We Post
This book is one of a series of 11 titles. Nine are monographs devoted to 
specific field sites (including this one) in Brazil, Chile, China, England, 
India, Italy, Trinidad and Turkey – they will be published in 2016 –17. 
The series also includes a comparative book about all our findings, 
published to accompany this title, and a final book which contrasts the 
visuals that people post on Facebook in the English field site with those 
on our Trinidadian field site.
When we tell people that we have written nine monographs about 
social media around the world, all using the same chapter headings 
(apart from Chapter 5), they are concerned about potential repetition. 
However, if you decide to read several of these books (and we very much 
hope you do), you will see that this device has been helpful in showing 
the precise opposite. Each book is as individual and distinct as if it were 
on an entirely different topic.
This is perhaps our single most important finding. Most studies of 
the internet and social media are based on research methods that assume 
we can generalise across different groups. We look at tweets in one place 
and write about ‘Twitter’. We conduct tests about social media and 
friendship in one population, and then write on this topic as if friendship 
means the same thing for all populations. By presenting nine books with 
the same chapter headings, you can judge for yourselves what kinds of 
generalisations are, or are not, possible.
Our intention is not to evaluate social media, either positively or 
negatively. Instead the purpose is educational, providing detailed evi-
dence of what social media has become in each place and the local conse-
quences, including local evaluations.
Each book is based on 15 months of research during which time the 
anthropologists lived, worked and interacted with people in the local lan-
guage. Yet they differ from the dominant tradition of writing social sci-
ence books. Firstly they do not engage with the academic literatures on 
social media. It would be highly repetitive to have the same discussions 
in all nine books. Instead discussions of these literatures are to be found 
 
 
vi INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES WHY WE POST
in our comparative book, How the World Changed Social Media. Secondly 
these monographs are not comparative, which again is the primary func-
tion of this other volume. Thirdly, given the immense interest in social 
media from the general public, we have tried to write in an accessible and 
open style. This means we have adopted a mode more common in histor-
ical writing of keeping all citations and the discussion of all wider aca-
demic issues to endnotes. If you prefer to read above the line, each text 
offers a simple narrative about our findings. If you want to read a more 
conventional academic book that relates the material to its academic 
context, this can be done through engaging with the endnotes.
We hope you enjoy the results and that you will also read our com-
parative book – and perhaps some of the other monographs – in addition 
to this one.
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Introduction: Welcome to Mardin
One evening in late Spring, as on many other weekday evenings, 
Yağmur1 went to visit her aunt and three cousins, together with her 
mother and younger sister. The seven Arab women sat in the sitting room 
of a well-furnished house for more than five hours. They spoke about 
clothes, make-up and food. They gossiped, drank tea and ate fruit and 
sweets. Throughout the whole evening the young women of the family 
sat on the sofa, constantly using their smartphones to speak with their 
secret boyfriends (sevgili) right in front of their mothers and aunts, who 
were apparently ignoring what was going on. The two mothers may have 
imagined that their daughters might be flirting with boys, but they didn’t 
really care about this, as long as the relationship was kept private and 
silent and nobody talked about it.
Yağmur, aged 23, is an exuberant and friendly Arab woman from 
Mardin. She has a white Samsung Galaxy S5 that is always covered by 
fancy cases of different colours which she has bought in the course of her 
trips around Turkey. On her phone she uses Facebook for several hours 
every day, but she also uses Tango and, more rarely, Instagram. She uses 
Facebook as a very private channel of communication, mainly to com-
municate secretly with her boyfriend, but also as a box of hidden treas-
ures where she stores many pictures of herself hugging her boyfriend, 
pictures that were taken on one of the very few times they were able to 
meet privately face to face. These photos are visible only to her. She used 
to share them with her boyfriend until a few months before, when she 
stopped trusting him. Yağmur also uses Facebook to communicate with 
cousins and other family friends of her age, although she has unfriended 
most of her older relatives because they gossip too much. On social 
 
 
Social Media in SoutheaSt turkey2
media she portrays herself as a modern woman who, however, carefully 
behaves in accordance with the principles and morality of Islam: she has 
never used an image portraying her face as a public profile picture visible 
to strangers; she prefers religious or moral memes, verses from the Koran 
or political pictures supporting the AK political party2 and her beloved 
Prime Minister Erdoğan. Like the majority of her peers, she uses Facebook 
to show off and to be praised and appreciated by friends and relatives. 
For this reason she shares a lot of images portraying holiday trips and 
rich banquets with relatives and family friends. Yağmur is also quite pol-
itically and religiously active online:  she often shares material support-
ing the AKP and Islamic memes. Every week she wishes ‘Happy Friday’ 
(Hayırlı Cumalar)3 to her Facebook friends, as do many other inhabitants 
of Mardin. Like all of her relatives, Yağmur is an active AKP supporter. 
She is devoted to Prime Minister Erdoğan: ‘I love him because he brought 
economic development and wealth in the region and in Mardin, and also 
because I am Turk and Muslim, and I want to feel free to wear the veil in 
public spaces.’ Being an AKP supporter is a very important aspect of her 
character and identity. Whenever a particular national or international 
event becomes the topic of discussion, like the Gezi Park protests, the 
local election or the Israeli war against Gaza, she posts on Facebook many 
pro-Erdoğan and nationalist pictures and memes. Yağmur conforms to the 
dominant expectations of her society in public-facing social media while 
simultaneously enjoying the liberties offered by the more private online 
spaces.
This book is about social media use in Mardin, a medium-sized town 
in southeast Turkey, inhabited by a majority of Kurdish and Arab peoples. 
Mardin lies within sight of the Syrian border and the region has thereby 
been much in the news recently because of its proximity to the civil war, 
the advance of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) and the Kurdish strug-
gle against it. More generally, the topic of social media in Turkey will 
probably conjure up two different images for the reader: the Gezi Park 
protests of summer 2013, where social media was used as an efficient 
tool for political activism and became the focus for government suppres-
sion of that activism; and the YouTube and Twitter ban of March 2014, 
following the corruption scandal that undermined then-Prime Minister 
Erdoğan’s reputation a few weeks before the local election. These two 
stories have circulated widely in the international news. However, for 
reasons given in Chapter 6, this town was not affected by the Gezi Park 
protest, and the ban on Twitter and YouTube only remotely affected the 
lives of its inhabitants. Ordinary uses of social media of the form found 
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in Mardin and which make up most of the content of this book have 
rarely been in the spotlight.
I have been asked several times why I chose Mardin as a field site 
for my research. Local inhabitants of Mardin, Turks from western Turkey 
and foreigners were all surprised to discover that research about the 
use of social media was to be based in such a small place in a periph-
eral area. Studies about social media have traditionally focused on the 
large metropolitan centres such as Cairo, Tehran, Istanbul or New York, 
where ‘important things’, such as mass demonstrations or new forms of 
advanced capitalism, happen; much less has been said about the use of 
digital technologies in places that are not at the centre of global networks 
of culture and economy. There is often a tendency to imagine that the 
diffusion of the same digital technologies brings cultural homogenisation 
and leads to social transformations in the direction of a more modern, 
developed or democratic society.
Technological determinism often comes with a vision of modernity 
and development as a single trajectory. Given these premises, there is 
probably no need to study the use of social media in Mardin, as it will just 
follow after a time lag from what we know about metropolitan use, and 
will therefore be less interesting than these other sites which represent 
the vanguard of modern life.
However, this book is based on different assumptions. Anthropo-
logical studies have shown that the same technologies are used in quite 
different ways in different contexts and have different cultural and 
social consequences; there is no unique model of change or only one 
way of being modern. This study is indeed about social media and social 
change, and it investigates whether and to what extent social media has 
brought transformation, or whether it has rather reproduced social pat-
terns already existing in the offline world. The following pages are about 
continuities and transformations. This chapter is largely dedicated to the 
description of the field site, a town that has been transformed under the 
pressures of economic neoliberalism and urbanisation, especially those 
fostered by the AKP government of Turkey since 2002. Chapter 2 intro-
duces the media ecology of Mardin and argues that social media, the 
internet and mobile phones have led to a partial break with traditional 
family-bond sociality, whereas other media, such as TV and radio, have 
strengthened family ties. This chapter focuses on the materiality of the 
internet and mobile phones as contributing to new forms of individu-
alism and individual-based social relations. Chapter  3 analyses what 
people post on Facebook, which is the most used social media platform in 
Mardin. Here the results are somewhat less predictable. Social media has 
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created a new form of public space that in many ways is more conserva-
tive and traditional than offline worlds and reinforces groups such as fam-
ily and lineages as well as the individual. Nevertheless, showing off and 
achieving fame and popularity is so important that, despite resistance, 
people have ended up re-creating new norms that regulate the bound-
aries between the private and the public in the offline world. The shift-
ing of these boundaries has produced a new idea of ‘public’, characterised 
by a more visible presence of women, new images of private spaces and 
intimate domains, alongside these new public performances of conserva-
tive and religious values. Chapter 4 describes how social media has been 
used to maintain traditional kinship and family relations in the face of 
migration and urbanisation. This chapter portrays social media as a very 
important and useful communication tool to retain traditional kin rela-
tionships that have otherwise been undermined by the political and social 
changes of the last few decades. Chapter 5 can be seen as the opposite of 
the previous one, since it focuses on the consequences of the new private 
forms of communication opened up by social media, which have resulted 
in the creation of new kinds of premarital love and friendship relations 
that were less common in the past. In a highly gender-segregated soci-
ety, digital technologies constitute one of the few places where women 
and men can interact, flirt and experience romance. In this respect digital 
technologies in Mardin have altered relationships between genders, ideas 
of love and institutions of family and marriage. Chapter 6 deals with the 
topic of politics, in a region of Turkey that has a long history of conflict 
and political violence, and where social media and the internet are under 
State control. Social media are largely experienced as places under the 
surveillance of the State and of society, and self-censorship is an import-
ant force shaping its political use. Consequently online content regarded 
as political emerges and is expressed only under certain conditions.
These chapters focus on the role of social media in social transform-
ations (Chapters 2 and 5) and continuities (Chapter 4), or on both these 
opposing processes at the same time (Chapters 3 and 6). A central theme 
linking all these chapters and constituting the perspective through which 
this volume examines social change is the relationship between the pri-
vate and the public. Social media consists at the same time of both very 
private and very public environments, along with the many spaces that 
stand between the two. This is one of the reasons why the social change 
brought by social media is not a linear and uniform process, but is rather 
the combination of conflictual and opposite transformations. This book 
will indeed show that more public social media, like Facebook walls, are 
very conservative spaces where the traditional norms ruling offline life 
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are reinforced and strengthened. This is because public-facing social 
media are constantly under the gaze of family, neighbours and friends, 
more so than offline public spaces such as streets or cafes, whereas more 
private online spaces are often used to create and maintain new types of 
social relationship that break with existing social norms and traditional 
family ties.
For example, private social media has led to new, individual-based 
forms of socialisation and has facilitated forbidden love and romance. 
On social media women and men can create and maintain their own 
relationships as individuals, free from the constraints of family and 
society ruling the offline world. Offline these same individuals tend to 
exist as members of kin groups, and their role, identity and behaviour 
are mainly prescribed by attributes such as gender and age. In the off-
line world, women especially tend not to have much autonomy, and 
their choices are highly dependent on those of their older male family 
members. To a lesser extent and in different ways, this is also true for 
young men. Smartphones have become places of secrets where young 
adults such as Yağmur store private photos and conversations, memes 
and memories, outside of family control. All these elements could 
support the argument that social media are liberating tools that have 
facilitated the expression of repressed desires and the creation of more 
individual-based social relations. Berry Wellman and Lee Rainie called 
these transformations a movement towards ‘networked individualism’ 
in their recent book and other articles.4 Some of the examples in this 
book will support their arguments. In Mardin, social media has brought 
about just these kinds of transformation towards a society where people 
are ‘networked as individuals rather than embedded in groups’,5 and 
where groups have less power in defining the identities and behaviours 
of individuals. In the context of modern Muslim Turkey, these elements 
are understood as ‘Western’, secular and modern. To this extent, the 
findings seem to sustain a linear vision of social change.
However, these transformations towards more individualised 
forms of sociality happen mainly on a secret and hidden level. People do 
not recognise these new relations and individualities as legitimate, and 
they do not display them in public. In Mardin, as in many other places of 
the Muslim Middle East, the boundaries between public and private have 
always been carefully policed. For example, the intimate and domestic 
spaces of the house have always been well delimited and protected from 
the gaze of outsiders. On Facebook, people have started to display in pub-
lic pictures from their everyday lives that have traditionally belonged to 
private domains: dinners with family members and gatherings in private 
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spaces, for example, or the new visibility of women, whose public pres-
ence has always been limited and controlled. Yet the most significant 
finding is that even in these new online public spaces characterised by 
the intrusion of the intimate and the domestic, people perform selves, 
social relations and values that have traditional legitimacy in their soci-
ety. Women and men on Facebook display and exhibit only that which 
confers on them honour, respectability, fame and popularity. In order to 
do so they conform to conservative and traditional social norms. Thus a 
social change towards a more individual-based society and an individual-
ised self in private comes simultaneously with the performance of highly 
conservative and traditional norms in the new online public space, which 
has progressively incorporated scenes from the domestic and intimate 
domains. Furthermore, social media has also been used extensively to 
maintain contacts with family members dispersed around Turkey and 
abroad, leading to a strengthening of family and tribal ties that would 
have been threatened by this dispersal. So, in direct contrast to the move-
ment from a group-bond society towards individualism, we find a public 
reaffirmation of the importance of groups such as family, tribe and eth-
nicity, which become viable again partly thanks to social media. We also 
see a reaffirmation of Muslim values of female purity and modesty and 
traditional ideals of male honour.
The social change brought by social media in Mardin is clearly 
contradictory, but, in that, it also reflects the transformations that were 
already going on in the historical and political moment of the research. 
Social media provides part of a solution to the disruptive impacts of mod-
ernisation, urbanisation and migration, enabling the reproduction and 
the continuation of traditional social forms, and at the same time, it cre-
ates new kinds of social relations. Southeast Turkey has recently gone 
through significant urbanisation, an expansion of the neoliberal econ-
omy and an extension of women’s education and access to the job mar-
ket. Then, especially during the 1980s and ’90s, the region was affected 
by extensive, sometimes forced, migration from villages to metropol-
itan areas. This context helps to explain the contradictions in the conse-
quences of social media use.
This ethnographical study based in a medium-sized town in south-
east Turkey aims to highlight the distinctiveness of social media in this 
region of the world. Most scholarship on digital media has focused on 
European and North American contexts, whereas studies about social 
media in Turkey or the Middle East have mainly been limited to politics, 
organisation of protests or surveillance.6 Very little is known of the every-
day ordinary experience of social media users in this part of the world.7 
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This book is intended to fill this gap, contributing to our understanding 
of the consequences of social media and digital technologies as culturally 
and historically grounded.
This is the second monograph to appear in a series of nine. It is 
important to note that the conclusions of this book are almost the oppos-
ite of those of the first monograph about an English village.8 In our 
comparative book, How the World Changed Social Media,9 we offer a def-
inition of social media as scalable sociality. This reflects the development 
of social media as the colonisation of the space between a prior duality 
of public broadcast media and private conversation. In the case of the 
English village this raised important issues, because the English popula-
tion used this new facility to create gradations of closeness and intimacy 
along these scales. In this book, we shall see that people in Mardin also 
create different gradations and groups, but, by contrast, they use social 
media mostly for ‘very private’ and ‘very public’ online communication, 
and this in turn extends the distinction between private and public. This 
is not at all what one might have guessed would be the response to social 
media as scalable sociality, and it once again demonstrates that we can-
not predict how a new set of technologies will be appropriated locally.
Mardin
The city of Mardin is an unusual and unique place within Turkey. It is a 
multi-ethnic and multi-religion city located 30 km away from the border 
with Syria and around 250 km from the border with Iraq, in the middle 
of the Kurdish region of Turkey.
SYRIA IRAQ
GEORGIA
IR
AN
TURKEY
BULGARIA
ARMENIA
Fig. 1.1 Location of Mardin in Turkey
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Located on the top and at the bottom of a hill in front of the 
Mesopotamian plain, Mardin is an enclave of an Arabic-speaking minor-
ity within a largely Kurdish region. This means that, far from being just a 
‘Turkish’ field site, many of my ethnographic observations are likely also 
to be relevant to other ‘Middle Eastern’ societies.
The primary population is split between Arabs and Kurds,10 but 
there are also Syriac Orthodox, Catholic Armenians, Turks and, more 
recently, a considerable number of Syrian and Yezidi refugees. The city 
has around 87,000 inhabitants and is divided into three parts:  the old 
city (Eski Mardin), the slum (Gecekondu) and the new city (Yenişehir). 
The old city is the historical part of the town, with historical buildings, 
mosques and churches, and is inhabited mainly by Arabs, along with a 
smaller number of Syriac families and Kurds; with the expansion of the 
new city, this has mainly become the low-income residential area and it 
now includes a number of Syrian refugees.
The poorest neighbourhood (Gecekondu) surrounds the old city and 
is occupied mainly by Kurdish migrants. They escaped from the violence 
afflicting villages in the 1980s and 90s during the conflict between the 
State and the Kurdish nationalist group struggling for greater Kurdish 
rights and self-determination within Turkey – the PKK.11
Fig. 1.2 View of the Mesopotamian valley from the old city of Mardin
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The new city (Yenişehir), where most of the research was based, 
is the wealthiest part. Building started around 20  years ago and has 
expanded mostly in the last 10 years.
Fig. 1.4 The suburban area
Fig. 1.3 Partial view of the old city
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Fig. 1.5 Mardin, the new city
(a) (b)
Fig. 1.6 Construction sites in the new city of Mardin
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In Mardin, Kurdish and Arabic are commonly spoken, along with 
Turkish, which in the new city has become increasingly common in public 
spaces, especially among the youth. Arriving in Mardin from the nearby 
cities, the uniqueness of the city clearly stands out in contrast to the rest 
of Turkey and the region. To the east, the poorer provinces of Siirt, Şırnak 
and Hakkari are the heart of the Kurdish region of Turkey: people wear 
traditional Kurdish clothes more often and speak Kurdish more frequently, 
and buildings, streets and infrastructures are visibly less developed. To 
the north, Diyarbakır is a large urban centre considered the capital of 
the Kurdish region of Turkey, which has expanded enormously in the last 
20 years as a result of migration from the surrounding rural areas. To the 
west, the large city of Urfa is also an important Kurdish centre with a major-
ity Kurdish population. In Mardin, historical influences of Arab, Syriac and 
Artuklu12 are very evident, not only in the local architecture, which has 
also made it a tourist attraction, but also in the language and the lifestyles 
of its inhabitants. But just as in the rest of southeast Turkey, the Turks in 
Mardin are largely confined to a small minority of public employees.
The image of the city portrayed by the State, local institutions, 
tourist agencies, the media and some of its own inhabitants refers to the 
ideal of cosmopolitanism and happy coexistence of different ethnic and 
religious groups. However, the city has experienced numerous conflicts 
and political violence in its history, especially after the foundation of 
the Turkish Republic, with the development of the Turkish nationalistic 
project based on the notion of ‘Turkishness’ and the denial of religious, 
ethnic and language minorities.13 Different ethnic and religious groups 
have built different relations with the State, producing diverse forms of 
political identity. During the Ottoman Empire, the Sunni Muslim Arabs 
were the local representatives of the Ottoman authorities, and during the 
Turkish Republic they continued to be loyal to the State and to support it, 
thus maintaining their privileges. In contrast, the Sunni Muslim Kurds, 
organised in nomadic tribes, have always been more reluctant to be sub-
jected to governmental authorities.14 The Catholic Armenians were killed 
or deported during the genocide in 1915, and only a very few families 
remain in the city. The Syriac Christian Orthodox, who were also victims 
of genocide have generally migrated abroad, after the foundation of the 
Republic and especially since the 1950s, and they now constitute a small 
minority. The most severe conflicts were experienced in the 1980s and 
90s, when the struggle between the Turkish State and the PKK exploded. 
During the 2000s different truces were declared, and in 2012 a peace pro-
cess was started, but was interrupted in the summer of 2015, the time of 
writing this book.
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I chose Mardin because I felt that the study of social media usage in 
a place characterised by the coexistence of different groups in a (post)-
conflict area might disclose important discoveries regarding the political 
implications of social media. It also followed my own interest in politics 
and political anthropology, having previously written a PhD on the topic of 
online journalism and foreign correspondents in Lebanon. However, the 
project did not proceed according to this plan. In the light of 15 months’ 
ethnographic research, it seems that the most interesting outcomes were 
related not to the outstanding peculiarity of Mardin and the current rela-
tionships between its ethnic minorities, but to what the city has in com-
mon with many other places in this geographic area. These are the impacts 
of social media on gender differences that can be found in many Muslim 
societies, and how social media is entangled with processes of urbanisa-
tion and economic development. In Mardin, both Arabs and Kurds are 
Sunni Muslims and live according to social norms of gender segregation 
that are similar to those of many other Middle Eastern Muslim countries 
and provincial areas across Turkey. In the last 10 years, in conjunction 
with the economic growth of the country, the city of Mardin has expanded 
rapidly. The Turkish economic boom has brought more wealth to those 
cities within the Kurdish region of Turkey that have been loyal to the gov-
ernment. This has resulted in the expansion of the building and indus-
trial sectors. The extension of the State bureaucracy has brought new job 
opportunities and has created a new ‘middle class’ of State employees. My 
research has therefore focused on this growing young generation of more 
affluent Kurds and Arabs who live in the new part of the expanding city. 
For the sake of simplicity, I purposely decided not to include the old and 
the new minorities that inhabit the city, and I apologise for their absence 
from this book. The Christian population would have required a differ-
ent analysis, as would the many Turkish public employees that have come 
to Mardin from other areas of Turkey. The recent Syrian refugees,15 who 
mainly dwell in the oldest crumbling buildings of the town, have not been 
included in the research either, although they have increasingly come to 
be part of the city, many of them exploited as construction workers, dish-
washers or sex workers. Syrians were generally seen by the inhabitants of 
Mardin as backward Arabs, derided for their lack of style, blamed for the 
increased cost of houses, tolerated as poor victims of war or more often 
ignored and made invisible.16 Clearly this situation would have required 
its own engagement rather than merely becoming an add-on to my estab-
lished research.
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History, politics and the Kurdish ascent
Mardin has always been at the crossroads of trades, different peoples 
and different religions. Prior to the invasion of the Arabs and the 
Turks, the region was inhabited by Armenians, Jews, Arabs, Kurds and 
Syriacs.17 At the end of the Umayyad dynasty in the eleventh century, 
a Turkish population, the Artuklu, arrived in Mardin and governed for 
a few centuries before the arrival of the Ottomans. In those years, the 
city became an important trade centre and developed extensively.18 The 
Artuklu architecture has also created some of the finest buildings within 
the old city and has made Mardin an important tourist site. In 1514, the 
Ottomans conquered the region and, under their rule, Mardin continued 
to remain an important political and economic centre whose economy 
was based on trade and agriculture.19 The city started to decline after 
the end of the Ottoman Empire, with the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic and the drawing of the borders with Syria and Iraq.20 In 1915 
the Armenian massacre that took place throughout the whole region was 
particularly cruel in Mardin, which had a large Armenian population, 
and it was followed by the mass migration of Syriac and Armenians to 
Europe and other countries in the Middle East.21 Kurds in Mardin have 
memories of this massacre and they are quite ready to recognise their 
responsibilities.
The Arabs, having consolidated their power during the Ottoman 
Empire by supporting the Ottoman authorities, continued in the same 
vein during the first period of the Turkish Republic, implementing the new 
State laws and rules, and helping transform Mardin into a secular and mod-
ern place which reflected the politics of Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the 
Turkish Republic. In this way, they kept their economic and political privi-
leges.22 By contrast, the Kurds found themselves in a new nation where reli-
gious and language minorities did not have a legitimate space and became 
even more marginalised and suppressed. The conflict between the Kurds 
and State forces has had lasting effects on people’s lives, for example in the 
general mistrust people have towards others in their everyday relationships. 
In the last decade, the Arabs of Mardin have started to lose their power and 
privileges in the face of a new, more influential role for the Kurds at the 
national and local level. The governing AK party began negotiations with 
the Kurdish population that continued during the time of my field work, but 
stopped in summer 2015 when Ankara decided to end the peace process.23 
The reforms of the last decade temporarily calmed the tense relations and 
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resulted in increased opportunities to improve the economic conditions and 
the political role of the Kurds. In the 1980s and ’90s in Mardin the Kurds 
typically settled in the poorest neighbourhoods surrounding the city cen-
tre, while in the last decade they have started to become regular inhabit-
ants of the developed and rich part of the town. ‘The Arabs are afraid of 
us now. They had the power for so many years, but now it’s different. They 
are afraid of us because we are more powerful’ was a statement I was told 
by numerous Kurdish friends in the city of Mardin. The Kurdish ascent in 
Mardin reached its height and cathartic moment at the end of March 2014, 
when the Kurdish political party BDP (Bariş ve demokrasi Partisi – Peace 
and Democracy Party) won the local election for the first time in the his-
tory of the city. Up to that point, Mardin had always been ruled by the 
pro-government parties supported by the Arabs. That day, thousands of 
Kurds and BDP supporters were out in the streets expressing their happi-
ness at the result of the local elections, while the Arabs remained closed in 
their houses mourning such a humiliating defeat. This happened when the 
peace process was still alive and people felt that non-violence and peaceful 
relations would characterise future relations between Kurds and Arabs. But 
at the time of writing this book, the new political course may have started a 
new phase in the life of the city.
Despite all this, at first glance Mardin appeared a peaceful place; 
every time I started a conversation with new people, I was told: ‘Mardin 
is a unique place where Kurds, Arabs and Syriacs, Muslims and Christians 
happily live together.’ In public spaces, people do not talk about politics in 
order to make this cohabitation possible and peaceful. Things are very dif-
ferent in the private spaces of their houses, where Arabs, Kurds and Syriac 
Christians are free to express their disdain, or even occasionally hatred, 
for the other groups. So the sharp distinctions between private and public 
social media that dominate this volume have clear precedents in these prior 
offline contrasts. During the first months in the field, talking about politics 
was almost impossible for me, and political conversation only became pos-
sible when I became much closer to people and conversations were clearly 
confidential. The silence surrounding politics paused only with the begin-
ning of the political campaign for the local election of March 2014, when 
most of the public spaces were used for heated political propaganda.
Stereotypes and prejudices about Arabs and Kurds are many. Arabs 
are usually described by Kurds as rich people interested in power and 
money, without their own political ideas. They are seen as lazy opportun-
ists who do not like hard work:  ‘Look, for example, at the bakers. Until 
10 years ago, before the town was populated by the Kurds, the bakeries 
closed very early in the afternoon because they don’t like working! Now 
because the Kurdish bakeries are open until the evening, they had to do 
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the same.’ Arab men and women are also described as obsessively passion-
ate about food and meat, and they are sometimes derogatorily referred 
to using the Arab expression lahme (meat). In these derogatory portraits 
and stereotypes, food represents the approach Arabs have towards power 
and possession, characterised by greediness and voracity. Arab women 
are portrayed as modern and beautiful, interested in clothes, make-up 
and food. On the other side, Kurds are described by Arabs as backward 
rural migrants, retrograde, ignorant, not developed, obstinate like sheep, 
poor, aggressive, always ready to fight, and only recently developing in 
the direction of a more modern lifestyle.
However, it’s by no means the case that every relationship and 
interaction between Arabs and Kurds is dominated by dislike, antipathy 
and divisions. Different forms of sociality and friendship between Arabs 
and Kurds do exist, and cases of intermarriages and friendships are com-
mon, even if always characterised by some difficulties. My Kurdish and 
Arab friends told me several times: ‘I have both Arab and Kurdish friends, 
but friendships with them are always characterised by a sort of barrier. 
We talk and we drink tea together, but there is something between us 
that keeps the distance, we never become really close.’ Moreover, the bor-
der between these two contrasting social and political forces cohabiting 
in Mardin is more blurred than is commonly thought: some Arab fam-
ilies support the Kurdish movement and the Kurdish party BDP,24 and 
some Kurdish families back the government party AKP. In the 1980s and 
’90s, a few Arab families joined the Kurdish cause, motivated by leftist 
and Marxist ideas and desires for social justice. Other Arab families, for 
their own economic interests, started to support the BDP a few months 
before the local elections in 2014, when they knew that the BDP had a 
good chance of winning, whereas some Kurdish families in Mardin have 
backed the AKP, especially after the beginning of the peace process.
The few academic articles about Mardin have focused on issues of 
contested representations. Kerem Oktem25 examines the struggles over 
different discourses, symbols and images: the State, tourist agencies and 
some of its inhabitants have produced a ‘poetic vision of the city’. Several 
Turkish TV serials and films produced in the last decades have given an 
Orientalist view of the city that portrays the image of Mardin as a ‘trad-
itional’ place with ‘feudal’ violence, as opposed to the developed and 
modern west of Turkey. Human rights organisations have defined the city 
as traumatised as a result of the conflict between the State and the PKK. 
Zerrin Özel Biner26 examined the reaction to the candidacy of Mardin 
as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. However, what these have in com-
mon is a view focused only on the ‘old city’, because the ‘new city’ was 
demographically irrelevant until a decade ago, and also less appealing 
 
 
 
Social Media in SoutheaSt turkey16
to tourists and TV producers. By contrast, my research was carried out 
precisely in this new and modern part of the city, locally called Yenişehir, 
which has developed over the last 15 years.
The new city of Mardin
The new city of Mardin, located at the foot of the Mardin hill, is a 
fast-growing and largely uncontrolled modern development, with 
high-rise buildings and new construction sites everywhere, and full of 
dust and sand.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 1.7 Views of the new city
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There is one main polluted and dusty road connecting the two cit-
ies of Diyarbakır and Midyat. For eight months of the year, the smaller 
streets are crowded and full of shops and life. The summer months are 
simply too hot, reaching over 40°C, while in midwinter the area can be 
covered in snow.
People are attracted to the modern shops, markets, schools, cafes 
and restaurants. Women in particular are searching for comforts like 
proper running water and heating systems, and indoor kitchens and 
bathrooms. This was also the dream of modernity and middle-class 
living standards that emerged in the metropolitan areas of (western) 
Turkey in the 1990s.
The new city is inhabited by the inhabitants of the old city who 
started to arrive in the late 1990s, by people who moved from the 
nearby towns of the province, and by Turkish and Kurdish civil serv-
ants (memur) and university students. By the end of my field work in 
August 2014, there were also Syrian and Yezidi refugees. Unlike the 
old city, here different ethnic groups generally share the same build-
ings and the same streets, and this is unique within a province where 
towns have always been formed in ethnically homogeneous neighbour-
hoods. There are no official census reports, but Kurds are more common 
here than in the old city, where Arabs are the majority. In the new city, 
Arab culture is not hegemonic; people speak Turkish more than Arabic 
or Kurdish, and the choice of Turkish by the new generation often 
expresses a desire of modernity.
Middle-aged women and men describe the expansion of the new 
modern city through the nostalgic opposition between the previous sta-
ble family and community and a new, more fragmented society. Certainly, 
in the new city, social relations have changed faster than in the rest of 
the province, especially in relation to the possibilities for women and the 
consumer aspirations of both genders. In the less urbanised and poorer 
areas of the province and region, as well as in the old city of Mardin, 
women spend most of their time at home; most do not use the internet, 
and social media is associated with men looking for women. Selecting 
the modern new city as the principal field site allowed for a greater focus 
on these ongoing social transformations.
The city of Mardin stands out as the modern provincial capital with 
three hospitals, 23 bank offices, 14 insurance offices and 19 high schools 
used by people from all around the province. The whole province has 
experienced demographic27 and economic growth in recent years. This 
includes a new airport terminal, and a new intercity bus terminal is under 
construction. In 2007/2008 a new state university was inaugurated, and 
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since 2011 a large shopping mall has attracted customers from the 
whole region. Agriculture produces 70 per cent of provincial income. It 
is based on a large landowner system and produces wheat, barley, corn, 
red lentils and cotton.28 Industrialisation in Mardin started in the 1990s, 
and mainly concerns agricultural production, such as the production of 
flour, bulgur and animal feed.29 Depending on political circumstances, 
Iraq and Syria are both potentially important markets. Agriculture-based 
enterprises in Mardin are typically small and medium-sized 
family-based outfits, and the whole economic field is built on family 
structure.30
Behind this lies the economic development of Turkey as a whole, 
and the AKP’s attempt to strengthen its position in the southeast by 
developing the region and extending public services and infrastructure. 
A commonly heard expression is that ‘Mardin is a city of civil servants! 
Everybody is a public employee in this building!’ This reflects the large 
number of public employees such as teachers, accountants, nurses, vets, 
doctors and policemen who work in the small centres and towns of the 
province but live in the new city. This group also constitutes the main 
presence of Turkish people within the town.
Yag˘mur, Leyla and Seçkin, the inhabitants  
of the new city
I will now introduce three characters who, of course, cannot be represen-
tative, but may help to humanise this rather abstract introduction to the 
new city of Mardin.
Yag˘mur, who we already met in the opening of the chapter, is one 
of the many original inhabitants of Mardin. She was born in the region of 
Hatay, where her family had migrated in the 1970s. They moved to the 
new city of Mardin in the mid 1990s when she was a baby and the new city 
was first being developed. Her grandfather was a tailor who had decided 
to move to Hatay with his family to look for better job opportunities as he 
didn’t have enough work to support his family in Mardin. He ended up 
being a factory worker in the metal sector for more than 20 years until the 
age of 50, when he retired and returned to Mardin with the whole family. 
Yağmur is employed in the small office of an insurance company. She is 
proud of the fact that she found this job thanks to the patronage network 
of her family (torpil), which showed that her family was well connected in 
the town. Arabs in Mardin can usually find jobs in the private sector more 
easily than Kurds, thanks to their family networks. Immediately after 
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high school Yağmur started to work as a shop assistant (one of the 
worst-paid jobs in town and in all of Turkey), but after a few years she 
found this better-paid job. Like many other young Arab women from 
Mardin, she didn’t go to university, which was not seen as effective in 
finding a job:  social capital can provide better job opportunities and a 
higher salary than a university degree. And anyway, as a woman, she 
does not have the responsibility of earning good money to maintain a 
family; a decent job with regular income is the best way to fund her daily 
living expenses while waiting to get married. Yağmur is a modern woman 
with modern ‘middle-class’ living standards.  She likes hanging out in 
cafes and eating meals in restaurants; in summer she goes on holiday 
to a relative’s house by the sea, and she is always well dressed. After her 
9-to-5 job, she often meets some of her numerous cousins or relatives at 
their houses or sometimes in cafes. With two aunts and two uncles on 
her mother’s side, and four uncles on her father’s side, she is always sur-
rounded by many cousins and cousins’ children, with whom she spends 
a long time chatting. She has only a few friends from school with whom 
she is still in touch, but she rarely meets them, and friends from work she 
meets only at work. She knows many people in Mardin and whenever she 
walks in the streets of Yenişehir she always says hello to everybody.
She defines herself as a good Muslim, but not too religious, as 
she does not pray five times a day. Before the beginning of Ramadan 
she decided to wear the veil:  ‘I feel ready for this now. It’s my personal 
choice, I feel more mature now and I want to better observe God’s wish.’ 
Because she thinks the quality of clothes in Mardin is not as good as that 
in Istanbul, she spent a few days looking for a nice veil on some fash-
ionable shops’ websites, and then she bought an expensive and beautiful 
one. A malicious friend suggested that she had decided to cover herself 
to find a husband more easily: ‘That is the reason why young women start 
wearing the veil in Mardin, there aren’t other reasons!’ Like the majority 
of young women in Mardin, Yağmur has a secret boyfriend who is hidden 
to her male relatives but not to her mother and sisters. She was waiting 
for him to find a job and ask her to get married, but her boyfriend’s older 
brother and uncle, who knew about the relationship, have not accepted it 
because Yağmur was not pious and religious enough.
Yağmur does not like Kurds and she does not have Kurdish 
friends: ‘When I meet some Kurdish school friends in the street I say hello, 
of course! But we never hang out together, we never call each other on 
the phone, we never eat together. And on Facebook it is the same. I have 
Kurdish friends on Facebook but we never talk! I do not like them; they 
are dirty!’ She does not like Syrian refugees and she avoids restaurants 
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with Syrian waitresses and cooks, which have become common in 
Mardin since the beginning of the war. She does not like the Arabs living 
in Arab countries, and she started to hate black people after she met one 
African man who was selling sunglasses in Mardin. She also does not like 
‘Western Christian Europeans’ or North Americans because they are not 
Muslims. But she made an exception for Italians like myself, because they 
are Mediterranean and thus more similar to Turks.
Leyla is a newcomer into Mardin Yenişehir. She is a 26-year-old 
unmarried Arab woman who has lived in Mardin with her family for 
three years, having grown up in Kızıltepe, a town 30 km away from 
Mardin. Her father has two wives, two houses and ten children. His first 
wife lives in a flat in Mardin Yenişehir with Leyla and her brothers and 
sisters, while his second wife lives with three more children in their vil-
lage, where they own a small piece of land. The two wives had been liv-
ing with all their children in the same house in Kızıltepe, but eventually 
they could no longer manage the cohabitation and decided to separate. 
Leyla only completed education to elementary school level. In the 1990s, 
women living in rural areas rarely completed formal schooling: in fact, 
her two older sisters did not even finish primary school, though her two 
younger sisters have completed high school, and the youngest is prepar-
ing for the admission exam to enter university. When I  first met Leyla 
she was walking around Mardin Yenişehir with her sister after visiting 
some relatives. In those days she was extremely bored because she was 
spending most of her time at home, making food for the family, some-
times visiting relatives, and waiting for some decent man to ask for her 
hand in marriage. She did not feel well integrated into the city and, 
although she had many relatives there, becoming friends with other local 
women was almost impossible for her, because they were too snobbish. 
For Leyla and her family it was not appropriate for women to have a job; 
it was shameful. But at the same time, being at home all day was really 
frustrating. So after being exposed to the modern life of the city and to 
a different model of femininity, and also because they were in need of 
money, Leyla started to work, first as a shop assistant and later as a clean-
ing lady. Her life started to change: she discovered a new world beyond 
that of the extended family. She started to have new local friends, to hang 
out in cafes, to use social media and to (secretly) flirt with a boy. Before 
working, Leyla and her sisters had considered social media immoral and 
inappropriate for respectable women. When I  first tried to talk about 
social media with them while sitting in a cafe (çay bahçesi), they silenced 
me and they felt completely embarrassed. ‘Talking about social media in 
public is shameful (ayıp) for women’, she murmured to me. Later, she 
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changed her mind and opened a Facebook and a WhatsApp account. 
The reason for this transformation in Leyla’s life will be explained in 
Chapter 5, where we’ll discover that love has been the driving force that 
has vanquished any moral and religious concerns and made her a social 
media user.
Seçkin is a Kurdish mathematics teacher in his early 30s, who has 
lived in Mardin for eight years. Although the public employees living in 
Mardin come from many different regions around Turkey, my research 
focused only on the Kurdish population, since it was felt that working 
with both Kurds and Arabs was sufficiently complex. Seçkin is one of 
these Kurdish public servants. He is from a small town in the province 
of Diyarbakır, one hour away from Mardin. Like many other Kurds of his 
generation, he grew up in a large and poor family with nine siblings, a 
housewife mother and a father employed as a construction worker. Yet, 
out of ten children, eight have a university degree or are university stu-
dents; three became civil servants after passing the dreaded examination 
that grants a job for life as a public employee in Turkey. Seçkin, like many 
other Kurds in their 20s and 30s, has benefited from the economic growth 
of Turkey and its free education system to improve his social conditions. 
He now has a decent salary, a second job as a football teacher and a third 
job as a musician, as he plays guitar for tourists in the touristic restaurants 
of Mardin. He has now saved enough money to get married as soon as he 
finds the right woman.
Seçkin proudly defines himself as a Kurd. Like many other people of 
his age who grew up in the Kurdish region of Turkey in the 1980s and ’90s, 
he has been exposed to many forms of political violence. Many of his friends 
and relatives have been killed by Turkish soldiers or gendarme, or have 
been arrested and tortured in jails. Many others decided to go to the moun-
tains and fight with the PKK. He reads a lot and he has clear ideas about 
the Kurdish issue in Turkey and in the region, but he is not actively involved 
in politics. As a civil servant, he is not free to express his political ideas 
publicly, either on or offline. Political activism might result in him losing 
his job. He looks at western Turkish society in a very contradictory way: he 
consistently presents himself as a modern person, free from the backward 
restrictions of Kurdish society, like obeying his parents’ will in terms of 
marriage choices, or maintaining connections with the extended family. 
In summer he likes to go clubbing in Antalya and Istanbul. Yet, at the same 
time, he continuously manifests the need to be recognised as a Kurd; he 
keeps pointing out his Kurdish identity, and he often expresses his desires 
for an independent Kurdistan. Seçkin uses Facebook quite a lot on his new 
iPhone, mainly to promote himself as a musician and football coach, but 
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also to discreetly flirt with girls. He very rarely refers to politics in his public 
postings. He considers social media a very useful tool to expand his social 
network and popularity, something that in this case immediately translates 
into more opportunities for earning money. The case of Seçkin illustrates 
the way social media is effectively used to fulfil aspirations for individual 
success. He is a popular figure among young educated ‘middle-class’ adults 
in Mardin, and social media partly contributed to this. Seçkin represents 
the way Turkish State policies, economic development and social control in 
the southeastern region have contributed to the assimilation of the Kurdish 
population into Turkish society and Turkish State administration, but have 
not diminished their identification as Kurds.
This plurality will be a major feature of this book because social 
media has often drawn lines by increasing political and ethnic inequali-
ties, and providing a stage where some Mardinites can publicly perform 
their political and religious identities more than others. Yet, at the same 
time, social media represents a new shared experience in the growth of 
new private communicative practices that have emerged in similar ways 
across this spectrum of different groups. Courtship, flirting, romance and 
love are not especially different among young Kurds, Arabs, religious and 
secular individuals. Potentially, then, this provides common ground, and 
an ‘assurance of shared sociality’.31
Household, family and gender roles  
in the new city
The expansion of the new city and education brought significant trans-
formations to the family, the household and the role of women. In the new 
city, households are nuclear and neatly divided from each other, while 
people in the old buildings of the old city used to live in proximity to their 
extended family. In the new city, houses are impressively uniform with 
the same dimensions and shape: a big lounge, a kitchen, two bedrooms, 
a second sitting room that can be used as a third bedroom and two toilets. 
The only distinction is age, with low-income families living in the oldest 
properties. New houses can cost up to TRY 400,000 (Turkish lira, around 
GBP 100,000), which is quite high for this region. The Arab word el-beit (the 
house) in the old city referred to the house of a family and, at the same time, 
to the lineage (families descended from the same ancestors) living in that 
neighbourhood. In the new city, where relatives very rarely live close to each 
other, the loss of communal and inter-family solidarities is often the subject 
of nostalgia amongst the middle-aged and older. Despite some resistance, 
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overall this shift from extended family to nuclear households has occurred 
smoothly through the relocation of young people into the new city.
At the same time, traditional kin affiliations remain important 
among Arabs and Kurds, and social media have played an important role 
in the maintenance of these family ties.32 The Kurds have traditionally 
been organised into nomadic tribes (aşiret), which in a few cases are still 
vital and operative; their members recognise the power of their chieftain 
(ağa), and they are ready to support each other in the case of conflicts and 
problems. Where the tribe has lost political authority, Kurds still main-
tain strong ties with distant relatives, like great-aunts and great-uncles, 
second or third cousins, and their children. The Arabs from Mardin are 
organised in lineages (sülale), groups descended through the pater-
nal line33 that include families with common male ancestries; but these 
maintain more autonomy from each other than is the case with Kurdish 
tribes, as they are not under the authority of any one leader, nor do they 
share common obligations as members of the same lineage. The Arabs 
from Mardin have also been more assimilated by the modernisation pro-
cesses that started with the founding of the Turkish Republic. For them, 
modern nuclear families tend to be seen as the ideal model. Arabs tend to 
maintain close relationships with first-degree relatives (cousins, uncles, 
aunts, nephews and nieces), but less so with more distant relatives. Urban 
Arab families usually have between two and four children, in contrast to 
Kurdish families that traditionally had up to 10 or 12 children, though 
the new generation of Kurds living in the new city has fewer children. 
Although households in the new city are nuclear, most people continue to 
remain close to their extended family, which is their most important social 
network. Social life is based on family rather than between individuals. 
So teenagers and young adults spend more time with siblings and cousins 
than with friends. Friends are never seen as completely trustworthy and 
they always constitute a potential threat; men are much more likely to 
have large networks of male friends beyond the family than are women.
In the new city, men and women are more educated, and the num-
ber of women with a university degree is rapidly increasing. In 2012 only 
99 women aged 50–54 from the urban areas of Mardin had a university 
degree, but 3,057 of those aged 25–29 did.34 While gender relations in the 
old city, with its lower levels of income and education, remain traditional, 
women in the new city mix more freely in public spaces. There remains, 
however, a powerful sense of male domination and a fear of women caus-
ing shame (ayıp) that will impact on the family, through inappropriate 
dress or relationships with males. Men also retain a conformist model of 
masculinity based on honour, strength, dominion and bravery. Marriage 
 
 
 
Social Media in SoutheaSt turkey24
is also changing:  the traditional system of arranged marriage (Görücü 
usulü evlilik) that dominated until recently is now less frequent than mar-
riages for love, even if families often publicly present the latter as though 
they were arranged. Educated young women and men actively refuse 
arranged marriages, which they regard as a sign of backwardness.
Methodology
This book is based on traditional ethnographic methods. I spent 15 months 
in Mardin between April 2013 and August 2014, including two month-long 
breaks. The research started a few months before the rise of the Gezi Park 
protests in June 2013 that led to governmental propaganda against social 
media and reinforced the government’s conspiracy theory, according 
to which many European countries were backing and supporting the 
protesters in order to damage Turkey’s economy and political stability. This 
anti-social media propaganda intensified during the political campaign 
before the administrative election in March 2014, when YouTube and 
Twitter were used to discredit the reputation of Prime Minister Erdoğan. 
In this political climate, as a European researcher working on social media 
in the Kurdish region of Turkey, I was often accused by locals of being a 
spy working for the UK secret services. In some cases this prevented me 
from creating relationships of trust. Even some of my closest friends, after 
15 months, were sure that I was an agent of some European government 
collecting information about social media that would be used in some 
future involvement within Turkish and Middle Eastern politics. Despite 
this, I  was able to forge many good relationships. When I  arrived in 
Mardin a couple of people I already knew introduced me to new people 
and helped me to extend my social network. Thanks to the hospitality 
and generosity of many individuals and families, I  could in turn meet 
others who would help me collect further observations and information. 
I  introduced myself as an Italian researcher working for a university in 
London. This provided for an alternative association, this time with the 
foreign professors working in the new local university that had opened a 
few years earlier. This made everything smoother. As a foreigner, without 
any local affiliation, I was able to gain access to all the different ethnic and 
political groups living in the town. When asked about my political views, 
I tried to avoid such issues when with people who would not have approved 
of my views. As a woman, I also had the opportunity to have access to the 
worlds of both men and women, which would not have been possible for 
a man. Obviously, I  had more confidential and close relationships with 
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women, and this is clearly visible in the outcomes of the research that 
highlight and portray women’s experience. In order to have better access 
to the masculine domain, I recruited three male research assistants who 
assisted me during the first few months of field work. Living in Mardin as 
a European single woman was not easy. I lived on my own and shared the 
house with a woman who was teaching English at a local university. This 
had the advantage that I was not associated with any specific family, but 
I was thereby seen as fair game for male harassment, as I was not visibly 
protected by any older men.
Mardin is such a peculiar place in Turkey that I could not keep it 
anonymous. However, I hope that the city is big enough not to reveal the 
identities of the individual people I talk about. For purpose of anonymity, 
I have changed people’s names and swapped around some of their fea-
tures. I developed my most intimate and close relationships with around 
10 families and about a hundred individuals, though I met and talked to 
thousands of people. Beyond this participant observation, I carried out 
around 100 in-depth interviews and issued two different questionnaires, 
amounting to 250 people surveyed. I have also conducted an online analy- 
sis of images and conversation on around 200 Facebook profiles of my 
local friends, and on a few Instagram and Twitter accounts.
I believe the value of this research lies in this combination of online 
and offline analysis, something that is rarely realised in the study of the 
internet and social media. The combination is essential to an anthropo-
logical commitment to holism and the study of human beings in their 
totality.35 The study of culture by anthropologists is based on the detailed 
accounts of the particulars and minutiae of people living in small and 
circumscribed areas. While contributing to a better understanding of 
the many ways social media are used in Mardin, I aim to challenge the 
essentialising assumptions of media and internet scholars as to the uni-
versality of digital technologies. It is only through the analysis of specific 
practices of usage, and the comparison between them, that we can exam-
ine the wider implications without inappropriate generalisations. I hope 
that this book will contribute to the understanding of the effects of social 
media in Mardin, but also to a better comprehension of the social trans-
formation in contemporary southeast Turkey and to the study of social 
media more generally.
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The social media landscape: 
Individuals and groups in the local 
media ecology1
‘Sometimes married men (on Facebook) meet other women, they cheat 
on their wives and they go to live with the women they met on Facebook. 
My husband cheated on me with another woman, and went to live with 
the woman he met on Facebook.’2 This is the message a young woman 
from a rural background wrote in my notebook when she was so overcome 
with tears that she could not speak any more. A few days after my arrival 
in Mardin, when I  told her I  was doing research about social media, 
the expression on her face changed, she started crying and told me her 
story. Two years before, her husband found a woman on Facebook. They 
secretly started to meet each other and then he suddenly left his wife and 
went to live with the new woman, taking their three children with him. 
She went back to her parents’ house, and for the last two years she has 
not been able to see her children or even talk with them on the phone 
because their father won’t allow it. And she blamed Facebook for all the 
pain she was living through. She had never opened a Facebook account, 
and she stated that she never would.
Another married Muslim woman in her early 30s, who was wearing 
the veil, reacted with a shocked face when I submitted a questionnaire to 
her while she was waiting for her child in the hall of a school: ‘What do 
you think? I am a married woman and I have three kids. Of course I don’t 
use Facebook. I look after my kids, and I make food for them and for my 
husband. Then we go to visit relatives and family’s friends or they come 
to visit me. This is my life. Why do I need to use Facebook? I don’t need it.’
In another case, a man in his 50s reacted to me with a great sur-
prise, while miming his wife cutting his throat: ‘Are you crazy? No, I don’t 
use Facebook. If I use it my wife will kill me.’ Another time, a group of 
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seven men between their 20s and 40s, in the office of an accountant, 
bluntly lied to me and denied they were social media users.
In the following 15 months I heard many negative comments about 
social media, or I came across many individuals who were lying and using 
social media secretly. Many people, especially women, tend to cover and 
play down their usage of social media and the internet in general. Social 
media are surrounded by discourses which often portray their use as 
immoral, dishonourable and shameful, and only rarely as positive and 
beneficial. These claims originated from the actual kinds of social media 
use in Mardin. The evidence suggests that social media has contributed 
to the proliferation of courtship, flirting, friendships and romances that 
have challenged the most important principles organising society, in par-
ticular gender segregation and gender hierarchies, arranged marriages, 
and the unity of the family, leading to serious consequences in people’s 
lives. Try to imagine a place where communication between men and 
women has largely been forbidden, where marriages have been arranged 
by families and where love is a sense of attachment towards a person you 
didn’t choose but ended up sharing your life with. Imagine that these 
social relations have been sustained by an organisation of space designed 
specifically to maintain gender segregation and intra-household-based 
communication. Now try to picture what could happen if a completely 
new and different architecture is put on top of the previous one and, 
probably for the first time in centuries, people start living in new mate-
rial conditions of existence. Men and women start spending hours every 
day in communication with people of the opposite sex, women have 
relationships with friends outside their family network and men flirt and 
harass women even more, while at the same time others try to resist all 
this, going on living the same traditional life. It’s the beginning of a social 
change that is not free of conflicts, adaptations, resistance, new suffer-
ings and new happiness. To paraphrase the words of some Mardinites, it 
is the beginning of a ‘new revolution’.
If we want to understand the extent to which smartphones and 
social media have created a break with the previous social forms, then 
first we need to examine how the material organisation of space and 
the materiality of the media prior to the internet helped to control and 
explain people’s behaviour and relationships in the town. For example, 
the protection of domestic spaces from the gaze of (male) outsiders in the 
old city traditionally formed part of the male control over women.3 In the 
new city of Mardin, these spatial rules have been partially reproduced, 
despite the transformation of architecture described in the last chapter. 
In the modern buildings of the new city, the goal of ‘protecting the visual 
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privacy’4 of women and domestic space is achieved by a complex system 
of curtains. They have to maximise the light in the dark hours of the day, 
while protecting from the sun in the hot hours, but always guard against 
the neighbours being able to see inside the home. Windows even slightly 
uncovered by curtains are considered completely unacceptable.
Women will cross spaces such as streets, cafes, markets and shops, 
but only men inhabit them in more permanent ways. While walking in 
the street, the protection of women’s reputation is maintained through 
different strategies:  women always have to protect themselves from 
men by trying to never meet their gaze; and only women that never look 
around while walking in the street are considered respectable. Young 
women going to the dershane5 always keep their notebooks visible in 
their hands to clearly show that they are going to school and not some-
where else; and when they go somewhere else they tend to walk together 
with other women of the family or, more rarely, alone. What mostly pre-
serves women’s respectability in the streets of the new ‘modern’ city of 
Mardin is the lack of anonymity made possible by the size of the town. 
While I was strolling around with them, locals would claim to know the 
identity of roughly 70 per cent of the people (the remaining 30 per cent 
were civil servants and people from different towns). In Mardin Yenişehir, 
the streets are not anonymous places where individuals ignore each 
other. Women may not be recognised as specific individuals, but they are 
known as members of specific families or belonging to specific towns of 
the province, and this is important for maintaining their respectability. 
One day I was walking in the streets with my research assistant Sonnur, 
a single woman in her late 20s, with her younger, well-built brother fol-
lowing us as a sort of bodyguard. Two young men sitting on the corner 
of the street saw me and Sonnur and started to make some stupid jokes, 
thinking we were both tourists; Sonnur shouted and the younger brother, 
who was only a few metres from us, immediately arrived, argued and 
fought with the two boys, who started apologising and justifying them-
selves, saying that we both looked like strangers (yabancı)6 from Western 
Turkey, otherwise they would never have made those kinds of comments. 
In this patriarchal society, women are not seen as individuals with their 
own autonomy and independence, and their movements and their social 
relations are often kept under control.7
Within the house, the living room is the most important place where 
people spend most of their time. People talk with other family members 
and guests, always sitting in a circle and orienting their attention towards 
the others. Individual bedrooms have only recently been introduced and 
rural families living in the new city still share the same room at night. So 
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even though the change in architecture could provide people with the 
opportunity to spend more time alone, in practice, family members con-
tinue to share common spaces for much of the time.
The lack of individualism and the idea that individuals are deter-
mined by the group they are part of are reflected in many other cultural 
forms. The local line dances, delilo and halay, performed at weddings 
or other ceremonies, are never an expression of individual bodies, but 
always the sum of more figures moving in the same way and reiterating 
the same steps for a long time. Food is traditionally consumed by every- 
one taking their turn from the same big dishes located in the middle 
of the floor (or table), and sometimes even the same piece of meat is 
passed from one mouth to another. This was common for Rojda, a thin 
18-year-old girl who was always hungry and in search of food; during 
meals she enjoyed nibbling her sisters’ chicken and goat meat bones. The 
limits to individual autonomy are also visible among groups of young 
male friends, where friendship is the tie that bonds members of the 
same group rather than the result of a connection between two individ-
uals: when Cihan had an argument with Mehmed, who had a promin-
ent role in the group, he automatically loosened his friendship with the 
whole group. Individual autonomy is rarely taken into account in inter-
personal relationships: friends can call each other up to 10 times an hour, 
and no matter whether they are busy, they have to answer the phone. 
Or again, knocking at a person’s door creates the obligation to open and 
offer tea and food, at any time of the day or evening, otherwise the whole 
family would not make a good impression. The well-known sense of hos-
pitality generally characterising Muslim Middle Eastern society can also 
be seen as a consequence of this lack of individualism, as people always 
feel in some way responsible for others.
Television, which arrived in the city of Mardin in the late 1970s and 
in the villages in the mid-1980s, did not challenge this family-based soci-
ality, but rather reinforced it. Television is now in everybody’s house and 
it is usually watched by the whole family together. Less than 50 per cent of 
the respondents to the first questionnaire said they had two or more sets 
at home. Television tends to be watched in the living room and it is also 
often kept on as background when people talk. Television has been per-
fectly embedded into this model of household-centred communication, 
and has contributed to the sacralisation of the family and its unity. TV is 
often watched with the extended family, too, when cousins, uncles and 
aunts make family visits at the weekend or on midweek evenings, and it 
often inspires different topics of conversation. Watching news re-creates 
and reproduces traditional hierarchies within the family: the older male 
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members usually decide channels and times of the news, and manage 
the conversations. Depending on social class and level of education, 
women may or may not participate in the discussions, but they always 
maintain a subordinate role. Watching news on the television is one of 
those moments where men become the lead players within the house in 
the co-presence of their female relatives, while during meals, the scene 
is dominated by women, who lead the action in a quite silent environ-
ment, as people don’t like talking while eating. Reading newspapers, an 
individual activity that promotes autonomous thinking, is not a common 
habit, especially among the less educated population, but it is increas-
ing with major access to education and the diffusion of the internet and 
newspapers online. Radio is also present in the majority of people’s 
houses (80 per cent of Q1 respondents), but it’s rarely listened to, mainly 
being on while housewives are cooking or cleaning.
Computers tend to be used collectively by the family and controlled 
by men, who sometimes exclude women and younger family members. 
Women often exclude themselves from having their own personal com-
puters. Büşra, a single woman in her late 30s who lives in a house with 
her older parents, used a laptop with an internet connection mainly to 
make calls on Skype with her relatives living in other cities in Turkey, but 
she was concerned to show that the password to gain access to the PC 
was completely public and, although her parents did not use the laptop, 
her nephews and brothers used the PC whenever they came to visit her.
Mobile phones have started to break this dominance of family-based 
communication and to increase the autonomy of individuals. Even now, in 
those rural families where women are excluded from access to the inter-
net and are not smartphone users, it’s common for them to spend time 
alone in some rooms of the house talking on the phone in the absence of 
their family members. And this constitutes one of the very few opportu-
nities they have to maintain relationships beyond the family network and 
without the mediation of the whole family. Mobile phones were owned 
by everybody over 18 and by the majority of teenagers; only illiterate old 
people were excluded from using them. It is significant that people do not 
talk on the phone in public spaces very much, especially women. Women 
may have short conversations, but being seen by others communicating 
on the phone for hours can be seriously detrimental to their reputation. 
And this became even truer with the use of smartphones. In contrast to 
other societies, here it is rare to see women and men chatting on their 
phone in a densely populated space such as a bus or a bus station where 
others can look at you. People prefer to send messages in more protected 
spaces, far from the gaze of others.
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The main drive towards individual-based communication came 
with smartphones, which started to spread among the young popula-
tion in 2011 and 2012. Smartphones are individual devices that facili-
tate individual usage, and they are also containers of personal memories 
and personal relationships that are kept private and confidential. Women 
do not usually need to justify themselves because they use their smart-
phones at home alone and in private, and they tend not to give other peo-
ple their phone even after developing a good friendship and reciprocal 
trust. People use passwords to secure information and shield their social 
relationships. Despite some rare forms of collective usage, for example 
among young siblings in low-income families, or teenagers at school, 
smartphones are individual devices and they quickly became incredibly 
important for young women’s access to the internet and social media in a 
society dominated by restriction of women’s social relations. Most people 
are eager to show off their new phones. It’s quite common for those with a 
salary of TRY 1,000 (GBP 250) a month to own an expensive smartphone 
costing TRY 1,500 (GBP 375). While cars and houses are affordable only 
by a restricted section of the population – well-off men – smartphones 
have become the most ordinary and popular object of consumption 
that almost everybody is willing to own:  ‘If you have a small phone in 
Mardin, you are nobody! People will not even talk to you … showing off 
your new smartphone is so important here.’ Whenever wealthy young 
men go to restaurants, they cover the table with their iPhones, not leav-
ing space for dishes and courses. Smartphones have become the most 
common consumer good to show off social status, more than clothes or 
food. Young women like to adorn their phones with nice covers coloured 
in different ways, and to change them on different days of the week. In 
some cases, smartphones are never connected to the internet because 
owning a smartphone and showing it to your friends is sometimes more 
important than the functions of the phone itself. Samsung was the most 
popular brand, followed by iPhones, which were used by a smaller elite. 
Smuggled (kacak) phones were quite common too. Phones are the most 
smuggled goods after weapons, drugs and cigarettes.8 Most shops, except 
those belonging to the big phone companies, sell smuggled phones for 
less than half of the official price. Because of its proximity to the border 
with Syria, Iraq and Iran, smuggling is a very important source of income 
in southeast and east Turkey, which has developed still further after the 
beginning of the Syrian war and the closure of the border.
Zehra is a 21-year-old woman who recently moved to Yenişehir from 
old Mardin together with her father, mother and younger brother. Her 
family belongs to the community of Mahalmi, Arab speakers who arrived 
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in the city from the rural area of the province in the 1950s. The Arab elite 
of the city – Bajarili – consider them as lacking noble origins (asil) and 
also more ignorant (cahil). Mahalmi are usually more conservative than 
other Arabs from Mardin, and indeed Zehra is less free and autonomous 
than other women of her age. She finished high school two years before 
I met her, and since then she has been studying for the university entrance 
examination. When she was accepted at the University of Antalya, her 
father would not allow her to live so far from home, and she spent the 
whole year working 12 hours a day as a shop assistant in a nice boutique 
next to her house and her father’s shop. Her life was lived inside the walls 
of the shop and the house, under the gaze of her father and in the com-
pany of her mother and guests who occasionally visited and for whom she 
had to prepare food, teas and coffees. She was not allowed to hang out 
in cafes, nor to meet friends in the park, and even going shopping at the 
supermarket needed her parents’ authorisation. Beyond the family net-
work, she was only sporadically meeting one friend, a girl she had known 
from the age of eight, and a secret boyfriend who lived in the same build-
ing. Beyond them, she had no offline relationships that were not medi-
ated by the family. However, Zehra was an incredibly active user of social 
media:  on her Samsung Galaxy X3 she was constantly using Facebook, 
Instagram, Twitter and WhatsApp at work or at home. She had three dif-
ferent Facebook accounts, though only one of these was currently in use, 
or at least this is what she constantly repeated to me. She had around 
300 Facebook friends, out of which 60 were people she met on Facebook, 
mostly women and men from western Turkey, and a few from Europe. 
Like many other young women from Mardin, she was using social media 
mainly to meet strangers and become their friends. She really enjoyed it. 
These relationships were not limited to the space of Facebook, and when 
two Facebook friends came from western Turkey to Mardin for a holiday 
they met face to face. Through Facebook Zehra has met new people from 
Mardin as well, like Sinan, a photographer with whom she made a per-
sonal photo album portraying her well dressed and with carefully chosen 
make-up. On WhatsApp she mainly communicated with Fatih, her secret 
boyfriend, by sending him up to 500 messages a day. Fatih was very jeal-
ous of her Facebook account and he often obliged her to close it. For this 
reason, the profile was being turned on and off every couple of weeks.
Zehra didn’t have a computer in the house, nor an internet connec-
tion. All her social networking was limited to her smartphone. One day, 
she quit her job in the shop and, after arguing with her, her father con-
fiscated her phone as a punishment and gave it to her younger brother. 
Zehra, who was then spending her days sitting at home, immediately 
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bought a new white shiny Samsung Galaxy X3 that she used hidden from 
her father and brother, by carefully keeping it in her pocket. She would 
have died without a smartphone, as she told me:  ‘I am so lucky to not 
have an older brother. A father and a boyfriend are enough! One forbids 
me to have a phone, the other to have a Facebook account. It’s really 
enough!’ And she was laughing because, despite the restrictions imposed 
by the two men, she was able to buy a new smartphone and to reopen 
her Facebook account anyway. While I  was back in London we had a 
private chat on Facebook and she proudly showed me the picture of her 
new official fiancé, not Fatih, but a new one. They had met on Facebook 
two months previously, and they chatted there every day before meeting 
secretly a couple of times, until he went to her house to ask her father 
for her hand in marriage. While writing this book, I can follow them on 
Facebook and see the pictures of their wedding that was publicly pre-
sented as sanctifying an arranged marriage.
Zehra’s story is one of the many examples of the way smartphones 
and social media have increased individual connectivity and have chal-
lenged family-based communications, producing new conflicts and 
changes. But this story also shows that social media and these new forms 
of communication and romance have not eliminated ‘ideal’ forms of tra-
ditional arranged marriage, which continue to remain rooted and strong. 
The love-match made possible by social media has rather been absorbed 
into traditional and legitimate family idioms, to be presented in this case 
as a traditional arranged marriage. Although experiences of premarital 
romantic love existed well before social media, as many stories I heard 
from middle-aged and old people made clear, social media made these 
significantly more frequent. And just like in the past, most of these new 
kinds of intimate friendships have been experienced privately and only 
with absolute discretion.
Past and present internet usage in Mardin
As elsewhere, early access to the internet in Mardin was often through 
internet cafes. The first cafes opened in Mardin in 2000 and they reached 
their largest expansion in 2003 and 2004. After that people started 
buying computers and using them in their houses, while internet cafes 
were increasingly frequented mainly by male teenagers to play games 
online, which is their main use today. Sometimes adult men would go 
to cafes in short breaks from work to check their Facebook page and to 
chat with friends; and a few university students, women included, would 
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go there too to do online research. The use of the internet on personal 
computers in the private spaces of the house developed over a decade, 
peaking in 2010 and 2011, when smartphone usage started to spread.9 In 
2013 and 2014 the number of people opening internet contracts in their 
private houses decreased, as pointed out by the owners of shops selling 
broadband services.
Despite the increased usage of smartphones, almost every house in 
the new city has a computer, and the majority have an internet broad-
band connection, or access to a neighbour’s internet service.10 For exam-
ple, a shop based on the ground floor of an apartment block had a fibre 
optic broadband that was used by six more shops and surrounding apart-
ments. The owner was continually being asked to provide his password, 
and to maintain good relationships with his neighbours he had to do so. 
It is also quite common for young girls, not allowed to use the internet by 
their parents, to use the neighbours’ connections instead; many of them 
have a clear mental map of wireless connections in the buildings and the 
times of day they can access them, or they use friends’ and cousins’ lap-
tops or phones if they don’t have one. Like many other things in Mardin, 
internet connection was shared and used collectively, in such a way that 
those with more resources were expected to help others in exchange for 
social prestige and power.
People in their 20s and below tend to identify the internet with 
Facebook, but those a bit older were using the internet well before the 
arrival of social media. Chatting has always been the main form of inter-
net usage. Instant messaging programs, especially MSN Messenger and 
IRC before it, have largely been adopted to meet and talk with people 
of the opposite sex, especially strangers. As soon as they met someone 
new online, people used to type ‘ASL?’, the abbreviation for ‘age, sex and 
location’, in order to get some general information about him or her. The 
internet was used to meet new people and flirt with them well before the 
diffusion of social media, but social media made courtship less anony-
mous. A 40-year-old man noted: ‘MSN was not used so differently from 
Facebook, but now on Facebook you don’t need to type “ASL?” any more. 
If you have a look at people’s profiles you can understand so many things 
about them  …  Now getting in touch with girls is much easier than 10 
years ago!’ On Facebook, men flirt with women already knowing a lot 
of information about them. Synchronous communication has always 
been the favourite online habit in Mardin and in the region before and 
after social media. Today, Facebook users tend to keep the chat open to 
talk with friends and meet new people, to the point that Facebook often 
comes to be identified as a chat service:
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I have to prepare my exams and I  can’t use Facebook any more. 
It’s time consuming. When I went online I had to answer to all my 
friends’ messages ‘Selam’, ‘Merhaba, nasılsın?’ (Hello, how are 
you?) … And this took me at least a couple of hours. If they saw me 
online I had to answer all of them, otherwise they’d get offended.
At the time of my research, differences in internet access by age, gender 
and social class were quite significant. The generational gap was the 
most important, as people over 60 were very rarely internet users, irre-
spective of whether they were men or women, rich and educated or 
poor and illiterate. In Mardin, the elderly (people over 60 were usually 
already retired and considered old) may be illiterate, and they are often 
strongly attached to traditions and express dislike towards new tech-
nologies and novelties. ‘Technologies were created by the devil!’ was 
a frequent claim made by grandfathers. However, sometimes men of a 
more advanced age used computers together with other family members 
to communicate with relatives on Skype. Mehmed, a 61-year-old man 
who works in the bazaar of the old city, spends two hours every evening 
talking with four of his five sons living in other cities of Turkey. He can’t 
turn the computer on himself, and he has to rely on his son living next to 
him to do that. He goes to his son’s house every evening and they Skype 
together. Because of the high level of illiteracy, only a few men over 70 
and women over 50 can use mobile phones: they either use their sons’ 
and daughters’ phones, or they have learned to somehow recognise 
their relatives’ names on the screen. Elderly people strongly rely on the 
support of their younger relatives in many matters of daily life, not least 
their access to communication technologies. In Mardin Yenişehir, the 
old population are strongly attached to prior genres of social relations 
and habits which continue to remain in practice in the old city. Old men 
often commute from the old to the new city; they sit in the bazaar and 
talk with those people they have known all their lives. Women sit at 
home or visit their relatives.
Among middle-aged people (between 35 and 60)  the digi-
tal gender gap is really significant. In this age group, men usually 
have access to the internet, women don’t. This has to do with the 
fact that most women in this age group are housewives, and as such 
are excluded from relationships and connections with other human 
beings beyond family members and female neighbours. Housewives 
are devoted to raising children, feeding their husband and cleaning 
the house, while the internet is associated with the world outside the 
domestic sphere, dangers and threats to their modesty and honour. 
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Zeynep is a 23-year-old woman who daily spent hours on Facebook and 
WhatsApp. When asked if her 42-year-old housewife mother used the 
internet, she replied with a shocked expression on her face:  ‘Are you 
crazy? Why does my mum have to use the internet? What for? Of course 
she doesn’t.’ A few housewives do use the internet to talk with relatives 
on Skype and shop online, but not for social media, and always collec-
tively with other family members. Very few others do use social media 
very discreetly, mainly to peek at relatives’ and acquaintances’ profiles. 
The situation of educated middle-aged women with a job outside the 
house is a different situation, as society recognises that their position 
in the ‘public’ world gives them the legitimacy to access the internet, to 
own a smartphone and to have a social media account. But this is the 
case of a small upper-class minority. Within this age group, men have 
access to the internet and use it in significantly different ways accord-
ing to their level of education: uneducated middle-aged men tend to use 
the internet and social media mainly to flirt, harass girls, cheat on their 
wives, watch pornographic films, share religious memes and sometimes 
talk with friends. However, getting information about this group was 
difficult, given that many of these practices can’t be discussed with a 
woman. In contrast, educated middle-aged men were enthusiastic in 
explaining the advantages and the benefits of digital technologies, such 
as reading news, talking with old friends from school and university, 
and widening their knowledge of the world.
It can be said that those under the age of 35 constitute the inter-
net generation. Everybody in this age group uses the internet; even a 
20-year-old uneducated housewife from a conservative rural family has 
the chance to have a look at a Facebook page or a YouTube video a few 
times. My research has focused on this age group and they dominate the 
descriptive material of this volume. Although the digital generation gap is 
probably more significant in the southeast than elsewhere in the country, 
this trend is likely to be common all around Turkey. Vodafone, one of the 
few mobile phone companies in Turkey, has based its campaign on youth 
and uses the slogan ‘Youth is lived only once, live it free!’ (Gençlik bir kere 
yaşanır özgürce yaşa!). In Mardin, the most widespread Vodafone mobile 
package sold to people under 25 is called özgür genç, which means ‘free 
youth’ and it gives 12,000 SMS messages, 500GB of internet data and 
2,000 minutes’ talk (only on the weekend) for TRY 15 (around GBP 3.50) 
a month. The other popular package among teenagers and students was 
the ‘Facebook packet’ that allows customers to use Facebook and Twitter 
for TRY  5 a month (around GBP  1.20). In contrast, the most popular 
package sold to people over 25 does not include internet data. In a local 
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Vodafone shop, out of 80 mobile contracts created for people over 25 in 
that current week, only 10 included internet data.
Social media uses in Mardin
This section provides an overview of the current uses of the different 
social media platforms in Mardin.
Facebook
Facebook is easily the most popular social media in Mardin, and for this 
reason it has dominated the research behind this book. Eighty-six per 
cent of the respondents to Q1 use Facebook more than any other social 
platform, and 60 per cent claimed to have been active on Facebook for 
between four and seven years. 72 per cent look at their Facebook profiles 
every day; 15 per cent keep Facebook always on, and only the remaining 
13  per cent look at their profiles fewer than seven times a week. The 
average number of friends people have on Facebook is 338.
In the new city, children at elementary school, and occasionally 
even those as young as four or five, open their first accounts. At this age, 
Facebook is more widespread among middle-class families with educated 
parents that have a positive attitude towards digital technologies and edu-
cation, and they also want to show off to the families of other children that 
they can afford computers and smartphones, whereas in low-income fam-
ilies with a lower level of education children use Facebook less. Children 
use Facebook mainly to play games with school friends, among which the 
most popular is Candy Crush Saga. For example, Hülya is an eight-year-old 
girl who opened 40 different Facebook accounts to send herself more gifts 
so that she could win the game more easily. Among teenagers and young 
adults, almost everybody has now had a Facebook account for some time, 
and the main significant differences are between rural and urban families, 
where the former tend more often to exclude young female members from 
using it. People are largely aware of Facebook privacy settings and mas-
ter them well. 80 per cent of the Q1 respondents regularly change their 
privacy settings. People usually make their Facebook profile visible only 
to a group of friends and invisible to strangers. It is also quite common to 
create different groups within the same account and make different posts 
visible to different circles of people. Sometimes Facebook is also used to 
upload pictures that are visible exclusively to the owner of the page. In 
general, a user’s Facebook status is not updated frequently (63 per cent 
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of respondents do it less than once a day, and 27 per cent had not done 
this in the last month), as people engage more with private chat (around 
60 per cent of respondents had sent at least 30 private messages in the last 
month) and look at other people’s profiles.
In Mardin it is not uncommon to have more than one Facebook pro-
file. This evidence would not have been clear from a formal questionnaire 
because having more than one profile is seen as dubious and people tend not 
to talk about it. The topic is rather treated and debated with irony and jokes 
among friends, or embarrassment with strangers. However, a 35-year-old 
man, married with two children and owner of a small shop, proudly 
admitted that he was simultaneously active on 12 different Facebook 
accounts: one used with the extended family, one with work friends, one 
with ‘ordinary’ friends, one with female friends that are simply friends, one 
with female friends that could become more intimate, one with foreign 
girls, one for business (under the name of his shop), one for online gaming, 
one under the name of his four-year-old daughter, one under the name of 
his six-year-old son, and two more accounts he didn’t want to tell me about, 
which were perhaps used for political purposes. Beyond this extreme case, 
both women and men sometimes have two or three profiles, in order to 
keep different spheres of their lives separate. When men and women in a 
premarital relationship want to speak with other people of the opposite sex, 
they may open a new Facebook profile to avoid the partner’s jealousy. When 
people break up with a partner, they may open a new Facebook account 
to socialise with the new partner and the new partner’s friends. Men also 
sometimes have a different account to be in touch with friends from their 
military service, and occasionally women have two profiles to keep fam-
ily separated from friends. Another common pattern of usage has to do 
with the transience of these Facebook profiles, as at times people close old 
accounts and open new ones. When this is the case, Facebook is not used 
to maintain people’s fundamental social relations, but rather to create an 
alternative social network of friends, or to have an additional channel of 
communication with them. It is also common to have fake profiles under 
false and invented names: women mainly aiming to escape their family’s 
prohibition and control, men wishing to get in touch with women and har-
ass them without being recognised. Alternatively, fake profiles are used for 
political purposes, as will be examined in Chapter 6.
Whatsapp
WhatsApp spread significantly during the 15 months of my field work. 
When I  carried out the first questionnaire in summer 2013 WhatsApp 
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was rarely used, but it had become widespread by the end of my research. 
The success of WhatsApp is also explained by people’s passion for private 
chats. People increasingly opt for WhatsApp because the chat on Facebook 
is not very much appreciated on smartphones, and SMS messages are 
more expensive. WhatsApp has come to be the most used application 
for intimate communication with close friends, close relatives, lovers, 
and also between small groups of people. WhatsApp is often used as an 
additional communication channel that amplifies the frequency of inter-
actions with close family members, friends or partners, and diversifies 
the genre of communication thanks to the presence of visual and verbal 
content. Unlike spoken communication on the phone, WhatsApp can 
be used at any moment of the day, during work and between one break 
and the next, allowing more privacy and secrecy in communication 
with ‘forbidden’ friends. Alternatively, young adults living far from their 
home town use WhatsApp to increase proximity and intimacy with their 
favourite family members. One 26-year-old woman living on her own in 
Mardin has five brothers and sisters. She regularly speaks on the phone 
with all of them, but she uses WhatsApp only with her two favourite 
sisters. One sister regularly sends her pictures of her niece, and she replies 
by sending her pictures of herself at work and during ordinary moments 
of daily life. Another 32-year-old man regularly speaks on the phone with 
his brother and sister living in other towns, but he chats, shares pictures 
and cartoons on WhatsApp only with his brother, and very rarely uses 
WhatsApp with his sister. And one 35-year-old man uses WhatsApp above 
all to communicate with his two brothers living in two different cities of 
Turkey. They send texts to each other many times a day. Another man 
uses WhatsApp only with his girlfriend and with his best friend, to whom 
he sends at least 100 messages a day. A woman uses WhatsApp only with 
her three best friends and her younger sister to whom she sends a lot of 
pictures from everyday life. Sending photos through WhatsApp is a very 
common practice. In contrast to pictures posted on Facebook, which tend 
to be more formal and ceremonial, those posted on WhatsApp are usually 
more informal and intimate, portraying moments from ordinary life:  ‘I 
would love that my sister living far away could take part in my daily life. 
For this reason I always send her pictures of what I do during the day!’
In Mardin and in the whole region intra-family relationships are 
usually quite intense, and people use the phone many times a day to com-
municate with their close family members, such as parents to sons and 
between siblings. People are often quite distressed by the distance sepa-
rating them from their parents or sons, an example being a 40-year-old 
mother who cried her heart out because her daughter had left a couple 
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of weeks previously to start university in another city in Turkey five hours 
away by bus. A woman in her early 20s also started to have tears in her 
eyes because, for the first time in her life, she was living one hour away by 
bus from her family and she could visit them only on weekends. Women 
may call their sisters up to eight or 10 times a day if they are out of the 
house for different reasons, and they send many messages and images 
on WhatsApp. WhatsApp is used mainly for intra-family relationships to 
increase immediacy and proximity, but also for communication between 
lovers in premarital relationships, who may send each other up to 700 
WhatsApp messages every day. Broadly speaking WhatsApp has been 
received and accepted with less concern, anxiety and excitement than 
Facebook, because it is mainly a ‘private’ medium that does not challenge 
traditional boundaries between the private and the public. It cannot 
reveal secrets and intimate confidences in public and, above all, it cannot 
put people in touch with strangers.
instagram
Instagram also spread during the time of my field work, mainly among 
educated young adults, who enjoy showing their most beautiful and 
creative pictures. Teenagers are not using Instagram very much, also 
because it needs a phone with a camera that can take clear photos. 
Instagram, like Twitter, is the social media used by a small elite of 
more educated youth, and not by the majority of the population. On 
Instagram they mainly show off exciting experiences, such as holiday 
trips and dinners, or cool commodities, such as fancy clothes or new cars. 
In a different way from Facebook, however, here they experiment with 
new visual codes and languages together with smaller groups of peers. 
On Instagram young people are more creative, original and interested in 
aesthetics. A contribution to the diffusion of Instagram also came from 
the fashion industry based in Istanbul and Ankara, which has recently 
started to use this social media as an online showcase, and middle-class 
women have started to use this social media to shop online.
Twitter
Twitter is not used as much as in other metropolitan areas of Turkey. Like 
Instagram, the main Twitter users are educated young adults who have 
attended university and have friends in other towns of Turkey. They use 
Twitter to read news and follow politicians. In Mardin, Twitter is considered 
the social media for the educated elite:  the best dershane of Mardin  – a 
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private school that prepares students for state examinations and is affiliated 
to the Gülen movement11 – decided to post their advertisements only on 
Twitter and not on Facebook, to distinguish themselves from the others, 
because, as the director of the school told me, ‘Facebook is for everybody!’ 
Teenagers also use Twitter, mainly to follow stars, international pop singers 
and actors. They prefer Twitter to Facebook where it’s easier to find many 
inauthentic profiles. It was also common to have a Twitter profile and not 
use it: only 36 per cent of the respondents to Q1 have tweeted at least once 
in the last month, and 70 per cent have never retweeted.
Viber, Wechat, line and Tango
These are smartphone applications used by a few adults and teenagers, 
for text messaging, free voice calls, picture sharing and video calls. 
People enjoy making video calls, especially to relatives living far away. 
Tango also has a function of geolocation that is used by hundreds of 
men in an attempt to meet and harass girls. Nobody mentioned this to 
me during the interviews, but within half an hour of downloading the 
application on my own smartphone, I  received around 70 messages 
from men located within a kilometre who were writing to me using 
terms like ‘sweet angel’, ‘dear sweet’ or ‘lovely’. I  had to change my 
account’s name from Elisa Costa to Ali Costa and act as a man in order 
not to be bothered.
youTube
YouTube is used a lot to listen to music and watch video clips, but not 
to upload self-produced materials. Young adults and university students 
could spend entire evenings with their friends listening to YouTube 
videos. For Kurds especially, YouTube was a wonderful source of Kurdish 
music and artistic products that had been forbidden for many years in 
Turkey. During the period of field work the ban on Kurdish language, 
music and arts was no longer active, but Kurdish cultural products were 
distributed only on the internet and on Kurdish satellite TV channels, and 
not on mainstream Turkish television.
skype
Skype is used especially by middle-aged people to communicate with 
relatives living far away, as young people prefer to use video-call services 
on their smartphones.
 
 
 
 
social media in souTheasT Turkey42
online games
Games are very important components of social media. They are often 
played with old friends, or with the purpose of meeting new people, to 
chat with them, and eventually also meet them face to face. The most 
popular games, indeed, are those which give the opportunity to meet 
new friends and also communicate while playing. For example, Sidar, 
a 21-year-old man, met his ex-girlfriend while playing İstanbul Kıyamet 
Vakti. For the first few days they communicated on the game, then they 
started to talk on MSN and then on Skype in front of a camera, and finally 
on Facebook. It is common for both young and older men from Mardin 
to use online gaming to seek out women from western Turkey who are 
seen as more sexually available. Women from the southeast generally 
do not have premarital sexual intercourse, and if they do they expect 
it to lead to marriage. Sidar’s ex-girlfriend was from Antalya, and they 
were able to see each other there for three summers, against the wishes 
of her family, who didn’t want to have their daughter engaged to a man 
from the southeast. For this reason, her parents frequently confiscated 
her phone. He bought her three mobile phones one after the other, after 
which the relationship finished. Games such as Okey, Tavla and Poker 
are very popular, and they are played mainly to meet new people; other 
common games are Candy Crush Saga, Criminal Case, City Ville, and 
Farmville.
commerce and Facebook
Facebook is of considerable importance among small businesses in 
Mardin: hairdressers, shops, musicians, estate agents, cafes, restaurants 
and private schools use Facebook pages to promote and advertise their 
activities. In this domain as well, the generation gap is highly significant, 
as only people under 35 or 40 use social media for business, with the 
result that all those kinds of economic activities run by middle-aged men 
(or, more rarely, women) do not have an online presence, except in those 
few cases where the owners are progressive enough to let their children 
do it on their behalf. In some cases, Facebook has been much more than 
just one more channel for advertising, but has allowed the creation of 
a business that otherwise would not have been possible. This is, for 
example, the case with Ev Arıyorum, an estate agency opened by a man 
in his early 30s, who uses Facebook to put buyers and sellers in touch, 
largely benefiting from the expansion of the most profitable economic 
sector of Mardin. The main advantage brought by the use of Facebook is 
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the opportunity to create connections with people not living in Mardin. 
Here a major component of the flourishing property market are 
Mardinites who migrated to Europe or other parts of Turkey and decided 
to invest their money in Mardin, as well as civil servants who come to 
work in Mardin and are looking for houses to rent.
The transnational dimension of Facebook also allows local musi-
cians and artists to get in touch with people in Europe, to ask questions 
and buy musical instruments and technical equipment or simply to 
exchange impressions on the best way to play songs. In addition, men 
with particular skills or qualifications to promote take great advantage 
of Facebook:  athletes, English teachers, artists and graphic design-
ers use Facebook to develop and promote their own image and brand. 
A  painter has created his own public character thanks to an effective 
use of his Facebook page, and has started to receive further requests for 
his paintings from shops selling souvenirs to tourists. As one person put 
it:  ‘Facebook is used for two main reasons in Mardin:  to find girls and 
to show off. So if you have something you would like to be noticed for, 
Facebook can be really helpful.’ The use of Facebook to advertise and pro-
mote small private businesses is often not so different from the common 
practices of personal use by individuals, to the point where the bounda-
ries between advertising and showing off are obscured.
Polymedia and different social circles in 
southeast Turkey
Madianou and Miller’s theory of polymedia12 was intended to ‘describe, 
but also to understand, the emerging environment of proliferating 
communication opportunities and its consequences for interpersonal 
communication’. Instead of treating each platform individually, each 
is defined in relation to all the others. This perspective emphasises a 
movement towards moral, social and emotional concerns reflected in 
the choice between these platforms, rather than the more technical and 
economic reasons previously given for these choices. Three precondi-
tions are necessary to apply this theory:  availability, affordability and 
media literacy. In Mardin these conditions were not met all the time, as 
teenagers and young adults have media literacy, but not always afford-
ability and access to the media. The choice of one medium instead of 
another, for example WhatsApp instead of SMS, was often led by the 
need to save money; and limitations to access were frequent, due to social 
restrictions more than to lack of infrastructure. Women are from time to 
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time excluded from social media use and they end up preferring those 
media that can keep the communications secret and private. On the other 
hand middle-aged people, who have more economic opportunities, were 
often  illiterate in digital terms if not literally so.
However, the theory of polymedia can be really useful in Mardin 
to understand how different mediated spaces are integrated with each 
other. The ethnographical research shows how different social settings 
online are defined by reference to the people who inhabit them, more 
than by the platform’s affordances or an individual’s emotional concerns. 
It is not important which social media is used in generating a specific 
genre of usage, but rather what social circle is associated with that genre 
of usage.13 In other words, the appropriate units of analysis to take into 
account are the different social groups people create on the same plat-
form or on different platforms, rather than the different social media 
platforms in themselves.
In Mardin, teenagers and young adults actively create different 
online social environments and behave differently according to the 
people who inhabit them. When it helps them to retain these defined 
social groups and genres of use, they switch easily from one platform to 
another, or between different spaces of the same platform. For example, 
people share the same kinds of photographic materials (funny and con-
fidential pictures) and have the same kinds of talk within small groups 
of school friends on Facebook and on WhatsApp. But these may con-
trast with what they share on the ‘public’ wall of both Facebook and 
Instagram, which consists of images whose contents are quite similar to 
each other. Married couples share their intimate photos in the private 
spaces of Facebook or WhatsApp equally. So it is not the different plat-
forms that matter; it is the particular types of usage and the groups asso-
ciated with them. People actively change Facebook privacy settings to 
create different social groups, such as general public, large family, small 
family, general friends, school friends, flirting. In Mardin, social media 
has not produced social convergence of the type described in European 
and North America contexts.14 Instead, they retain discrete and disparate 
social groups on social media which are kept carefully separated from 
each other through the tight control of privacy settings and maintenance 
of different accounts.
Halil works as an English teacher in a private school. Like many 
other young Kurdish men, he was raised in a large family with many 
siblings. His family moved to the new city of Mardin from a village to 
escape the war between the PKK and the Turkish State 20  years ago, 
when Halil was a child. His parents have always been tied to their tribe, 
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whose members inhabited a few villages in the area between Mardin and 
Diyarbakır. As Halil grew up in Mardin and has lived in different Turkish 
cities, he has distant relationships with the members of his extended 
family. He claimed to be able to name around 300 relatives, distributed 
between his home village, Mardin and other towns in Turkey, while his 
tribe includes a few thousand people, most of whom he has never met. 
Halil has one Facebook account with around 600 friends, of which 200 
are relatives (cousins, aunts, uncles, father’s and mother’s cousins and 
second cousins). He has divided his Facebook friends into four different 
groups: the generic public includes all his 600 friends; the close family 
group has 11 members, brothers and sisters and a couple of nephews 
(whereas mother and father, uncles and aunts belong to the generation 
of non-internet users); the large family group includes around 100 rela-
tives living in Mardin, in his village and other towns in Turkey; the fourth 
group is used with colleagues and students to share materials, organise 
activities and arrange appointments. On the public Facebook he shares 
songs, news, pictures and generic information that may be of interest to 
everybody, such as the news on the invasion of Sinjar and the massacre 
of the Yezidi population by ISIS, which happened a few days before Halil 
and I met for the interview, or news and comments about the presidential 
elections of a few months before. In the close family group he communi-
cates practical and ordinary needs, such as ‘Don’t call me on the phone 
at this time because I  am working!’ or ‘I am travelling to Urfa, do you 
need anything from there?’ In his large family group they discuss trivial 
matters such as the night before when he could not sleep and asked who 
was awake and available for a chat. Alternatively they support each other 
when they need something, such as when Halil went to Diyarbakır for 
a medical exam and was in need of a bed for a night; or they share job 
vacancies when they see an interesting one; they also invite each other on 
trips together on bank holidays. In this more private group he also shares 
news strictly related to Kurdish issues that can’t be posted on the public 
wall because it might not be appreciated by Arab and Turkish friends with 
different political views.
Facebook, the most used social media, is ruled by different norms 
according to the different social circles it is used by. Creating differ-
ent groups inside the same Facebook profile is a common practice:  for 
example, it is possible to have a public profile seen by a large group of 
friends and relatives, with three different closed groups with school 
friends, friends from work and relatives, and one private space shared 
with one’s girlfriend. As we have seen, for the same reason it’s common 
to have several Facebook profiles: one for the family, a second to flirt with 
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girls or boys, a third to speak with friends, and a fourth for politics. So in 
Mardin there is not one Facebook but many different Facebooks. What 
I call ‘public’ Facebook profiles are the most commonly used. They are 
shown to a wide group of family members and friends, and are usually 
used to increase personal visibility and honour, and to generate approval 
and recognition by others. More private uses of Facebook may have the 
opposite purpose, that is of reducing visibility and secretly taking advan-
tage of the opportunities opened up by this new ‘revolutionary’ architec-
ture that can put you in touch with a large number of people all around 
the world. The public Facebook wall is the site of what could be termed 
the ‘normative individual’. No matter what gender, age or social class an 
individual belongs to, he or she is mainly concerned to show off his or 
her best qualities and to receive the highest number of likes. Here peo-
ple reproduce traditional social norms, based on male honour, female 
modesty and gender segregation, that are even stricter than those in the 
offline world. If urbanisation has widened spaces with a certain level of 
anonymity that allows more flexible behaviours, on the public Facebook 
wall people are constantly under the gaze of others. The public Facebook 
reproduces the same social context previously only found at weddings, 
which for centuries have been the only social events where a few hun-
dred relatives and friends, women and men, gathered together in the 
same space under the gaze of these others. On the public Facebook wall, 
as at weddings, people aim to perform their best public self by sharing 
their best images and carefully controlling the comments of their rela-
tives and friends. At wedding ceremonies, participants enjoy looking at 
other people’s behaviour and clothes and discreetly commenting about 
them. Similarly, people spend hours looking at other people’s Facebook 
profiles and gossiping about them. On the ‘public’ Facebook people per-
form the most conventional and formal self, much as they imagine this 
should be at wedding ceremonies.
All of this is in stark contrast to the use of WhatsApp, WeChat, 
Viber, SMS and private uses of Facebook as described above. It is hard to 
exaggerate the degree to which social media has at this very same time 
become integral to the construction and experience of love and intimate 
relationships. Teenagers and young people send their lovers up to 600 
private messages a day and spend up to 10 hours a day on different social 
media platforms to communicate with ‘prohibited’ partners and lovers. 
Young couples in secret relationships usually use all the media at their 
disposal to communicate with secret partners without being seen by oth-
ers, thus challenging the social rules that cannot be publicly broken and 
subverted.
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Ayşe and İzzettin are a young couple in their early 20s. She works 
as a shop assistant 12 hours a day in a supermarket, and he is officially 
enrolled at the local university, but spends most of his time helping a 
friend in a grocery shop. Nobody in the family knows about their relation-
ship. As they both have a new Samsung phone and the money to top up 
their internet credit, they spend hours sending messages and pictures to 
each other on WhatsApp. They each send the other around 400 messages 
a day, including pictures of themselves and what they are doing during 
the day. When she is at work, WhatsApp is the best platform because it 
doesn’t take up too much time. WhatsApp is also the best application for 
the nights when she is at home and she wants to communicate with him 
far from the gaze of their parents. When she has breaks at work and she is 
at home alone, they speak on the phone for up to one or two hours a day. 
When they have used up their internet and phone credit, they send each 
other SMS messages. They never communicate on Facebook because it 
might publicly disclose something about their relationship. They rarely 
see each other face to face, around once or twice a month for a very short 
time when they can go to sit in a hidden corner of a park or meet at one of 
their houses when nobody else is there.
Society as the premise
This chapter has focused on how the range of social media understood 
as polymedia confirms the creation of different online spaces whose 
size and degree of privacy vary. However, in Mardin, the most common 
and ordinary uses of social media are split between the very public, 
wedding-like situation of the Facebook wall and the uses by individuals 
for intimate and private communication. In Mardin, communication 
technologies have facilitated new forms of interpersonal communica-
tion that add to existing ones based on group solidarity. These new types 
of relationships include strangers, in clear contrast with European and 
North American contexts, where research showed that social media are 
used for maintaining already existing offline relationships, mainly with a 
small group of intimate friends, family members or partners.15 These new 
relationships take several forms and all produce significant changes in 
the production of the self towards heightened individuality. In any case, 
a disposition to individualism, now accentuated by social media, already 
existed in southeast Turkey,16 where the primacy of the family over the 
individual has always coexisted with more individualistic notions of the 
self.17 In this patriarchal society, the initiatives of males and elders often 
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direct the lives of females and the young, and men often view their wives, 
sisters, junior siblings and children as extensions of themselves.18 Social 
media has opened up new opportunities for women and young people to 
act as individuals autonomous from the wishes and desires of their older 
male relatives. However, these new opportunities for them to act autono-
mously, as separate from their families, have not been followed by new 
ideologies of modernity that accept these individual-based relations, 
friendship and romantic love as legitimate cultural forms.19 Social media 
has enabled practices that are quite different from what continue to be 
the ‘ideal’ social relations and the ‘ideal’ self.
In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated something that is cen-
tral to the whole book. In accordance with the other books in this series, 
this chapter was formally supposed to be about the landscape of the social 
media itself, the different platforms, and the way they relate together as 
polymedia. By contrast, Chapters 4 and 5 were supposed to be more about 
the relationships themselves and the ways they changed in relation to the 
spread of social media. But in practice this division doesn’t really work for 
a place such as Mardin. As the evidence of this chapter has made clear, 
all the main categories of social media usage, including those basic dif-
ferences in platforms such as Facebook compared with WhatsApp, turn 
out to consist of contrasts that are fundamentally social. What is actually 
being researched here soon turns out not to be Facebook, but particular 
genres of content associated with particular parts of that platform, which 
may be identical to a section of another social media application. This is 
because what people care about is not keeping the platforms separate but 
keeping the different social groups and even different aspects of them-
selves separate, since when these come in sight of each other all sorts of 
problems arise.
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Visual posting: Showing off and 
shifting boundaries between 
private and public
On Saturday afternoon, three 23-year-old Arab female friends had lunch 
together in the house of one of them in the modern Toki1 building at the 
entrance of the new city. The housewife mother of one of them had cooked 
delicious traditional food from the region – çiğ köfte (raw meat balls served 
on lettuce leaves), Mercimek Çorbası (lentil soup) and I şkembe dolması 
(tripe stuffed with meat and rice) – and served this savoury, rich meal in 
the spacious empty floor in the middle of the lounge. The three women took 
innumerable pictures of the feast and themselves sitting together, and posted 
the best on Facebook. Just after finishing the meal, they went out into the 
garden right next to the building and started posing in front of the camera 
while I was given the task of taking pictures of them together. In order to 
make the afternoon more exciting, one of them suggested taking a photo 
as if they were in the shopping mall of Diyarbakır, the coolest and biggest 
mall in the whole of southeast Turkey, located one hour away from Mardin. 
The other two women were excited about this idea. They asked me to take a 
picture of them on the bench and not to include the details in the background. 
I took several photos and they chose the best one and shared it on Facebook 
under the caption ‘trip to Diyarbakır mall’. I was surprised and asked: ‘Why 
did you this? Do people really believe that you went to the shopping mall 
in Diyarbakır?’ One of them said: ‘I don’t know, but we want others to be 
envious of us!’ They didn’t seem concerned about people’s suspicions, 
but they were excitedly eager to display to friends and relatives that they 
were spending a happy, cool and enviable afternoon. Fame and popularity 
were worth lying for. Photographs, after all, fit this purpose as images that 
convey a sense of reality and disarm other people’s suspicions of their 
veracity.2
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Showing off is recognised by Mardinites themselves as one of their 
cultural traits. A  friend described their eagerness for displaying new 
commodities in this way:
Mardin is a different city. In Mardin people love new things, new 
cars, and new clothes. Mardinites are different, they love fashion 
and luxurious life. Earning money and being able to consume is 
the most important thing here. It’s not important the work you do, 
but the clothes, the phones, and the cars you have. If you have a 
small phone, you are nobody … I know a landowner who decided 
to sell his land to buy an Audi A4. Another man was the owner of six 
flats, he sold three of them to buy a BMW5 25. Having a car is more 
important than having a house. The car gives you social status, just 
like fancy smartphones. This is Mardin.
Behaving ostentatiously with the intention of impressing others is a 
common and shared habit in Mardin, and social media has multiplied 
the opportunities for doing so. The following pages investigate how 
young adults construct and present online selves and their personal 
relationships, taking advantage of the new visibility offered by social 
media. The desire to achieve fame, status and popularity has led them 
to break traditional boundaries between private and public that have 
always been strictly controlled and monitored. They want to achieve 
admiration and respectability, and the public display of their personal 
life is the only way to do it. However, in this new ‘public’ space, indi-
viduals still have to present their ‘self’ according to socially acceptable 
standards that are even more traditional and conservative than those 
existing in the offline world. On social media, more than offline, people 
are always being checked up on by their family members, relatives and 
friends, and for this reason they conform even more strictly to tradi-
tional and conservative social norms.
Public Facebook and wedding ceremonies
As seen in the previous chapter, in Mardin, social media have produced 
different kinds of spaces whose discourses, practices and performances 
change according to the number and the types of people that inhabit 
them. This chapter presents the visual material of what I call the ‘public’ 
Facebook wall, which is the place that is visible to the general category of 
Facebook friends. The analysis is not extended to Instagram or Twitter, as 
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the purpose was to examine and compare images posted by the majority 
of the people living in Mardin. All the material is taken from the Facebook 
pages of those who have friended and added me to the general public of 
friends during the course of my research, after having met me face to 
face. Images shared in private Facebook groups and in most of the fake 
and anonymous profiles will not be considered here, nor will the images 
included in more private Facebook profiles addressed to specific groups 
of people, because the same owner had more than one account.3 Clearly, 
the ‘public’ Facebook is a place where people post what they know 
is going to be constantly under the gaze of others, and is where they 
perform a self that is imagined as continuously monitored, controlled 
and judged. In other words, this is a place under surveillance. The best 
analogy for this ‘public’ Facebook in prior offline settings is probably the 
wedding ceremony. Weddings are the main, and until recently the only, 
public social events where women and men meet, and where different 
extended families and networks of friends gather together. At weddings, 
just as on ‘public’ Facebook, people present their best public ‘self’ in front 
of the gaze of others. Weddings were one of the very few occasions when 
women showed themselves in public to be chosen as brides by men or 
men’s mothers, aunts or older sisters; similarly, on Facebook, women are 
seen and gazed upon by others, not least men and men’s female relatives 
who are looking for brides. In both sites, women and men precisely 
compose their public appearance, and the presentation of the self is very 
competitive: men and women aim at impressing others while defending 
their honour and reputation. And in both sites, public presentations 
of the self are likely to be highly discussed and to create gossip and 
comments. Interestingly, the reproduction of the wedding environment 
in these online spaces has been happening just when weddings are losing 
their social role in the offline world, due to the spread of urban social 
spaces such as cafes and restaurants, which are ordinarily occupied by a 
variety of women and men who are not necessarily relatives or friends. 
Weddings are now only one among many public or semi-public events 
with gender-mix sociality. Urbanisation produces more anonymous 
public spaces, while Facebook re-creates traditional social contexts 
where people attempt to present selves that fit in with the expectations of 
the extended family and family friends.
Users of the public Facebook imagine that they are also tracked and 
scrutinised by the State. Mardinites feel themselves to be under political 
surveillance, and they are. This is a consequence of the real internet cen-
sorship existing in Turkey,4 but it’s also deeply implicated in the history 
of the Turkish State, long before the arrival of social media and digital 
 
 
Social Media in SoutheaSt turkey52
technologies. The region has experienced decades of State violence and 
inter-ethnic conflict and, as a result, people’s traumatic experiences of life 
have shaped a feeling of fear and suspicion towards the ‘other’, whether 
this other is the State or a particular social group and whether the threat 
is real or not. Concerns about the surveillance of the State and surveillance 
of one’s own friends and relatives blend into and reinforce each other. This 
produces conformity and normativity on the one hand, and competition for 
social prestige and success on the other.5 For example, young people with 
more than one Facebook profile tend to share more pictures in the ‘pub-
lic’ one, precisely to achieve social recognition and celebrity. But these 
photos are normative, conventional and not particularly daring: in a lot of 
self-portraits they aim to portray themselves looking handsome, beautiful, 
happy, well dressed, and sometimes surrounded by many good friends. 
The following pages will examine how people present idealised versions of 
themselves through visual images that fit in with accepted norms of con-
duct and good standards of wealth, education and social success, and how 
these differ from self-presentations in public spaces of the offline domain.
New boundaries between private and public
On Facebook, people post hundreds of photos of themselves that were 
previously kept strictly outside of the public gaze, and some of these 
images portray moments from their intimate, personal and domestic 
lives. This practice had been frequently criticised and contested by many 
Mardinites, and some of them refuse to open a social media account for 
exactly this reason. Guarding privacy and protecting intimate spaces from 
the gaze of outsiders is indeed a very important component of Muslim 
cultures. Boundaries between ‘public’ and ‘private’ are very normative 
and reflect local understanding of sexuality and relations between the 
genders. Although Facebook users adopt different strategies to limit 
and contain the display of their personal and private life, the overall 
outcome has been the entry of the private into the new online public 
space. Ordinary family events such as lunch and dinner have become 
much more important as visible events, as have images of engaged 
and married couples holding hands or hugging each other and photos 
portraying the bodies and faces of women. These photos have become 
quite common, especially among secular and modern Arabs and Kurds, 
but are considered inappropriate by more conservative and religious 
people. Photos of couples mainly aim at showing off the happiness and 
success of their engagement or marriage.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3.1 Married couples
Fig. 3.2 Engaged couple
Portraits of family gatherings inside domestic spaces have also 
been displayed from time to time. These images reproduce the formality 
of posed photography, but informality, spontaneity and casualness also 
appear, though more rarely. Pictures of children portrayed in ordinary 
moments of domestic life are also quite common.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 3.3 Formal family photo (a), informal family photos (b, c) 
(a) (b)
Fig. 3.4 Children
These images include ‘semi-private’ spaces of the house, such as 
sitting rooms, where families usually receive guests, or kitchens, but 
they don’t reveal completely private spaces such as bedrooms or toilets. 
On Facebook, people make more ‘public’ those ‘semi-private’ spaces 
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designated for receiving house guests, but they never reveal the domestic 
and intimate core of the home.
Another example of a ‘semi-public’ space that has become more 
‘public’ is the high-school or university classroom. Students often 
post pictures with their classmates to proudly show that they attend 
university.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3.5 Students
Not only have ‘semi-private’ or ‘semi-public’ spaces become more 
public, but women have increased their presence in ‘public’, something 
that has broken traditional boundaries and has given rise to issues of fe-
male reputation and respectability. The background to this is an offline 
world where women have always had a narrow presence in public space, 
and where the range of acceptable public exhibitions of the self was ex-
tremely narrow. The next section examines what strategies have been 
developed by women and men to preserve their privacy while publicly 
sharing personal images and information to achieve fame and popularity.
Preserving reputation / pursuing popularity
More individual portraits, fewer relationships
People tend to share many pictures portraying the individual alone. These 
images are significantly more common than pictures portraying a person 
with friends or relatives. People tend not to display their personal rela-
tionships as they are often worried about showing images of other people 
without their consent. When the photo does depict the person in company, 
they tend not to tag them. The number of photographic images posted by 
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any one person, indeed, is significantly higher than those posted and tagged 
by their Facebook friends. Being tagged in someone else’s picture is not 
desirable, and 48 per cent of the respondents to Q1 declared that they had 
untagged themselves in some photos at least once in the last month. While 
the practice of tagging someone on a Facebook picture can be seen as a gift 
or a courtesy between two or more people since it expresses attachment and 
sentiments of friendship and intimacy, people may not feel that this has to 
be expressed explicitly in the public space of the Facebook wall.
Young men and women enjoy posting a lot of individual portraits, 
and they like to change their profile pictures many times every month; 
such images often elicit more than 50 ‘likes’ from friends. Groups of young 
male and female friends more often share their pictures privately on 
Facebook or WhatsApp, but this is less common on the public Facebook.
As a result, postings are dominated by the most appealing or impres-
sive self-portraits clearly aimed to attract the most ‘likes’. This is done very 
differently in the case of men and women. The dominant ideal of masculinity 
reflects values of male independence and power, along with values of eco-
nomic and professional success. Many pictures portray men standing next 
to a car or a motorbike, or participating in hobbies, sports or holiday trips.
(a)
(d) (e)
(b) (c)
Fig. 3.6 Male individual portraits
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The images chosen as profile pictures often portray young men 
dressed in sober, elegant or professional clothes even when they do not 
normally adopt this dress code in their daily lives – as in the case of uni-
versity students, men with ordinary work such as civil servants in state 
offices, teachers or small private business owners. This emphasis on 
future career achievement and economic success means there is a sharp 
discrepancy between the self as portrayed in the online and how it is dis-
played in the offline world.
(a)
(c) (d)
(b)
Fig. 3.7a–d Male profile pictures
Models of femininity are more variable and contradictory and 
change dramatically according to the woman’s age and social back-
ground. However, it is possible to identify two main ideals. Some women 
define their public selves through a publicly stated affirmation of mod-
esty and piety. In this case, photos portraying their face and body are 
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completely or partially absent from the public-facing Facebook, and 
sometimes this anonymity in public is contrasted with the shared images 
of themselves with their chosen Facebook friends. Images of babies 
expressing tenderness and sweetness, or pictures of landscapes are often 
used as profile pictures.
(e)
(g) (h)
(f)
Figs. 3.7e–h Female anonymous profile pictures
Anonymous profile pictures are more common among young women 
and teenagers from rural backgrounds of high-school age, who have to 
play with different kinds of images not to be found by older male relatives. 
In this case, they are not deliberately choosing anonymity, but this is rather 
the only option they have if they want to use Facebook in the social sur-
roundings they live in. The case is different for religious Arab urban women 
who decide to post religious images as profile pictures, in order to express 
modesty and piety. In this case, they are intentionally deciding to publicly 
perform their adherence to specific forms of modern Turkish Islam, as it is 
advocated by the AK party or Muslim brotherhood communities.
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(i) (j)
Figs. 3.7i–j Female anonymous profile pictures
(k)
(n)(m)
(l)
Figs. 3.7k–n Female profile pictures
The second kind of ideal woman is presented in those photos of 
young women from urban backgrounds, who pay more attention to dress 
and appearance, and frequently post self-portraits that emphasise aes-
thetic style, beauty, attractiveness and their ability to choose and wear 
interesting clothes. This is especially the case of university students or 
women working outside the house. They may be secular but this cate-
gory may also include other women who are more religious and covered. 
Women from Mardin, especially Arabs, are interested in clothes, make-up 
and appearance, and Facebook has become the place where they display 
modern aesthetic qualities and fashionable beauty and appearance. 
Again, this may mark a clear discrepancy between these portraits and 
their offline appearance, where in daily life they wear more sober and 
ordinary clothes. But even those images, which are carefully selected 
with regard to dress and flashy make-up, still always follow norms of 
respectability and decorum, and they never attempt to pose with origi-
nal, strange or weird expressions or display alternative aesthetics.
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This is a reproduction of the ideal of the woman devoted to her 
family members, but it is also a reaction to the fear of having the image 
stolen and used for inappropriate or malicious jokes by stalkers. The fear 
of image misappropriation constitutes a deep-rooted social anxiety. At 
one phase during my field work, the town seemed full of hacking appli-
cations that allowed spiteful people to enter Facebook pages and make 
unpleasant jokes dishonouring the pages’ owners:  several people had 
their Facebook profiles stolen and filled with shameful imagery and text. 
The anxiety related to social media photography was also fuelled by the 
Over the 15 months of my ethnographic research, there was only 
one report of a woman from Mardin who was not behaving properly 
on Facebook. She was described as ‘crazy’ (deli) by other female young 
Mardinites because she was continually posting pictures showing gri-
maces, smirks and messy hair intentionally to create sensation and gos-
sip. However, this was an isolated case.
Alternatively, women often present themselves together with im-
portant family members, which might include nephews, nieces or sisters 
in the case of unmarried women, or their husband and children in the 
case of married women.
(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 3.8a–c Female portraits with family members
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then-Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, who, since the Gezi Park protests 
in June 2013, has demonised social media, actively describing it as a 
threat to Turkish family values. The main legal case that constituted the 
basis for the Twitter ban in March 2014 concerned a person who opened 
a social media account under the name of a housewife to distribute por-
nographic material. For this reason, some young women did not use pic-
tures of themselves alone as profile pictures visible to the general public.
family, gender segregation and formality in  
group photography
Although the dominance of individual portraits stands out as the charac-
teristic of public Facebook photography, group portraits are also present 
and they share some distinctive qualities. First, they portray relationships 
that have social legitimacy, such as those between family members, male 
friends and, more rarely, female friends. Second, all the images have 
similar aesthetic qualities:  subjects stand erect and motionless in front 
of the camera and gaze straight into the lens. The style is usually very 
homogeneous: people sit around a table or on the floor before a spread of 
delicious food, or during a holiday scene they invariably stand stiffly lined 
up next to one other in front of the camera. Group portraits on Facebook 
are very formal and posed expressly for that photograph.
(a)
Fig. 3.9a Group portraits
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Most of these images depict people in public places, such as restau-
rants, parks or tourist destinations. Photos portraying members of the 
same family within domestic spaces are less common, but they do exist, 
as noted above.
Group portraits disclose no clues about the relationships that 
exist between the pictures’ subjects, and expressions of sentiment are 
usually absent. This photographic material validates an individual as 
part of a socially accepted set of relationships, such as between family 
members or same-sex friends, who are involved in socially accepted 
and worthy activities, mostly eating special meals and going on holi-
days. Pictures showing whole extended families are quite rare, with 
the exception of wedding pictures. Since these unfailingly depict an 
Fig. 3.9b–c Group portraits
(b)
(c)
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ideal image of the collective self, this may discourage people from 
publicly sharing any image of the extended family which falls short of 
this ideal.
Facebook photography partially reproduces the formality of ana-
logue framed photography. Yet the degree of change is evident when we 
compare these Facebook portraits with the many family photographs 
taken and printed before the arrival and the diffusion of digital photog-
raphy and stored in drawers or ordinary photo albums. Analogue pho-
tos which were shown exclusively to close friends and relatives within 
the protected place of the house were characterised by more informal-
ity and casualness, while the few formal pictures deemed suitable for 
display on walls and shelves of the house were of wedding ceremonies 
and ancestors. However, digital photos of ordinary moments of daily 
life that are taken to be publicly shown to others on social media are 
much more formal. Social media photography has expanded formal-
ity to those moments of the ordinary daily life that were previously 
immortalised through informality. In effect, this is a reverse of the his-
torical trend towards informality. Moreover, the advent of social media 
photography has had the effect of ‘democratising’ the opportunity for 
image creation. This has resulted in a major transformation: pre-digital 
photography in most honour-based societies created a formal and sol-
emn image of the family and made it eternal,6 whereas social media 
photography does the same for the individual and his/her predeter-
mined role in society. Young women and young men who were tradi-
tionally excluded from the chance of expressing themselves now have 
the opportunity to construct and perform their personhood in public. 
They use Facebook to publicly display themselves as individuals, as in 
the offline world the opportunities to do so are narrower.
food, objects and holiday trips
Photos with food are very common because this is a perfect visual sign 
to express a rich sociality without having to show pictures of people. 
People prefer to post a picture of the meal, sweets or coffee. Especially 
when special breakfasts, lunches or dinners are organised in private 
houses, pictures of the guests tend not to be displayed. When friends or 
relatives meet to have special meals, young members of the family often 
take a picture of the food as soon as this is ready and before it is eaten. 
Exhibiting abundance, opulence or refinement, the ability to cook good 
food and a happy social life is the main aim.
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There seemed to be a consensus that, similar to other genres, the 
exhibition of special feasts has the goal of impressing others and getting 
their admiration and envy. If taking pictures of particular feasts is a must, 
ordinary meals are rarely displayed on the public Facebook.
Another common genre of visual posting includes those objects 
that express the aspired-to modernity and wealth; these may be cars 
for men or different accessories bought in large towns in western 
Turkey or abroad for women. Showing off material possession is a com-
mon practice both offline and online in a town that stands out as the 
richest city in the poorer province and region.
(a)
(c) (d)
(b)
Fig. 3.10a–d Food
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Fig. 3.11 Objects
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3.12 Cars
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For the same reasons, people post many pictures portraying holi-
day trips. Out of 1,000 posts of 200 profiles I examined, 140 are photos 
of holiday trips. These are ways to show off to friends and relatives that 
the person is enjoying life and can afford to do so. Pictures of trips and 
journeys are forms of individual self-expression and self-promotion, as 
family members are rarely portrayed. The majority of photos portraying 
trips are uploaded by the same person or, more rarely, by someone else 
who added the tag. Similarly, geolocation systems are commonly used 
to display where someone had dinner or a holiday. These practices are 
also debated and criticised:  ‘People always want to show off. Why do 
they have to write on their wall that they had dinner in this or that res-
taurant? Or that they went to Istanbul to have fun … I am not interested, 
I don’t like it at all.’ When I asked my respondents why their friends had 
posted that particular kind of picture, the first answer they gave me 
was always the same:  ‘They want to show off how beautiful, rich and 
happy they are!’ Once again, the majority of images are of individuals 
alone, for reasons already noted. This is particularly true in the case of 
unmarried women, who are more easily victims of gossip and rumours, 
whereas married people with children more often show pictures of them 
together on holiday.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 3.13 Holidays
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The public Facebook is a conservative place
Abundance of individual portraits, scarcity of friendship relationships 
(especially between women), lack of mixed-gender groups of friends, 
monitored and controlled displays of women’s bodies, formality of 
postures, great quantities of food, memorialising the family and the 
presence of objects representing traditional feminine and masculine 
models are all elements that contribute to the creation of a public space 
where people appear to conform to traditional norms and values. This 
becomes even more evident when comparing the photographic materials 
of different social groups, which turn out to be quite similar, despite the 
observable differences between them in the offline world. As a result 
of migration from both villages and larger metropolitan areas, Mardin 
is inhabited by a mixture of rural and urban people. For those women 
and men with urban and secular lifestyles, the discrepancy between 
their offline lives and their public images online is quite significant. In 
semi-public and more anonymous spaces such as cafes and restaurants 
they behave and maintain social relations that are rarely portrayed on the 
public-facing social media that is constantly under the gaze of relatives 
and family friends.
Drinking alcohol and hanging out with a mixed-gender group of 
friends are common practices in the offline world that are very rarely por-
trayed in the visual Facebook material of either men or women. Young 
adults rarely post pictures of themselves smoking cigarettes or having 
fun with their peers; women rarely upload pictures portraying them-
selves sitting in cafes, even when they are chaperoned by family mem-
bers, just in case observers think they are sitting with men who are not 
family members. Men attending the disco nights sometimes organised 
by one restaurant do not post pictures of themselves dancing with scant-
ily dressed women; among secular middle-class people, premarital rela-
tionships are occasionally possible and they are sometimes conducted 
freely in the public space of the town, but images of such partnerships 
are never shown on the public walls of social media. Gender segregation 
is even stricter in the images posted online than in behaviour offline. On 
Facebook, people create representations of the self and construct spe-
cific forms of personhood that fit with the expectations of relatives and 
family friends. In this sense, we can again see how Facebook recalls the 
wedding ceremony. Young adults don’t drink alcohol, smoke cigarettes, 
entertain with lovers and mixed-gender groups of friends at weddings or 
on Facebook; but they do these things in ‘semi-private’ or ‘semi-public’ 
offline spaces. As a result, the photographic content posted by people 
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from rural and urban backgrounds is quite similar, since the 
ultra-conformity of online obliterates the differences in behaviour 
offline. However, unlike at wedding ceremonies, where participants can 
perform a limited number of public actions (e.g. sitting, eating and danc-
ing), the public visual material on Facebook represents a larger variety 
of activities, social relations and objects. Indeed, personal life, domestic 
spaces and women’s bodies have entered the online public space, despite 
resistance and strategies to protect privacy and intimacy. Display of indi-
vidual portraits, married couples and families, images of meals and food, 
objects and some interiors of the house constitute a public display of the 
personal daily life that does not have any precedent offline.
Memes: education, morality and religion
Whereas the range of photographic images posted on Facebook is quite 
limited due to the social constraints ruling the public appearance of 
individuals and groups, people post many memes, video clips and news 
items. Photographic images on the public Facebook mainly have the goal 
of presenting affluent and moral selves, while memes are mostly oriented 
to publicly performing an educated, literate, civilised person. Being 
knowledgeable and committed to the main principles of Muslim morality 
is a very important value in Mardin: for example ‘Cahil’ (uneducated) or 
‘serefsiz’ (dishonourable) are among the most common derogative terms 
used to criticise those who don’t confirm to these ideals.
The public display of memes citing famous writers, poets and 
philo sophers constitutes the best way to perform a commitment to val-
ues of high virtue, scholarship and wisdom, and to show engagement 
in intellectual activities. Sharing authorised discourses of writers, 
political parties, Greek philosophers or Iranian poets gives the oppor-
tunity to perform an erudite self in a highly normative way, not run-
ning the risk of being criticised by others. There was no evidence that 
this expression of enlightenment and knowledge contributes to the 
shaping of individuals who think autonomously or contrary to estab-
lished authorities, as claimed by some scholars of digital media in the 
Muslim Middle East.7
We can differentiate different kinds of memes posted on the pub-
lic Facebook. The first group includes poems and writings by ancient 
Muslim poets or the contemporary mystic guru Osho. They address top-
ics of ethics, morality and philosophy.
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Fig. 3.14b Philosophical meme. Translation: ‘Don’t do politics with 
whom you love. Politics damages friendships. Politicians go their own 
way; you will be left without friends.’ Aristotle
Fig. 3.14a Philosophical meme. Translation: ‘He who knows what 
he is won’t be affected by what is said of him by those who don’t know 
themselves.’ Ibni Sina (a Persian Islamic philosopher who lived between 
the tenth and eleventh centuries)
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Fig. 3.15a Translation: ‘If love is so beautiful, who knows how 
beautiful the creator (of this love) is…’ Sems-I Tebrizi (a Persian Muslim 
poet and philosopher, an important figure of Sufism who lived between 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries)
Fig. 3.14c Translation: ‘Only tenderness can heal because all the 
illnesses inside human beings originate from the lack of love.’ Osho
A second category includes religious memes: some memes celebrate 
religious festivals such as Bayram and Friday prayer day. Alternatively, 
people share verses from the Koran or prayers. Writing ‘Hayırlı cumalar’ 
(Happy Friday) on Facebook, SMS and WhatsApp was also a common 
practice among Mardinites. 
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Fig. 3.15c Translation: Happy Bayram/May your festival of sacrifice be 
holy,/ holy God permit,/we shall see many more festivals. Happy Bayram.’
Fig. 3.15b Translation: ‘Thanks, God. We are the servants of every 
word with a scent of rose in it. Happy night and happy Friday.’ Yorgun 34
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Fig. 3.15d Translation: ‘Mum is fasting, so I have to deal with all the 
housework ☺’
Fig. 3.15e Translation: ‘And after I said; glory to God for having 
created me as a Muslim.’
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A third kind of meme expresses commitment to morality and gen-
eral values of loyalty towards family members, husbands or wives and 
correct behaviours with others.
Fig. 3.15f Verses from the Koran. Translation: ‘Do not exult. Indeed 
Allah does not like the exultant. But seek through that which Allah has 
given you, the home of the Hereafter; and (yet), do not forget your 
share of the world. And do good as Allah had done good to you. And 
desire not corruption in the land. Indeed, Allah does not like corrupters.’ 
(Translation taken from: http://quran.com/28/76-77)
Fig. 3.16a Translation: ‘Elder sister!/Elder sister means life./
Sometimes you can say sister in the breath you take,/sometimes when 
you are sad you can find her there.../when you’re out of breath she gives 
you breath,/when you’re out of courage, she gives you courage…/elder 
sister is your soul/is by you,/is in your blood..!’
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Fig. 3.16b Translation: ‘Do what you want to do/Live how you want 
to live. But to laugh don’t make anybody cry./ And don’t sell anyone to 
take advantage of them.’
Fig. 3.16c Translation: ‘I don’t share my thoughts so as to 
convince anyone that I am right./I share my thoughts so that 
people who think alike know they are not alone.’
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A fourth category includes memes about love, romance and rela-
tions between women and men.
Fig. 3.17a Translation: ‘To love is so wonderful, when you are the one 
who is loved.’
Fig. 3.17b Translation: ‘Women don’t like good men.’ Nejat I sler (a 
Turkish cinema and theatre actor)
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Fig. 3.17c Translation: ‘Don’t be among those who live with  
those they don’t love and who die with those they cannot forget.’
Fig. 3.17d Translation: ‘Come to my city my love/Come tomorrow/
Leave everything. Say: “there is someone waiting on me” and come/
Come, so that your steps will give meaning to this city./Come, so that 
this city will stop being my hate/Come, so that I can breathe/Come…’ 
Nazim Hikmet (a Turkish poet and writer and Communist activist)
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A fifth common kind of meme includes cartoons.
Fig. 3.17e Translation: ‘If you don’t know my worth when I am by 
you; then the day you will know my worth, you won’t find me by you.’ 
Necip Fasil (Turkish poet and novelist)
Fig. 3.18 Cartoon meme. Translation: ‘I said to the banker: I refer you 
to God, He asked me for a referral fee! I had to run away, Humanity has 
died for sure.’
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Finally, there are memes about politics whose content is split 
between supporters of the government and supporters of the Kurdish 
movement. These memes reflected the political events happened over 
the 15 months of my field work: the Gezi Park protests, the local election 
in March 2014, the Israeli war against Gaza, autonomy of Rojava (Siryan 
Kurdistan), the rise of Islamic State (ISIS) and consequent crisis in Iraq 
and Syria. People also posted quite a lot of political posters and memes 
on the occasion of ordinary anniversaries, such as the foundation of the 
Republic or the Kurdish new year’s eve. As result of surveillance, images 
supporting the State, the government and the Turkish nationalist project 
were definitely more frequent than images supporting the Kurdish cause. 
But this point will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 6.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3.19 Political memes
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Conclusion
This chapter has presented the visual material posted on the public-facing 
Facebook walls, and argued that people in Mardin manage to find ways 
to retain a highly conservative online appearance that is not so much a 
reflection of offline behaviour but an exaggerated version of it, while at 
the same time finding opportunities to display and show off their claims 
to wealth and status. It was suggested that the best way to understand 
this simultaneity is by analogy with the traditional wedding, which is also 
a kind of hyper-visible space where people look very different from their 
ordinary appearance and where they are not only more careful about 
how they appear in public, but also see it as an opportunity to display 
their aspirations and claims to status.
The premise for both of these developments is that the charac-
terisation of online as a space of surveillance provides opportunities as 
well as constraints.8 People carefully construct and display their desired 
qualities because they know that this self-presentation will be observed 
and monitored by others. This was particularly evident in the case of 
those women who spent hours looking at images on the Facebook pro-
files of cousins, aunts and uncles living far away to discover more about 
their lives. People in Mardin have always placed great importance on 
public events and public appearances, and for this reason they have 
always dedicated a lot of effort to crafting a public image of individual 
and collective self at ceremonies or in the ordinary moments of their 
daily lives.
‛The online public space’ is not a mere representation of something 
already existing in the offline world; it rather constitutes a new form of 
current visual presence, a kind of additional reality to the offline world. 
As noted in this chapter, the hyper-conservatism of public appearance 
online is not a reflection of the offline world. In fact, it is so extreme in its 
avoidance of anything that might lead to a loss of reputation that it has 
eliminated the primary social differences that exist in this society, for 
example between people from rural and urban backgrounds. The point 
of the analogy with the wedding is also to demonstrate that general off-
line public sociality in Mardin was used to produce visual realities well 
before the arrival of social media. Here it matters less what people really 
do, but more what people are seen to be doing. In this context, social 
media has multiplied the opportunities for producing new realities, but 
at the same time it has intensified people’s vulnerability – something 
that has in turn given rise to many concerns over morality, including the 
morality of using these new online spaces.
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So although, in common with other areas of the world, young 
adults show images from their daily life on social media that never had 
such public visibility before, they do so in a very different way from many 
‘Western’ societies. The results of my research reveal stark differences 
from the results of studies based in Europe and North America, where 
social media users publicly display connections, intimate social rela-
tions and friendships.9 In Mardin, this kind of public display shows no 
sign of developing as an important component of social media for two 
reasons:  people reproduce online the traditional boundaries that have 
always delimited the domestic private and intimate sphere offline, and 
they also fear that this newly produced visibility may reveal what has to 
be kept hidden.
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4
Relationships: Kinship, family  
and friends
Although the policies put in place by the Turkish State since the 
foundation of the Republic in 1923 were aimed at modernising Turkish 
culture and society and assimilating ethnic minorities, Kurdish and Arab 
kinship systems continue to be quite different from those of the Turks. 
The Turkish nation-building project was based on the idea of a civilising 
mission that included a transformation of the masses from southeastern 
and eastern Anatolia; discussion of the kinship organisation of the 
population living in the southeast has been part of a wider ‘Orientalist’ 
representation sustained by the Turkish nationalist elite, who stigmatised 
ethnic minorities as backward, tribal and primitive.1 The kinship systems 
of the population inhabiting the Middle East were a central theme of 
investigation within anthropology during the 1950s and ’60s,2 while more 
recent studies have investigated the transformation of Kurdish kinship 
under the assimilation policies of the Turkish government.3 In order to 
comprehend the impact of social media on family relationships in Mardin, 
it is necessary to have some understanding of how kinship networks are 
organised. Moreover, shedding light on the connections enabled by social 
media provides valuable insights into what kinship is and what it means 
for many young people living in Mardin at the time of my research.
Generally speaking, we can say that traditionally Turks were organ-
ised into villages:4 ‘people belong to their village in a way they belong to 
no other social groups. On any definition of community, the village is a 
community – a social group with many functions, not all of them explicit, 
and to which people are committed by birth or marriage, and bound by 
many ties’,5 whereas Arabs and Kurds were organised into different types 
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of lineage (groups of people who see themselves as relatives because 
of their descent from a common ancestor). These preferred endogamy 
(people should marry within their group), especially marriages between 
patrilineal cousins (descended from the same male ancestor). They also 
followed the principle of segmentary alliances and oppositions.6 Despite 
the transformations of recent decades, lineages continue to be import-
ant elements in the society of Kurds and Arabs living in Mardin, with 
significant differences between the two. For the urban Arab population 
of Mardin, lineages (sülale) include descendants from a particular ances-
tor. The best lineages are seen as old and noble (asil) in origin. People 
have considerable regard for these as well as for the claim to direct 
descent from the Prophet Mohammad. Arab families within the same 
lineage have always preserved a certain level of autonomy, not recog-
nising the authority of any leader, while among the Kurds lineages are 
usually incorporated into tribes that have a hierarchical structure. Their 
members are usually loyal to a chief, and they may include extended 
families whose genealogical relation to the core group is sometimes 
dubious.7
Fig. 4.1 An Arab man with his grandchild holding the genealogical 
tree of the family. As with many other Arab families in Mardin, they 
claim to have noble origins and to be direct descendants of the Prophet 
Mohammad
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In the old city, members of the same Arab lineage tended to live 
in the same neighbourhood and to use the Arabic expression el-beit (the 
house) to name both the neighbourhood and their extended family. In 
the new city, by contrast, households are inhabited by nuclear families 
who no longer share the same quarter, street or building with their rela-
tives, and have thus become increasingly autonomous from each other. 
The situation is different in the case of the Arab-speaking groups called 
Mahalmi who migrated into Mardin from the nearby villages and towns 
in the 1950s and claim to be organised into tribes (aşiret). Most of these 
still live in the old city.
With the exception of poor peasants, the Kurds have traditionally 
been organised into tribes, which vary significantly in form, organisa-
tion and size from a few thousand to more than a hundred thousand. 
Many of these tribes continue to maintain their importance despite 
the influence of external factors such as the assimilation policies of the 
Turkish State, the war between the PKK and the Turkish army, forced 
migration, urbanisation and the neoliberal economy. Instead, Martin 
van Bruinessen argues that in the 1980s and ’90s Kurdish tribes in south-
east Turkey retained their authority, as a consequence of the establish-
ment of village militia by the State, the electoral process and smuggling 
across borders.8 In Mardin at the time of my research, the word as iret 
continued to be used by most of the Kurdish population to define their 
kinship organisation, but Kurds agreed that tribes have progressively 
lost their importance as a source of allegiance, authority and support. 
Evidence from my research, however, shows that tribal affiliations and 
loyalties to the chieftain continue to be a reality among many Kurds liv-
ing in Mardin, though with significant differences between them. For 
example, Kurds who migrated to the city centre decades ago are more 
assimilated into the urban (Arab) lifestyle and have loosened their con-
tacts with the members of their lineage/tribe who still live in villages or 
nearby towns. Also occupation, social class, level of education and prov-
enance of the family played an important role in strengthening or weak-
ening kinship ties. Having said that, compared to Arabs, Kurds continue 
to be in touch with a higher number of distant relatives such as first, 
second or third cousins.
Certainly, everybody in Mardin, whether they are Kurds, Arabs or 
Syriacs, share strong bonds to members of their extended family. This 
powerful connection with family members is also expressed in the spoken 
language that classifies the social world as divided between kin (akraba) 
and non-kin/strangers (yabancı). This chapter describes the use of social 
media to maintain connections with members of the extended family, 
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lineage and tribe, in the face of geographic mobility, migration, forced 
migration and urbanisation that have affected, to different degrees, all 
the inhabitants of the town. The first part of the chapter examines how 
social media is used to connect with members of the same lineage and 
tribe, while the second part considers relationships between members of 
the same nuclear family and friends.
Social media, lineages and tribes9
The first finding of this research is that social media has facilitated the 
maintenance and the strengthening of ‘weak’ connections with up to 400 
relatives, including siblings, uncles, aunts, great-uncles and great-aunts, 
nephews, nieces, first, second and also third cousins. If we consider that 
in many Kurdish families the average number of siblings is between five 
and 12, one person’s first cousins – children of uncles and aunts – could 
easily reach 100. With sons and daughters, and grandsons and grand-
daughters of brothers and the sisters of grandfathers and grandmoth-
ers, one person’s relatives connected on Facebook might number a few 
hundred. The in-depth interviews with Kurdish and Arab teenagers and 
young adults living in Mardin, and more general ethnographic observa-
tions, confirm that social media plays a major role in maintaining contacts 
between those members of the extended family, lineage and tribe who 
live far away from each other.
People generally agreed that tribal and lineage affiliations have 
weakened, while still preserving an important role in voting behaviour 
and political alliances. Mardinites’ narratives portrayed a happy past 
characterised by strong kin solidarity, as opposed to a present marked by 
individualism, selfishness and an emphasis instead on labour in search 
of money. Extension of formal education among youth and women was 
seen as responsible for the decline in tribal authority, because it has 
granted increased autonomy to young people, and especially women, 
who increasingly see themselves as critical individuals who less eas-
ily accept the power of traditional authorities and rules. For example, 
I heard of several cases of young adults who disobeyed the wishes of their 
older male relatives in terms of voting behaviour, resulting in unexpected 
electoral results. The move from rural areas and the old city to the new 
city has also contributed to the weakening of kinship solidarity, as well as 
migration to other cities in Turkey.
In this context, social media has been adopted to keep alive and 
repair relationships with members of the extended family dispersed 
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around the region and the country, or in different neighbourhoods of 
the same town. These networks of relatives may be very different in size, 
but the strongest and most frequent connections are between youth and 
middle-aged people of the same sex. Among young adults in their 20s 
and 30s it was common to use social media to keep in touch with distant 
relatives: not only cousins, nieces, nephews, young uncles and aunts, but 
also second and third cousins10 and their parents and children. Gender 
and generational differences were evident:  young women tended to 
‘friend’ fewer relatives, as they often saw them as a source of control and 
a threat to their freedom, while men tended to do this more; teenagers 
and the very young tended to have more friends from school and neigh-
bourhood and fewer relatives, compared to older people. Finally social 
media reflected the different kinship organisation of Arabs and Kurds; 
Kurds, but also rural Arabs and Mahalmi, were keener to friend more rel-
atives than the Arabs of the city. This was especially true of those Kurds 
who had moved to the new city more recently and were less assimilated 
into the modern urban lifestyle. Urban Arabs, indeed, more often had 
online social networks that consisted more of friends with fewer rela-
tives. However, despite these differences, most Mardinites used social 
media as an attempt to bring their kinship network, spread around the 
country and the region, back into the same online place.
Abdurrahman is a 19-year-old Kurdish student attending a der-
shane in Mardin. He moved from Kızıltepe11 to the new city to prepare 
for the university entrance examination as the quality of private schools 
is higher in Mardin. He shares a flat in a modern building of the new city 
with a school friend, while his father, mother and eight siblings still live 
in Kızıltepe. His father owns a medium-sized piece of land located in the 
plain between Kızıltepe and Mardin, and lived all his life in the village 
with his family, until a few years earlier when they all moved to Kızıltepe. 
Abdurrahman is a smart and ambitious student who is looking forward to 
gaining high marks in the state examination, which will allow him to start 
a good university course somewhere in Turkey. He doesn’t really enjoy 
life in the new city, and spends most of his free time at home with his flat-
mate, in Kızıltepe with the family and family friends, or rather on social 
media. Abdurrahman is a regular user of Facebook, Tango, WhatsApp 
and WeChat. On Facebook he has 200 friends, of whom around 180 are 
male relatives and 20 male friends from school and the neighbourhood. 
Out of these 180 relatives, around 50 live in Kızıltepe, 40 in Mardin, 30 
in Cyprus, 20 in Istanbul and 40 in his home village. His family is part of 
a small tribe made up of 1,500 members, all of whom he claims to per-
sonally know quite well. Considering that half of these 1,500 people are 
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women, and thus unlikely to be in touch with him on social media, and 
presumably more than half of the remaining male kin are too old or too 
young to use the internet, on Facebook he is connected with the majority 
of his tribe’s young male members. The people he mostly interacts with 
on Facebook are the 10 male first cousins who attend university either 
in Cyprus or in Istanbul. These are also the closest people beyond his 
nuclear family, since they all grew up together in the village and used 
to meet each other every day. He uses all the social media at his disposal 
to communicate with them:  Tango for video calls with each of them a 
few times a month, WeChat and WhatsApp for text messages many times 
a week, and Facebook for sharing memes and comments. Relationships 
between cousins of the same sex and age are very important and involve 
many traits that may recall relationships between close young friends 
in European and Mediterranean contexts: cousins are those with whom 
young people spend a lot of time to chat, have fun and share daily-life expe-
riences beyond the domestic space of the nuclear family. Relationships 
with cousins last long, often for a lifetime, as may happen between good 
friends. Online communications and interactions with cousins of a similar 
age and the same sex are very frequent in the region, and largely consti-
tute the online youth networks that in some ‘Western contexts’ are mainly 
made up of school or neighbourhood friends. Social media, indeed, play a 
focal role in maintaining contact between cousins when face-to-face con-
tact is limited. Online cousins gather in the same way they gathered in 
the streets of the village where they grew up together. In short, Facebook 
marks an attempted return to traditional group sociality.
Abdurrahman does not actively communicate with the remaining 
Facebook ‘friends’. He would only ‘like’ some status updates and posts, 
and more rarely write a few comments, but he is happy to have all of them 
there, so as to be updated about their lives. Facebook is an extremely 
important tool for having information about relatives with whom people 
otherwise wouldn’t communicate, and it creates the feeling of having 
them closer. It also facilitates gossip and rumour that in the past were 
mainly based on word of mouth. As noted in Chapter  3, Facebook is 
largely used to observe, monitor and spy on other people’s lives; in the 
case of relatives who live far from each other, this practice contributes to 
the creation of a sense of proximity, closeness and belonging to the same 
kin group. Furthermore, being aware of news and developments in the 
lives of a few hundred young male relatives expands the opportunities to 
know more about all the members of the tribe.
The use of social media by Katibe is pretty similar. She is a 
22-year-old unmarried woman who was born in a village in the Province 
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of Mardin to an Arabic-speaking family, which then moved to Kızıltepe, 
and then moved again to Konya after she finished high school. Katibe 
didn’t really like Konya, both because she was discriminated as a migrant 
originally from the southeast and also because she couldn’t find a job 
there. For this reason, she decided to come back to Mardin to live with 
her paternal uncle’s family, who resided in a flat in the new city. She 
looked for a job as a nurse in a nursery school, but ended up working as 
a dishwasher in a lokanta. But still she prefers living in Mardin to Konya.
Katibe has one Facebook account that she checks only a few times 
a week when linked to someone else’s wireless connection, because she 
doesn’t have a connection at home or an internet contract on her small 
smartphone. On Facebook she has around 110 friends, out of whom 90 
are relatives and 20 school friends from Kızıltepe living in the Province 
of Mardin. The 90 relatives all live in different towns of Turkey as they 
all migrated from the home village at different times, mainly following 
the worsening of the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army in 
the 1990s. While she communicates usually via phone and SMS with her 
mother, three sisters, four female first cousins and three aunts, she uses 
Facebook to keep in touch with more distant relatives. The 10 people 
with whom she communicates most often on Facebook are nine first 
cousins (eight female and one male), the four she was talking with on 
the phone and another four, and also one school friend from Kızıltepe. 
She communicates with them through private chat and only very rarely 
on the public wall. Katibe’s family belongs to an Arabic-speaking tribe 
with around 2,000 members; they have been in touch only sporadically 
over the last 20 years, mainly between old family members. Katibe, like 
the other relatives of the same generation, is not ordinarily connected 
with them face to face or on the phone, except when she visits the village 
every few years. However, on Facebook she is following the lives of 90 of 
her first and second cousins, nieces, nephews, young uncles and aunts 
by looking at their profile updates and public displays of pictures and 
personal information.
Even more than Abdurrahman, Katibe is using Facebook to observe 
the lives of her relatives. She has weekly interactions only with a small pro-
portion of them, but, thanks to Facebook, she is able to remain updated 
about the lives of many more. In Mardin, Facebook is used to peek at 
other people’s lives, especially by women. Female friends will spend 
hours examining and commenting upon the lives of their first or second 
cousins, uncles, aunts or nephews living somewhere else in Turkey or in 
the world:  ‘Look! He got engaged to that beautiful woman.’ Or:  ‘He has 
three kids, the youngest is so cute’ or ‘Look at her husband! He is so rich. 
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Look at his car, it’s so expensive!’ People readily admitted that gossiping 
about distant family members was one of the reasons for being on social 
media. As soon as a person ‘friends’ someone new on Facebook, they 
spend a good deal of time examining his/her wall and pictures, and this is 
not something to hide or to be shy about. It is a socially accepted practice. 
People carefully study the minutiae of relatives’ Facebook walls, and at the 
same time construct their Facebook pages to affect the content of other 
people’s gossiping. Gossiping engenders and expresses a powerful sense 
of belonging to a kin group, where connections between young members 
are increasingly more mediated by social media. It also facilitates partici-
pation in other people’s lives, and Facebook is the platform that makes 
this possible. It brings back to the same online place family members that 
have scattered around the country who wouldn’t have many other oppor-
tunities to meet, beyond weddings or sporadic visits to their home village 
or town. So while kinship networks are weakened in some respects, the 
impact of social media has been to strengthen such ties.
Not only is Facebook used to maintain contacts between relatives 
when they can no longer meet face to face, but it plays an important role 
by putting in touch distant family members who have never met or talked 
before. Cihan, a 26-year-old Kurdish man who was born and grew up in 
Mardin, one day started to receive several Facebook friend requests from 
people he didn’t know. When he saw that he had many ‘Facebook friends’ 
in common with them, he accepted the requests and started to chat with 
them. He was extremely happy to discover and meet these new relatives 
he hadn’t known anything about. Most of them had left their home village 
during the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army, while others 
had migrated at different times in search of better jobs and never went 
back. They were now living in the big cities of western Turkey. He said:
I found 40 relatives in this way. It’s so important for me. They live 
in Istanbul, Antalya or Izmir. They don’t come back to our village 
any more, but my father does not need Facebook, he already knows 
everybody. I am always surprised to discover how many relatives he 
knows. But we (the young generation) are forgetting our blood, we 
don’t know where we come from. For example one month ago one 
of my relatives from the village died. One of his brothers called my 
aunt on the phone, who called my uncle who called my father, and 
my father went to the village and prayed for him. I don’t even know 
the names of these relatives. We (the young generation) wouldn’t be 
able to be reached on the phone if someone dies. But now, because 
of Facebook, we are becoming more connected with each other. We 
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(the youth) use Facebook and Twitter, they (the old) use the phone. 
For the Kurds, the extended family is so important. For example, 
last year, the wife of my mother’s uncle who lived in Diyarbakır 
died. When we got the news, we all went there to visit his family. 
I have not seen this uncle for almost 20 years, I was a child when 
I saw him last time, and we were so close to each other. I remember 
he used to give me a lot of presents, cakes and chocolate; he really 
loved me. When I saw him again after almost 20 years we were so 
happy. Even after 50 years without seeing each other, the respect 
and affection for our relatives never end. Relatives are so important 
for us … The most distant relative I have on Facebook is the son of 
the daughter of the uncle of the uncle of my mother. He found me 
on Facebook, and we met once when I went to Antalya last summer. 
We spent one day together, we went to the sea, we smoked nar-
ghile and we talked all day. It’s not important whether we have met 
before or not, being aware of our common ancestry is enough. For 
example, if my father tells me that someone is a relative, I can then 
sit and talk with them, even if we have never met before. We respect 
each other. We are Kurds and for Kurds ties with our relatives are so 
important. For Arabs it is different. Look! My girlfriend is Arab, and 
she has just blocked her older brother on Facebook. This would be 
inadmissible for us.
Social media was defined as a tool against assimilation by some Kurdish 
friends. One told me:
For us Kurds, Facebook is a weapon against assimilation! Look at 
my brother! Most of his friends on Facebook are relatives living all 
around Turkey. During the ’90s life was so terrible here that most 
of our relatives had to escape from the villages and from Kızıltepe 
to somewhere else in Turkey. And Facebook is now the only way we 
have to remain in touch with them. Social media allows us to con-
tinue our bond with them and thus exist as Kurds.12
Policies of the Turkish State since the foundation of the Republic have 
aimed at denying the existence of Kurdish minorities and assimilating 
them into ‘modern’ Turkish society. The project to assimilate the Kurds was 
also pursued by a politics of displacement. Although Kurdish migration 
to the big cities in Turkey has been a long-term process, this intensified in 
the 1980s and ’90s.13 The State deliberately started a politics of removal 
of the Kurdish population from their traditional homelands, as part of a 
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strategy to expand its control over the southeast region. Migration was 
also created by conflict and the search for better economic opportun-
ities. Yet weaving these social networks of dispersed relatives has become 
a form of Kurdish resistance to assimilation, in which social media has 
played a key role. Many young Kurds in Mardin, including students from 
other towns of the southeast, villagers recently migrated to the new city 
or Kurdish Mardinites who have lived there for a few generations, are 
now using social media to extend or strengthen connections and rela-
tionships with distant relatives living far away. For example, chatting and 
playing games on Facebook with first or second cousins who still live in 
the village and whom they meet face to face only occasionally is a very 
common practice among young male Kurds.
Social media is also used to connect with relatives by those Kurds 
who don’t belong to any tribe. In Mardin not all Kurds belong to a tribe.14 
In Kurdistan there is a ‘wide range of forms of social and political organ-
isation’,15 and ‘distinction between tribal and non-tribal Kurds is gener-
ally made by the Kurds themselves’.16 Then, beyond the ‘traditionally’ 
non-tribal Kurds, who are typically peasants who do not own any land, 
there can be found a large number of people whose tribal affiliation 
existed in the past, but has become very weak with time, to the point 
that it doesn’t count any more. In the case of peasants with non-tribal 
origins, social media is not used to keep in touch with a large number 
of distant relatives, but it rather has great importance in maintaining 
contact with siblings, first cousins, nephews and nieces who have also 
spread across the country. For example, Baris  grew up in a village in the 
Province of Mardin in a poor peasant family that migrated to Istanbul in 
the early 1990s. He then got married and came back to live in the new 
city of Mardin where he has a good job as a computer technician and a 
‘middle-class’ living standard. He no longer has relatives in Mardin and 
thus regularly uses Facebook to interact with his five nephews and two 
brothers who still live in Istanbul, and three first cousins living in Izmir.
Facebook was not the only social media platform used to preserve 
ties with members of the extended family. WhatsApp, too, has come to 
be used to communicate with close and distant relatives. Rojda’s father is 
the leader of an important Kurdish tribe from Mardin Province, which is 
well respected by other Kurds of the region. He is a big land owner who 
more recently has started to work in the construction sector, and he is a 
firm supporter of the Kurdish nationalist movement and the BDP. Rojda 
is a 29-year-old married woman, the second of 10 siblings, who works as 
a teacher in a private school while preparing for the exam to become a 
state-employed teacher. As is often the case among big Kurdish families, 
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after getting married she continued to be closely in touch with her family 
of origin. She visits her beautiful paternal house in the new city at least 
two or three times a week and spends time there with her numerous sis-
ters, first cousins and aunts.
Rojda and her brothers and sisters grew up in the old city of 
Mardin in a neighbourhood that was inhabited mostly by close and dis-
tant relatives and members of the same tribe, which numbers around 
4,000–5,000 members, divided into five different lineages with five dif-
ferent family names. Until the age of 18 Rojda and her sisters had rela-
tionships mainly with members of their tribe. They went to school with 
relatives, as the primary and secondary schools located in the neighbour-
hood were mostly attended by members of the tribe, they played in the 
yard with relatives and they had meals with relatives. The few children 
not belonging to the family were included and accepted when playing 
together. Only with their attendance at university have they started to 
develop relationships with strangers (yabancı) and to create friendships 
outside the family network. However, Rojda and her sisters continue to 
spend most of their time with (female) members of the family. From their 
father’s side alone they have more than 100 first cousins. At her sister’s 
hen party, which was intentionally kept small and sober out of respect 
for the grandmother who had died a few days before, the participants 
were 60 female relatives and only three of the bride’s university friends. 
Throughout the party, they kept praising very proudly: ‘Look! They are 
all relatives! Here are all relatives.’
When young adults come from a prestigious family of an import-
ant tribe they usually have more social restrictions because there is a 
lot at stake: their family authority within the tribe and the prestige of 
the whole tribe to the outside. The behaviour of daughters and sons 
of the tribe’s leader can directly affect the power and the reputation of 
their fathers. For this reason, young Kurds who belong to leading fam-
ilies generally have to follow more traditional habits and customs: mar-
riages between patrilineal cousins continue to be quite frequent; a 
woman’s marriage with an outsider tends to be more accepted if she 
is educated to a university level; and inheritance is more often divided 
according to traditional customs that mean unequal divisions between 
daughters and sons. On the other hand, many Kurds living in the urban 
space of the new city who are not affiliated to any tribe tend to be 
more assimilated to the ‘modern’ family system:  arranged marriages 
with cousins are significantly less frequent, young women tend to be 
freer from family restrictions and young men are more independent of 
their relatives.
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In this context, Rojda and her sisters do not use Facebook, despite 
the fact that they are all aged between 16 and 32 and were all educated to 
secondary-school or graduate level. They explained this choice as a form 
of resistance to the public exhibition of private life, to women’s harass-
ment and to the immoral flirting and courtship between strangers of the 
opposite sex. As was often the case in Mardin, the whole family used to 
express one singular and uncontroversial ‘official’ opinion, and behave 
according to it. None of them, indeed, have ever had a Facebook account. 
Yet they have new smartphones where they use Viber, Tango and mostly 
WhatsApp. They opened a WhatsApp account at the beginning of 2014, 
and soon after that they created a WhatsApp group with around 60 female 
members: sisters, first cousins and aunts and nieces of similar age. The 
members of the group were all relatives who lived next to each other in 
the old city and were now dispersed around the new city of Mardin, other 
cities in southeast Turkey, and (in one instance) abroad. The group has 
been very active since its creation. Every day someone writes and shares 
pictures from her daily life: photos of new dresses and requests for sug-
gestions whenever someone wants to buy new clothes; images with food 
as soon as it is ready; and comments and jokes about other relatives. The 
women also used WhatsApp to organise meetings and gatherings: one day 
they arranged an iftar17 dinner for Ramadan in the garden of their fam-
ily building in the old city, and they used WhatsApp to decide the menu 
and balance different courses, as everybody was cooking different dishes. 
This organisation took more than two weeks, during which everybody 
was sending WhatsApp messages. After this prolonged organisation they 
finally had a sumptuous iftar dinner with roughly 30 people, the female 
relatives participating in the WhatsApp group and one of their several 
uncles with his sons. As Rojda put it:  ‘On WhatsApp we re-created the 
neighbourhood where we lived when we were children!’
The case of Rojda’s family illustrates how social media has been 
appropriated to reproduce the social organisation of their offline world, 
characterised by endogamy and tribal affiliation. As they mainly had 
contacts with members of their lineage in the offline world, so they did 
on social media. Friendships with people who were not members of the 
lineage (yabancı) were rare, both online and offline. In this case, social 
media has not led to any significant transformation of their social uni-
verse but has rather reinforced traditional social formations, counter-
ing the impact of geographic mobility and urbanisation that has pulled 
relatives apart. Also, by refusing to use Facebook to avoid its detrimental 
effects on women’s reputations, Rojda’s family enacted a form of spon-
taneous resistance; only a more ‘private’ social media platform such as 
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WhatsApp allowed them to be in touch with each other, but at the same 
time protected from the indiscreet gazes of voyeur strangers. As a result, 
through the guarding of their private lives, they also reproduced on 
social media their status as the traditional elite of the town.
The significance of social media in re-creating the kinship network 
is also proved by the extent to which some young Kurdish women and 
men experienced the online presence of older relatives as a burden. 
Whereas Abdurrahman, Katibe, Cihan, Baris  and Rojda all happily used 
social media to re-create the network of the extended family, other young 
adults did not. Young teenagers, university students and well-educated 
young people were especially keen to use Facebook to extend their social 
network beyond their kin group, whose presence was experienced as 
oppressive and constraining. An unmarried Kurdish woman in her mid 
20s and part of another important tribe of Mardin affirmed:
My uncle on Facebook controls me and my cousins many hours 
every day. If he sees something inappropriate, like a picture of me 
sitting next to a boy, he takes the phone and calls me! It happened 
already a couple of times. I  unfriended him, as well as my older 
relatives. I don’t want them on my Facebook. I now have only cous-
ins and relatives of my age.
This oppressive sense of being under control is not experienced only by 
women, but by young men too. An unmarried Kurdish man in his late 20s 
reported having received phone calls from different uncles making fun 
of him, asking which women in the pictures posted on Facebook were 
his girlfriends. He also ended up unfriending three uncles. Although for 
him and his university-educated friends of the same generation hanging 
out with female friends was a normal and common practice, it was not 
for his older relatives. Generally speaking, young, university-educated 
adults from middle- to upper-class families who spend a few years living 
on their own in large metropolitan areas enter into a new social world of 
relationships beyond the kinship network. And in these cases they more 
often prefer to use Facebook to maintain these new relationships, and 
the presence of so many family members is experienced as oppressive 
and burdensome.
Kinship networks and traditional marriage systems affect social 
media use in other various and unexpected ways. Among Kurds affili-
ated to a tribe, endogamy and marriage between patrilineal cousins con-
tinues to be very common, as in the family of Gülsüm, a young woman 
from a big tribe from the Mardin Province. She is a university student at 
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Mardin Artuklu University and a keen Facebook user. As a member of an 
important family within the tribe, she proudly describes herself as more 
subject to strict social constraints than her peers. In order to protect the 
honour and the prestige of her family and tribe, she also has to follow 
more rigid social rules online: she can’t post pictures of herself in class 
standing or sitting near male university students, whereas her female 
classmates can do so more easily; she can’t even post photos of herself 
wearing ordinary clothes, as she always has to appear well dressed with 
smart clothes. However, the interesting thing here is that endogamy and 
attitudes towards it have led her to unfriend from Facebook several of 
her male first cousins. On Facebook she had many relatives who thought 
that she was flirting with her cousins whenever they interacted with her 
on the public Facebook wall. She was also feeling courted whenever her 
male first cousins wrote to her, and thus she stopped answering their 
messages. A simple dialogue with them was seen by her and her family as 
a sign of courtship or romance. Everybody knew that she would have to 
get married to a first cousin or at least a relative, and for this reason she 
tried not to make Facebook a place where potential suitors could legitim-
ately start the courtship. On the other hand, she was more comfortable 
in receiving public comments and messages from her male school and 
university friends, because this was not necessarily considered a sign of 
flirtation or a declaration of love.
Among the Arabs, family relationships and migrations from and 
to Mardin have been quite different from those of the Kurds. As we saw 
at the beginning of the chapter, Arabs tend to be less attached to their 
distant relatives. They have been more easily assimilated into the ‘mod-
ern’ Turkish model of society; migrations towards western Turkey started 
mainly in the 1950s and continued in the following years, and were moti-
vated more by the search for better job opportunities. Many urban Arabs 
now live in different Turkish cities and Europe, and they tend to be better 
integrated into urban life than the majority of Kurds.
Generally speaking, Arabs on social media have fewer relatives than 
the Kurds. However, many urban Arabs, especially men, use Facebook to 
keep in touch with members of the same kin group when they have one. For 
example Ozan, a 33-year-old Arab friend from one of the most prominent 
Arab lineages of Mardin with 60,000 members all around Turkey, had 500 
relatives on Facebook. Around 350 of these lived in other towns in Turkey 
and 150 in Mardin. Most of them were university-educated people who 
enjoyed a  ‘middle-class’ urban standard of living, but who equally wished 
to remain connected with distant relatives. He was also very careful in 
specifying that his kinship network is a family (aile) or a lineage (sülale) 
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and not a tribe (asiret), as they don’t recognise the authority of any 
leader, and relationships between family members are motivated by dis-
interested affection rather than political goals or alliances for power. Yet, 
at the same time, many female urban Arabs in their 20s had very few rela-
tives on Facebook, as a strategy to protect themselves from their gossip 
and rumours. They tried to make Facebook a place where they could live 
a life less subject to the social constraints of the offline world. But despite 
different stratagems and regardless of the many older relatives who were 
unfriended, Facebook continued to be a space inhabited and watched by 
family members, similarly to the case of many young Kurdish women. 
Therefore, age, gender and level of education play a significant role in 
shaping the kinds of social network that people have online, as much as 
did the differences between Kurds and Arabs.
To conclude, this section of the chapter has shown how social media 
has been used to maintain connections with a large network of relatives 
who live in different parts of the country. Keeping distant relationships 
with a large number of kin, strengthening ties and facilitating communi-
cations with first cousins and close relatives, or starting new connections 
with family members never met before, have all contributed to repro-
ducing traditional kinship forms in the face of larger processes of social 
change and geographic mobility. This finding stands out as peculiar to 
this specific region of the world, where kin relations continue to be so 
important both offline and online, despite migration – whereas in some 
‘Western countries’ studies show that social media has been mainly used 
to communicate with a small number of intimate friends.18 The next sec-
tion will examine the uses of social media in the communication between 
members of the same nuclear family and between friends. Even in these 
cases, the findings are quite different from those of many other studies 
carried out in other regions.
Social media and personal communications between 
family members
Even though the phone continues to be the most used medium in conver-
sations between middle-aged people and between parents and offspring, 
social media has become an important tool of communication in the 
daily contacts between young members of the same family. Facebook, 
Tango, Viber, WeChat and especially WhatsApp are regularly used by 
siblings:  video calls on Tango, audio calls on Viber, text messages and 
images on WeChat and WhatsApp. Social media are used to reproduce 
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the immediacy, the intensity and the connectivity of face-to-face commu-
nication when this is not possible. In Mardin, relations between family 
members are made up of constant, endless interactions, and spending 
time alone is not considered desirable. People tend to be constantly 
surrounded by a large number of relatives and guests, and individuals 
understand themselves more as part of a relationship or as a member 
of a family. Young women who moved to Mardin for work from nearby 
towns can cry for hours because they miss their mothers and sisters and 
can meet them only at weekends. Other women were so full of guilt and 
shame because they had left their parents alone in another town that they 
had to renounce their work projects in order to go back to their home 
town. Mothers can become totally desperate because their grown-up 
children have moved to other cities in the region to attend university. 
Relationships between family members are intense, emotional and 
profound, and people can spend several hours a day interacting with 
their kin. Being cut off from their own family is one of the worst things 
that can ever happen to a person: for example, there were rumours about 
a Muslim man who was repudiated by the whole family after converting 
to Christianity and who became completely mad. This story was narrated 
as an example of the most horrible thing that can ever happen to a person 
in life. Family has also become the main source of security in the face of 
the political violence that has gone on for a long time in the region, and 
is experienced as the only source of safety from the threatening external 
world. Whilst relationships with non-kin are often ruled by a high level of 
mistrust, relationships between family members are frequent and based 
on immediacy and obligation always and everywhere in Mardin.
Social media has facilitated continuous interaction when this 
was no longer possible in the offline world. Social media, indeed, has 
not replaced the phone, but it is used in addition to it when some fam-
ily member goes to live in a different city after getting married or when 
starting university or a new job. For example, it is common for two sisters 
in their 20s who live in different towns to send up to 10 messages and 
10 photos of food and clothes every day on WhatsApp. People share their 
ordinary daily life, and conversations are rarely interesting and deep. 
Making the presence of the other visible is more important than saying 
something markedly interesting, funny or smart. Mobile phones remain 
the favourite medium and are used with great intensity and frequency, 
even when everybody is on social media. Young sisters can call each other 
up to seven or eight times a day when one of them is outside the house, 
or fathers can call their sons many times an hour if they have to explain 
something to them.
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Social media is often used in addition to the phone only with the 
favourite family members. Sibel is a 26-year-old woman living on her own 
in Mardin. She has five siblings and she regularly speaks on the phone 
with all of them, but she uses WhatsApp only with her favourite oldest 
sister, with whom she shares pictures and memes many times every day. 
Mehmet is a 32-year-old man who regularly speaks on the phone with 
his seven brothers and sisters living in other towns, but he communicates 
on Facebook only with his favourite younger brother. They chat, share 
pictures, cartoons and comics in private, and more rarely on the public 
Facebook. During the course of my research, WhatsApp came to be used 
more often than Facebook in communications between siblings, as it was 
preferred as a smartphone chat application. WhatsApp conveys a sense of 
immediacy and privacy that is not provided by Facebook.
Intra-family communications on social media are more com-
monly displayed on the public Facebook because they are more socially 
accepted than friendship relations. Tagging family members and sharing 
images, videos and news on Facebook is more common between siblings, 
cousins, wives and husbands, while images and pictures with friends and 
strangers are more often shared in the private chats of Facebook. In a 
society where the public display of private relationships has always been 
limited to a few controlled offline events and ceremonies, this constitutes 
one of the transformative effects of Facebook. For example, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, marital relationships are often displayed pub-
licly to prove to others that one’s personal life is happy and lived accord-
ingly to moral codes. This is also the case in those situations where these 
codes are not followed in ‘real’ life. A 27-year-old woman who came to 
work in Mardin from a nearby city told me this story. Murat, her friend 
and landlord, started to flirt with her although he had already a wife and 
three children and one secret lover whom he regularly saw at the week-
end when his wife was too busy looking after the children. The love of 
these two women was not enough and the man started to court my friend 
and send her messages via SMS and WhatsApp late at night. After three 
days of his harassing invitations and refusals on her part, she blocked his 
phone number. Murat started to call her from anonymous phone num-
bers; the girl stopped the second number too and he stopped harassing 
her. After a couple of weeks, Murat called my friend and ordered her to 
leave the house without giving her any explanation. In one week, she 
had to find a new flat and move all her furniture and belongings into a 
new place. She was evicted from her house because she didn’t want to 
have an affair with the landlord. During those weeks, I followed Murat’s 
Facebook postings (he is my friend on Facebook), and I  was surprised 
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to see that he completely changed his online behaviour. All year long he 
had posted pictures of holiday trips with friends, food and politics, but 
he suddenly started to post pictures of him with his wife and to write 
romantic and sweet words about his relationship with her. For the whole 
month he shared pictures and poetry proving his happy marriage. Men 
who cheat on their wives and harass girls are defined as serefsiz (men 
without honour), which is one of the most common and worst deroga-
tory epithets for a man. After my friend refused to have an affair with 
him, Murat’s main concern was to protect his reputation and protect the 
relationship with his wife, and Facebook was a good tool for achieving 
this. The photographic material on Facebook was an effective way to 
produce a new desired and ideal reality where people are more happy, 
moral and honourable.
If the story of Murat is an extreme example of the existing gap 
between the online and the offline, social media often facilitates the 
public presentation of ideal intra-family relations:  photos portraying 
women hugging baby nieces and nephews, men with groups of male 
cousins, female teenagers standing close to their mother or the nuclear 
family sitting around a table before lunch. Social media is very import-
ant in intra-family relations, both as a tool in one-to-one communica-
tion and as a form of public interconnectivity, where publicly shared 
narratives of happy relations contribute to a strengthening of the rela-
tionship itself.
Friendship
As is often the case in anthropology, geographic areas have always been 
associated with the study of specific topics, such as witchcraft in Africa, 
hierarchies in India, carnivals in the Caribbean, sometimes to the neglect 
of other subjects. Anthropological attention to the Middle East has tra-
ditionally been focused on kinship, gender and religion, and studies of 
friendships are relatively sparse.19 Yet, from the very beginning of my 
research, friendship emerged as a key theme requiring further examination, 
one reason being that Facebook was designed in North America to address 
a particular idea of friendship that is quite different from the one present 
in Mardin. In Mardin, as we have seen, Facebook is used more often with 
relatives than with friends. At the same time, relationships with local kin 
have many traits in common with North American relationships with 
friends. For example, relationships between cousins of the same sex 
would be comparable with typical friendships in the USA, as same-sex 
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cousins hang out together, sit in cafes, talk and spend time together. But 
a local friendship includes different feelings and expectations, and such 
a sense of obligation that can lead to distrust and fear of deceit if it is not 
reciprocated.
In Mardin, friendship was traditionally at least connected to kin-
ship. Both in the case of a relationship between two different families 
or households, or in the case of a relationship between two individuals, 
friendship was usually mediated by the family, with the few exceptions 
of friendships mediated by groups, such as bands of boys or groups of 
university and school friends. In Turkish there are two words for friends: 
arkadas and dost. The expression arkadas refers to the common friend, 
and dost to the intimate and good friend that lasts longer or for life. But in 
Mardin the expression dost was mainly used for good friends of the whole 
family, and more rarely for friends of a single individual.
Women tend to have more friends while they are at school, but 
after marriage their social network changes and mainly consists of family 
members. Only one or two best friends last longer, but ordinary friend-
ships from school and the neighbourhood will likely finish after marriage. 
The situation is slightly different for those women who attend university, 
as they usually continue to have more friends after becoming wives and 
mothers. With the exception of their best friend(s), friendship relation-
ships between women tend to be based on lack of trust: young women 
don’t usually confide private and intimate details of their personal life 
to their friends because they might use this information against them. 
Friends may discover secrets and could be motivated by jealousy and envy. 
Stories of romances and flirtation with secret lovers are rather confided 
to sisters or female first cousins, who are more trustworthy, also because 
gossip about members of the family would immediately affect the reputa-
tion of the whole family and themselves too. Friendship between young 
unmarried Arab women is based on sporadic meetings at someone’s 
house or in local cafes, where they can show off that they can afford coffee 
and tea there; meetings on a daily basis are rarer and something that per-
tains more to relationships between cousins. Other forms of friendships 
include colleagues who share the same office, who do not usually see each 
other again after changing job, or neighbours (komsu). Women usually 
have good relationships with neighbours of similar political affiliation and 
they visit each other when they are bored at home. On such visits they 
exchange food, and they gossip about other inhabitants of the buildings.
On social media all these kinds of relationships are quite faithfully 
reproduced. Young women usually have their school or work friends on 
social media, especially if they live in other cities. They use Facebook for 
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chatting, entertainment, to share images and have fun, and to provide 
information about their lives. Facebook is very important to maintain 
weekly contact with them. More intense relationships with the closest 
friends are more often lived face to face and on the phone, and only in 
second instance on social media. Indeed, relationships between best 
friends resemble those between family members and are lived with the 
same intensity. However, the most interesting change brought by social 
media is the new opportunity for women to meet new people and make 
new friends. Especially when teenagers come from a poor and conser-
vative background and their movements and relationships are highly 
restricted by the family, Facebook expands their network of friends. Girls 
often add strangers to their Facebook profile and have private conversa-
tions with them; they smartly change the privacy settings to avoid being 
seen by other friends and relatives or they create fake profiles, because 
being seen to be in touch with strangers is considered morally reprehen-
sible, even though this is not courtship and does not involve romance. 
Even though educated and more independent women more often share 
public pictures with their best female friend(s), or write comments to 
each other on their Facebook profiles, friendship relations are usually kept 
more private than relationships between relatives. This happens mainly 
because friendships between women do not constitute an important form 
of social capital to be shown off in public: husband, family, kinship and 
family friends secure more benefit, social support and well-being than 
friendship. To conclude, we can argue that social media has increased 
the number and the types of friends for women, by widening their social 
network online and offline, but it has not changed the nature of already 
existing offline friendship in any substantial way.
Social media has had a similar impact on friendship ties among 
men. Traditionally young men have more friends than women. They 
spend time together enjoying activities such as sports, hanging around, 
playing games, or sitting in cafes or çay bahçesi. Friendships among men 
are mainly transient relationships ruled by obligations and reciprocity, 
which do not last beyond the time and space of school, neighbourhood 
or work office. An exception is the best friend, who has usually been 
known since primary school or early childhood and is trusted and thus 
treated like a member of the family. The expression Akraba gibi (like a 
relative) was often used to describe this type of relationship. People often 
remark that ‘Friends come and go, but relatives remain for all your life. 
They never go away’.
For men, Facebook is largely used to maintain looser ties with 
friends (arkadaslar) met at school, university, military service or in the 
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neighbourhood, who have since moved to other areas in Mardin or other 
places in Turkey. Facebook has lifted the transience of these relations and 
has transformed them into more distant, long-term connections. Online 
interactions are not limited to written communication in private chat, 
but also include games and video calls. As with women, such interactions 
often reproduce the practices of sociality that existed offline.
Halil described his usage of Facebook in this way:
I tell you this funny story! One of my university flatmates moved 
to Gaziantep, and I came to Mardin. We couldn’t meet any more, 
it was too difficult. We were both too busy. But on Facebook we 
used to meet, chat, and made video calls. On day we got bored and 
I told him: ‘Come! Let’s play some games.’ We started to play Okey,20 
and during it we kept drinking tea, because on Okey there is the 
option to drink and offer tea. Then he started to send me one beer, 
two beers, three beers. It was funny, because he knows that I drink 
alcohol, and he offered me beers. But I know that he does not drink 
alcohol, and I didn’t send him any beer. On Facebook you can con-
tinue your own normal life, also in these small and nice things.
WhatsApp is used more among those groups of young male friends who 
also meet face to face, and they enjoy the presence of a further protected 
space where they can have fun and share funny images and jokes, far 
from the gaze and constraints of family and older relatives, and free from 
the formality of the public Facebook. Young men can spend many hours 
a day having fun on WhatsApp with their friends, especially at night, 
when they sit at home and are bored. WhatsApp is also used to organise 
meetings with friends at cafes or cinemas. Internet points are important 
places of sociality for teenagers and young boys, who meet to play games 
and enjoy their time; one WhatsApp group included more than 50 young 
men in their early 20s who used to meet in an internet cafe, but they used 
WhatsApp to organise meetings in other places in the town or holiday 
trips. The size of a WhatsApp male group may vary between five and 80.
Facebook is also used to increase the number of friends and acquaint-
ances. In contrast to women’s friendships, these comprise important 
social capital that is more often displayed in public to increase fame 
and popularity. It is quite common for male teenagers and less educated 
young men in their 20s to add on Facebook people they have never met 
before. In most of these cases, the friendship remains limited to the 
online space. They meet online, become Facebook friends, chat and play 
games on Facebook, but when they meet in the streets of Mardin they do 
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not say hello to each other, and they act as if they don’t know who these 
people are. Young unmarried men take advantage of Facebook to create 
an alternative social space inhabited by alternative networks of friends 
that do not necessarily coincide with the ties existing in the offline world. 
Online they can more freely choose with whom to be friends and they are 
less constrained by the norms ruling social relations in the offline world, 
which are built on hierarchies around ethnicity, social class, political 
affiliations and alliances between families. On Facebook, young men are 
more eager to act as individuals unbound from the constraints that limit 
them offline.
Conclusion
In this chapter, as indeed throughout this book, we have seen how 
social media is used simultaneously as a conservative force to repair 
the ruptures of modern life and migration with respect to kinship, as 
a reflection of offline life, as in most kinds of friendship, and also as a 
means to extend or develop other ties, such as new friendships with 
strangers or turning transient connections into longer-term weak rela-
tionships. As such, this chapter falls quite neatly into its place within the 
volume as a whole, between the earlier chapter, which focused on the 
more conservative aspect of social media in creating a new conservative 
public space which denies much of what happens offline (though there is 
also evidence for the counter rise of individualism), and the next chapter, 
which turns to an examination of the way social media has opened up 
unprecedented opportunities for friendship and flirting. Here we have 
not seen the impact noted earlier in the extension of conservatism or 
in what we are about to encounter as a form of radical transformation. 
Instead we have seen how social media and mobile phones have been 
integrated and are integral to most ordinary and everyday relationships; 
many of the details of this chapter have concerned the fundamental rela-
tionships that people care about. Yet even in this case, the consequences 
are quite significant: the maintenance and strengthening of kin ties that 
have become looser with the migration and geographic mobility of the 
last few decades, but also the use of social media for daily life relation-
ships between parents and children, siblings or cousins, which has had 
deep emotional and poignant impacts on people’s everyday lives.
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Hidden romance and love
The impact of social media in the field of premarital romance among 
young adults living in Mardin is extraordinary. The previous two 
chapters focused on the reproduction of traditional social formations and 
hyper-conservative public social norms. By contrast, this chapter inves-
tigates the new practices of courtship, flirting, dating and inter-gender 
communication that have been enabled by social media. I emphasise here 
the transformative role of social media and the extent to which it has 
expanded the opportunities to satisfy pre-existing desires for premarital 
romantic love, which were traditionally limited to rare encounters in 
the few available and suitable offline spaces. New forms of romance 
first appeared with the arrival of the internet in the region:  many 
people in their 30s and 40s noted that internet chatting and MSN were 
used to meet, communicate and flirt with people of the opposite sex. 
These practices have also been the subject of academic studies in other 
regions of the Middle East.1 However, the diffusion of social media and 
smartphones has made online premarital romance, love and friendship 
among young people more frequent and ordinary, less anonymous, and 
thus more integrated into their daily lives. The scalable sociality2 that 
characterises social media has made this possible, as users constantly 
navigate between a public space where they can meet new people, while 
at the same time presenting a self that conforms to moral expectations, 
and a private space where they can maintain secret communications with 
lovers and friends.
In Mardin, online courtship and flirting was often a source of 
public discussion and debate. Pretty much everybody, women and men, 
young and old, was aware that social media were commonly used to start 
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and experience romance. Young men were not reluctant to announce 
it loudly:  ‘Social media is all about flirting and meeting women. It’s so 
obvious, you don’t need to do research. Why? Is it different in Europe?’ 
Women recognised it more discreetly, and some of them blushed on hear-
ing the word Facebook. Social media was naturalised as a match-making 
medium and flirting was seen as its obvious and essential purpose. This 
raised obvious issues of morality. The anthropological literature on 
Islamic moral discourses is rich, and different studies have tried to un-
derstand how Muslim moralities can coexist with romantic forms of love 
within the same settings and also the same individuals.3 Since the publi-
cation of the key work of Lila Abu-Lughod on poetry in a Bedouin society,4 
scholars have stopped seeing the expression of sentiment and practices of 
premarital romance and sex as a simple ‘challenge to “traditional” values 
based on publicly held conceptions of honour and reputation, or Islamic 
constraints on premarital sex’.5 This chapter aims to contribute to these 
discussions by documenting how social media platforms have created 
new private and secret public spaces which give rise to live premarital 
romances that were previously limited to a very few secret offline spots.
The inhabitants of Mardin practise their Muslim religion in many 
different ways: Arabs and Kurds are both Sunni Muslim, but with differ-
ences related to their different schools of Islamic jurisprudence6 and to 
their different involvement in the past processes of secularisation and 
modernisation undertaken by the Turkish State. In addition, Islamic and 
Sufi congregations (cemaat) are quite powerful, and Mardinites com-
monly differentiate between ‘less religious people’ and ‘more religious 
people’, where the latter term usually refers to active members of these 
orders. Mardin has also been affected by transformations at a national 
level. The ‘Islamification’ of the society following the policies of the AKP 
government has moulded a dynamic religious conservatism that does not 
maintain the status quo, but rather reinvents the religious customs and 
traditions of the pre-Republic times.7 A general Islamification in Mardin 
was evident, for example, when comparing photos of Arab women in the 
1970s wearing miniskirts (even in the streets, but they spent very little 
time outside the home) with images of the many veiled women walking 
in the streets of Mardin now. However, many secular Kurds are resisting 
these wider processes of ‘Islamification’ in favour of Kurdish secularism.
Despite all these differences, there was a general agreement on 
what behaviour should be viewed as inappropriate by Muslims. Islam 
is a religion that has norms defining appropriate public behaviour for 
people and focuses less on internal thoughts than Christianity, for 
example.8 Words such as günah (sin) and ayıp (shameful) were often 
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used indiscriminately by almost every inhabitant of the town to con-
demn those practices that contradicted accepted norms, among which 
were premarital romance and premarital sex. Yet people agreed that the 
limits of acceptable behaviour were changing:  they described a move 
away from ‘traditional’ social forms dominated by kin relationships, 
observance of tradition and a well-defined ‘code’ of male honour and 
female modesty towards the emergence of new forms of modern life-
styles with mixed-gender friendships and new values. Elders described 
youth as lacking shame and shyness (utanma yok) and eager to experi-
ence premarital love and relationships, while youth described the elders 
as outmoded, backward and conservative (antika, geri kafalı). Other 
narratives emphasised a new role of women:  ‘Women couldn’t leave 
their house until 10 years ago. You couldn’t see any single woman walk-
ing in the street. Now, look! Women are everywhere.’ People acknow-
ledge changes in the inheritance system and dowry too: in the past, they 
were more keen to divide an inheritance unequally between daughters 
and sons, while now they tend to divide it equally; traditionally, the 
groom had to give money to the bride’s family, while now he pays for 
only the dowry, the house and its furniture and the wedding ceremony. 
Other stories emphasised the diffusion of a new idea of love and new 
forms of marriage. A married female friend in her early 40s, mother of 
three children, explained to me:
Young people don’t know what real love is. When I  was young 
I didn’t touch the hand of my husband until the night after our wed-
ding. And for years I desired and dreamt about love. Love is dream-
ing about it. Now young people walk hand in hand a few days after 
meeting each other, and they will never understand what love is!
People in their 30s emphasised the emergence of a new generation of 
teenagers and people in their early 20s who were living completely differ-
ent lives from them, due to the spread of social media A male high-school 
teacher in his mid 30s noted: ‘We are living an epochal revolution! Social 
media are like an explosion that is changing everything! Teenagers and 
young adults are living completely different lives from the previous 
generation!’
All these stories replicate a narrative of social change, as a move-
ment from tradition to modernity, from arranged marriages to marriages 
for love, from extended to nuclear family, from a family-bond society to 
individualism. But, in many cases, traditional forms, such as arranged 
marriages, remained the established convention even if the practices 
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were quite different. Whereas in western Turkey the policies of modern-
isation proposed by the Turkish State led people to see arranged mar-
riages as a sign of backwardness and lack of modernity,9 this was not 
the case in Mardin, where arranged marriages continued to represent 
the ideal. The ethnographical study, indeed, revealed several cases of 
marriages that were officially presented as arranged, but were in fact 
the result of premarital relationships. Only in a few cases would people 
openly and publicly declare the presence of a love-match.
In this new, modern, urban social context, people reacted in differ-
ent ways to the ongoing transformation, and supported different secu-
lar or Islamic ideologies. A stance towards social media was often used 
within conversations to express a position towards modernity, religion 
and morality: some women proudly claimed not to use social media, as 
they wanted to affirm their modesty and purity and their desire to resist 
an implied decadence, while other more educated and wealthy women 
openly and proudly declared their skills in using social media as a way 
to express their literacy, secularism, modernity and social status. Other 
women admitted to using social media, but noted that this was only in 
a moral and appropriate way. While some men boastfully showed how 
their wives were free to have a Facebook account and communicate with 
whoever they wanted as a way to perform the role of the progressive 
and secular man, others claimed that they chose not to use social media 
themselves in order to avoid the temptation posed by other women, 
expressing in this way their honour and principles. People constantly dis-
cussed social media’s positive and negative effects. Looking back at the 
100 questionnaires conducted at the beginning of our research, people’s 
comments always focused on the issue of morality. Adult women’s com-
ments were: ‘Social media is shameful’ or ‘Social media is not shameful’, 
‘Internet is moral’ or ‘Internet is not immoral’. Yet, as the ethnographi-
cal research progressed, it also became clear that some women and men 
commonly lied about their use of the internet in order to conform to pub-
lic discourses in which morality follows values of male honour and female 
modesty. In the innumerable conversations I had with the inhabitants of 
Mardin, the description of someone’s social media usage was often linked 
with his/her degree of backwardness or modernisation. The expressions 
varied from geri kafalı (backward), cahil (uneducated) and gundî (vil-
lagers in Kurmanji Kurdish) to medeni (civilised) and ileri (advanced). 
Social differences were commonly represented through the rural/urban 
dichotomy, which in turn refers to the division between Kurds and Arabs. 
In contrast, people do not usually talk in terms of class or poverty as such. 
To conclude, there was considerable evidence that, for people in Mardin, 
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irrespective of their use of social media, the topic had become an import-
ant mode by which they could represent their specific moral stance in a 
town that is undergoing major social changes.
The intention here is not to write a history of the actual transform-
ations of marriage, family and love in Mardin. Instead it is to reflect on 
what the narratives about social media themselves tell us about people’s 
responses to social change. The next section examines how the employ-
ment of social media for intimate relationships is differentiated by social 
class and different levels of education. The discussion then turns to the 
lack of trust and the role of jealousy as a constitutive element of premari-
tal relationships in the age of the internet. The second part of the chapter 
focuses on the common patterns of social media use among teenagers 
and young adults involved in courtship and premarital relationships. 
Overall, the chapter portrays female characters for two main reasons: as 
a woman I  obviously had easier access to women than men, and also 
because women have been affected more than men by the diffusion of 
social media, education and urbanisation.
Social differences
Many inhabitants of the poorer old city of Mardin like to describe 
themselves as attached to traditional lifestyles, old values and habits, and 
they often define themselves in opposition to the modern inhabitants 
of the new city. The low-income Arab population of the old city tends 
to follow traditional norms of arranged marriages and the exclusion 
of women from public life, as is also often the case of the low-income 
Kurdish population living in the poor suburbs of the town. Many men 
from low-income families reported that they prefer arranged marriages 
to love marriages:
Marriages for love are dangerous. If you fall in love with a woman 
and then you decide to marry her, you will surely end up deluded. 
Because love will finish at a certain point, and you will suffer. While 
if you get married with a women you don’t love and you have never 
met before, you don’t have expectations and you will be happier. 
When you have a girlfriend you start to promise things that can’t be 
satisfied. Then there is disillusion and people get upset. While if you 
get married with a woman that you have never met before, you will 
never be upset! You do not mislead and deceive. The role of the hus-
band and that of the wife will be better defined and everybody will 
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be happier. I got married with an arranged marriage. My mother 
saw my wife first, and I met her only once before getting married. 
I liked her, and then we got married. She is a housewife and cooks 
delicious food for me and of course she doesn’t use Facebook. 
I didn’t really prohibit her from using it, but she is not interested. 
She doesn’t want it. And we are very happy together.
Another man in his late 20s stated:
My mother showed me the pictures of different women, I chose the 
one I liked most, we then got engaged and married. We met only 
twice before our engagement party. I was not interested in women, 
and I  thought that it was easier for me if my mother could have 
chosen for me … Now I beat my wife, like they were doing in the 
past. For us it’s normal! I  don’t think there is anything wrong in 
that. It has always been like this in Mardin. Why do we have to 
change now? My wife is a housewife, she doesn’t work, she didn’t 
go to high school. I prefer her to be ignorant! If women study and 
work outside the house they can’t work properly inside the house. If 
she doesn’t iron my t-shirts, so why did I get married? If she doesn’t 
cook for me, so why did I get married? I could have stayed at my 
mother’s house. …  Of course my wife doesn’t use the internet. It’s 
forbidden! Until a few months ago she did not use a mobile phone 
either, but now I gave her one, so I can control her better. She never 
leaves the house without me. If she needs to go out and buy some 
groceries, she calls me and asks my permission.
While he was telling me this, his wife called him on the phone and 
asked permission to go out to buy some milk. He said yes and then shut 
his phone.
These two people, like other low-income, less educated and 
more conservative men I  talked with, didn’t tell me directly what they 
did on social media. I was a woman and they didn’t want to share such 
information with me. But on other occasions, other low-income and 
uneducated men confessed to me how they use Facebook and Tango to 
flirt with women, whether married or not. Revealing was the case of a 
32-year-old man, married with two children, who confessed to me to 
having four different Facebook accounts, out of which three were used 
with girls, one with his real name and picture, one with a fake male name 
and anonymous profile, and one with the identity and profile picture 
of a woman. I  myself also received Facebook friendship requests from 
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thousands of unknown men who were looking for women. Other young 
and middle-aged men told me how they spent hours every day sending 
friend requests to young women, as the simple presence of a profile pic-
ture with a face looks to them like a sign of availability.
More educated female friends agreed in telling me that ‘these kinds 
of men’ only use social media to meet women, talk with them and cheat 
on their wives:
Men who prefer arranged marriage will end up beating their wives 
and cheating on them. These kinds of men use social media only 
to meet new women, maybe from Russia, or East Europe, or also 
some local divorced woman that nobody else wants. Educated peo-
ple use social media also to read news and share comics, but those 
semi-illiterate men only want to have sex. Nothing more!
In conservative and less educated families, access to the internet is often 
prohibited to wives and daughters. Also, in the old city of Mardin, houses 
with an internet connection are rare. Here female teenagers tend to use 
the internet secretly in a relative’s house or through a school friend’s 
mobile phone. Not even educational purposes motivate parents to allow 
their daughters to use the internet, as higher education is not considered 
a priority:
Education is important, but it is less important than social connec-
tions. If my kids want, they will attend the university. But if my sons 
have a university degree and they don’t have connections, they will 
never find a job. In Mardin people find jobs because they know peo-
ple. Being well educated is not really so important. What gives you 
job is social connections.
In other cases, women refuse to use social media themselves to conform 
to Muslim moral values of modesty, enacting in this way a form of resist-
ance to the spread of digital technologies. They themselves considered 
social media a threat to a pious lifestyle, and were more than happy to 
not have a Facebook or WhatsApp account. Among less educated Arab 
families from the old city, as well as poor rural Kurdish families living 
in other areas of the town, social media tends to be used differently 
from the more modern, educated and relatively wealthier inhabitants 
of the new city where most of my research was carried out. The fol-
lowing story can be seen as an example of the experiences of women 
with rural origins who have recently migrated to the city. Previously 
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excluded from the internet and from any presence in public space, 
when she began to work outside the house Leyla started to use social 
media and entered into a premarital romance with a man. Although she 
used to criticise other women from Mardin for their immoral behaviour, 
she ended up acting like them: using the internet to live her romance 
and at the same time preserving her reputation based on Muslim values 
of female modesty.
Leyla
Leyla is a young unmarried woman in her mid 20s who recently moved 
from Kızıltepe to Mardin with her family. We introduced her in Chapter 1, 
when we presented the inhabitants of the town. Leyla likes to describe 
people from Kızıltepe as bearers of morality, in contrast to the inhabitants 
of Mardin:
In Kızıltepe life is different. People have more honour. Women there 
may have secret premarital romance with men, but only because 
they want to get married. But in Mardin it’s different: women don’t 
want to get married, they just want to enjoy, they want men to buy 
them gifts, and take them out to restaurants and cafes. That’s why 
women flirt with men in Mardin. Also men in Mardin have less 
honour because they have more money and they can have women. 
People in Kızıltepe have more honour.
When Leyla moved into the city of Mardin, neither she nor any of her 
sisters were working or studying, with the exception of the youngest, 
who was preparing for the university entrance examination. In line with 
the times, the two oldest sisters in their 30s hadn’t even finished elemen-
tary school, but the 18-year-old sister planned to study at the university. 
These sisters were sitting at home, making food, looking after relatives’ 
children and getting bored, in the hope that a man would ask to marry 
them. None of them used social media on a daily basis, nor did they 
have an internet connection in the house. Because they were in need of 
money, and bored of sitting at home, Leyla started to look for a job, and 
found one, first as a shop assistant and then as a cleaning lady. After a 
few months of work, Leyla fell in love with a colleague who was working 
in the same shop, and this was her first relationship with a man. Her face 
started to shine and she told me how extremely happy she now felt, in a 
way that had never previously been the case. She downloaded WhatsApp 
 
 
111hidden roMance and love
and started to spend many hours every day on the phone to communicate 
with the man, who had changed his job in the meantime.
Although Leyla owned a beautiful Samsung phone, she had never 
used the internet or social media on it before. She only sporadically used 
her sister’s smartphone to discreetly access her Facebook account. My 
questions about social media always created a lot of embarrassment, 
especially when made in front of her older brother, male relatives or 
strangers in public spaces. However, like many other people of her age, 
the romance between Leyla and Halil unfolded online and on the phone. 
Opportunities to meet face to face were very rare, as they both worked 
between 10 and 12 hours a day, with only two days off every month. 
On these days they met each other in cafes at the entrance of the city, 
where they ran less risk of being seen by friends or relatives. The com-
munication between the two happened mainly through WhatsApp and 
SMS messages. They were sending each other many messages every day 
and evening. Yet Leyla used her younger sister’s small smartphone  – a 
Samsung Galaxy Pocket  – and her Facebook account to get ‘informa-
tion’ about her new boyfriend, and to look at pictures of him. She also 
showed the photos of him to her sisters and to me, seeking approval from 
us. Her boyfriend’s Facebook wall, and the Facebook photos portraying 
him alone or with his relatives, provided the most significant informa-
tion she could get about him, and offered the only way of presenting him 
to her female family members. They minutely observed every single pic-
ture and made many comments about his physical appearance and tried 
to imagine what he would look like dressed in certain clothes instead of 
others. In those moments, Leyla was dreaming about him and about love. 
The concerns and worries she had about Facebook seemed to vanish. She 
fell in love, and Facebook was the only way to have information about her 
beloved, his life, his friends and his family. And, above all, it was the main 
way to feel close to him.
All the female members of the family knew about this (secret) rela-
tionship, and they started to feel that they knew the man through his 
Facebook pictures. The men of the family didn’t know anything about 
the relationship, nor about the use of Facebook to look at the man’s pic-
tures. When the father unexpectedly came into the room, the girls would 
instantly shut their phone so he could not see what they were looking at. 
But as soon as he left the room, Leyla would start looking at the photos on 
Facebook with her sisters once again, and she would continue to dream 
about her sweetheart. The photos of the young man always showed him 
well dressed, assuming charming postures and looking candidly straight 
into the camera lens.
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Once I  asked her:  ‘You described with negative terms those 
Mardinite women who spend hours on their smartphones to flirt with 
guys, but you are doing the same now on SMS, WhatsApp and Facebook. 
Why?’ She replied: ‘I love him, I communicate with Halil because I love 
him! And I wouldn’t talk with any other man in the world. And then we 
don’t even speak on the phone because we don’t have time. We only text 
each other.’
Love was presented as a perfect motivation that could justify her 
constant messaging and gazing at Facebook pictures. Like Leyla, many 
other women mentioned love as a powerful motive in their lives and in 
their use of social media. Leyla also believed that text messages, which 
don’t involve sound and images, were more compatible with her ideals of 
modesty and morality. In addition, romantic text messages and viewing 
Halil’s pictures on Facebook facilitated a process of imagination and a 
dream of love in line with local notions of love as desire rather than the 
results of a relationship based on face-to-face daily interaction. Facebook 
and text messages, indeed, served both to fulfil a need for a romantic 
imagination and to create an actual communication between the couple.
I had the opportunity to meet Leyla and Halil together first in the 
restaurant where Halil worked, and then in my house to drink tea. (As a 
European I was often asked to ‘cover’ meetings between young partners 
who didn’t have any other place to meet.) What struck me most in these 
encounters was the lack of verbal communication between them. They 
were not talking, they were not sharing ideas or exchanging points of 
view about something. They didn’t know what to say. In those moments, 
the silence in the room created so much embarrassment for me that I felt 
obliged to talk, while they were listening to me and winking at each 
other with their eyes and smiles. The text-message conversations showed 
some similarity with these face-to-face encounters, and included mainly 
two kinds of expressions:  romantic idioms and ordinary questions like 
‘What are you doing?’ or ‘How are you?’ followed by ordinary answers 
‘I am at work’ or ‘I am fine’. In these conversations, affirming and mak-
ing visible the presence of the other was often more important than the 
content of the communication itself. Yet social media has also enriched 
the communication, because such romantic partners felt safer and more 
secure expressing themselves online. On social media they additionally 
expressed emotional attraction and feelings of love that they could not 
express offline.
In conformity with the idea of love expressed in the Arabesk10 
songs, where the lover is unattainable and love will likely produce suffer-
ing and pain, the love story between Leyla and Halil didn’t have a happy 
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ending: one day Halil sent a text message to Leyla to tell her that his fam-
ily obliged him to get married to a cousin, and he couldn’t oppose this 
decision. He wrote to her that he was really mortified, but they couldn’t 
continue their relationship, and they couldn’t continue to text each other. 
After a few days, and for the first time in her life, Leyla opened her own 
Facebook account to be able to monitor Halil’s wall to understand exactly 
what was going on. However, in the meantime Halil had changed his 
privacy settings, unfriended Leyla’s sister and started to share his status 
updates and pictures only with chosen Facebook friends. So Leyla started 
to look at Halil’s sister’s Facebook profile. There she could see the photos 
of Halil’s engagement party, and she discovered that the official girlfriend 
was not a relative, but rather a girl who was working in the same shop 
where Leyla and Halil had met. Leyla discovered that Halil had been lying 
to her since the beginning of their relationship. She started to peek at 
him through the Facebook profiles of Halil’s sisters, brothers and friends, 
and any other person who could reveal any clue about him. To prevent 
any revenge from Leyla, Halil then closed his previous Facebook account 
and opened a new private one that was visible only to his new friends. 
Leyla was really desperate to discover why Halil had lied to her since they 
started to flirt with each other. For several weeks, whenever we met, she 
kept saying: ‘I don’t trust men. They are without honour.’
This story is revealing for several reasons. Leyla is a young woman 
with a low level of education from a low-income family who recently 
moved to Mardin. In accordance with her idea of morality and modesty 
she refused to use the internet, although she owned a fancy smartphone 
and could afford an internet connection. And she constantly described 
Facebook and WhatsApp as immoral tools used by immoral and sinful 
Mardinite girls to flirt with boys. However, her entrance into the job mar-
ket put her in the completely new situation of meeting men and falling in 
love with one of them. She started having a romance that was lived mainly 
via SMS, WhatsApp, and indirectly through Facebook, rarely face-to-face; 
so she ended up behaving as the other girls living in the new city who she 
had been criticising since her arrival in the town. While Leyla’s claims to 
a conservative morality were entirely true to her beliefs, so was her belief 
in the ideal of romantic love. Love explained this contrast with her princi-
ples and was described as the main driving force in life, and thus able to 
justify everything. Simultaneous affirmation of arranged marriage along 
with actual romantic relationships was something that older people, espe-
cially from urban backgrounds, practised, but in the case of Leyla the dis-
crepancy between her moral ideals and her actual behaviour was even 
more powerful, although she was clearly sincere in both. The rapid social 
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change created genuine dilemmas and internal conflicts with which she 
had to struggle.
Urban women, education and social media
Leyla’s social and cultural universe is quite different from the majority of 
other young women living in the new city. No matter whether they are 
Kurds, Arabs or Syriac Christians, in the new city young women tend to 
have more contact with men, both online and offline. New modern spaces 
and increased levels of education, as well as social media, have eased 
mixed-gender forms of social relations and friendships. The traditional 
male-only coffee houses, the Kahvehaneler, are attended only by male 
elders, whereas youths hang out in new, gender-mixed public spaces, 
such as ‘modern’ cafes, shops and restaurants.11 In the new city women 
tend to study, work, walk in the streets and sit out. They spend money and 
consume, and this creates friction with the older generation that does not 
understand this new lifestyle. The level of education among women has 
increased radically, particularly among the Kurdish population. Kurds 
invest a lot of energy and effort in providing a good education to young 
people, as they see it to be the only available means to improve their 
social conditions, and also to take back their Kurdish culture and identity 
denied by the Turkish State. For young women, university constitutes 
one of the few ways to escape a miserable life oppressed by fathers or 
husbands in a patriarchal family. A Kurdish female friend in her late 20s, 
employed as a teacher while living with her family in Mardin, reported:
In my life I  had only two options to escape from a miserable 
life:  going to the mountains and fighting with PKK, or going to 
the university. I convinced my father to send me to the university, 
otherwise I would have become a guerrilla. I didn’t want to live as 
a housewife, preparing foods for some cousin I had to marry, and 
raising kids. Now, thanks to my university degree, I will marry the 
man I want and I can have the life I want!
University, modern urban spaces and social media have had similar 
impacts on young women’s lives: they have all contributed to their entrance 
into a new set of relationships beyond those of the extended family, and 
they have put them in touch with a new, extended, public world. More-
over, no differently from Leyla, these new, modern, gender-mixed places 
have led women to open their first social media accounts. Some started 
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to use the internet and mobile phones when they were high-school or 
university students, and started to flirt with boys and communicate with 
friends; others use it to remain in touch with ex-university friends who 
live in other towns around the country. This new generation of young 
women who live in the new city share the experiences of being part of 
an extended network of social relations – online and offline – that signifi-
cantly differ from those of their mothers and older sisters.
However, important institutions such as women being virgins 
before marriage, discretion and secrecy in flirting with men, as well as 
the pretence of arranged marriages, continue to be quite firm among 
Arabs and Kurds. Modernisation has produced new social relations, 
but also new conservative ideologies and new strategies to protect 
women’s respectability and reputation. On social media, indeed, new 
friendships and romances came along with a new, conservative pres-
entation of the self.
Zozan
Zozan was a 30-year-old Kurdish woman from a nearby town, who moved 
into Mardin when she was employed as a veterinary nurse in a public 
office. She was living on her own in a house supplied by the State, she had 
her own car and she was living autonomously from her family, whom she 
used to visit only twice a month. As a single educated woman with her 
own job, she used to hang out with both female and male friends, and 
to take part in different cultural activities in the town. She considered 
the majority of her older relatives, most of them well-off owners of 
medium-sized businesses, as uneducated and backward. She didn’t have 
any of them as Facebook friends, because they would have considered her 
a shameful woman as she was living on her own and driving a car, and 
she was not yet married. But Zozan was able to carry on her independent 
life because she had a university degree and her own job.
Zozan was looking forward to finding the right man to get married 
to; she was becoming a bit too old and afraid that no one wanted her 
any more. She had had a few relationships with men in the past, none 
of which fulfilled her expectations. Whenever we met, we talked about 
love. Finding the right partner was her main concern at that moment of 
her life. One day she even went to Diyarbakır to meet a woman known as 
a good fortune teller able to read Turkish coffee grounds; she wanted to 
gain some information about her romantic prospects. Zozan’s dream was 
to get married to a man she loved: arranged marriages looked completely 
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awkward, backward and absolutely inappropriate to the way she imagined 
private life and family. Her father also hoped that she would find a man she 
loved. Before he married her mother through an arranged marriage, he 
had been in love with another woman he couldn’t marry because the two 
families didn’t agree to it. He and his wife learned to take care and support 
each other, but ‘love is another thing’, her father repeatedly told her.
The clairvoyant told Zozan that in three months, in June, she would 
meet a man she would fall in love with. She spent the following three 
months waiting for this to happen, and when talking with me about him 
she ended up calling him ‘the man of June’. When I came back to Mardin 
in June after a month in London, I found Zozan incredibly happy, excited 
and blinded by love: she had met the ‘man of June’ and he was wonder-
ful. And of course she started to date him, thanks to Facebook.
Zozan was driving her car to attend a state examination for a Master’s 
course at the local university; when she had nearly reached the building, 
she almost crashed her car against that of another attendee, who had 
come from another town of Mardin Province. They got out of their cars, 
and then started, rather amusingly, to have fun with each other, reassured 
that nothing bad had happened to them or their vehicles. They walked 
and talked until they reached the examination office. At the security con-
trol they left the keys of their cars in the same little box, and said goodbye 
to each other,  imagining they would meet again at the end of the examin-
ation. But ‘the man of June’ discovered he had left his ID at home and had to 
leave without being able to take the exam, while Zozan was already inside 
the examination room. So he left her a message with his phone number in 
the little box at the entrance of the examination room where they left the 
keys together. But the message got lost and it seemed that they didn’t have 
any other way to get in touch with each other. So the man started to look 
insistently for her on Facebook, without being able to find her because she 
had a private profile. Then he eventually went onto the Facebook page of 
her work and could see her name, send her a friendship request and write 
her a message. Zozan, who had liked him when they first met, accepted 
the friendship request and started to communicate on Facebook, and after 
a few days they exchanged their phone numbers and started talking on 
WhatsApp. Social media facilitated the courtship and made it possible for 
them to meet again and start the relationship; but it continued to consti-
tute an important element of their romance. Because he was living two 
hours away from Mardin, the couple met each other face to face only once 
every couple of weeks, but they talked regularly on the phone and chat-
ted a lot on WhatsApp every day. Each also had the habit of taking a selfie 
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every day and sending it to the other on WhatsApp; this was a way to feel 
closer to each other. Zozan carefully stored all these pictures on her laptop 
and looked at them whenever she felt the need to feel connected to him. 
After the first few days, they stopped using Facebook chat, but Facebook 
became important in showing loyalty and honesty. Zozan was monitor-
ing his profile to understand who his friends were and whether he had 
too close relationships with other women. Because they couldn’t meet 
as friends together and live their romance in public spaces, Facebook 
became their public context. Because of Facebook they often had long 
arguments too. Once his password was stolen and hacked;12 messages 
asking for money were sent to his male friends and messages with sex 
jokes to his female friends. He immediately unfriended all his Facebook 
contacts and explained to them that his password had been stolen, as he 
wanted to prevent them from receiving stupid messages and jokes. He 
also called Zozan to tell her that she was going to be unfriended. She 
thought that he wanted to hide something from her, and so she called him 
on his phone looking for further explanations, but he didn’t reply for the 
whole afternoon. Zozan’s fears became bigger and she seriously thought 
that he was hiding something important, such as a relationship with 
another woman that could have become visible on the public Facebook 
wall against his will. They could communicate only the following day 
when Zozan was completely angry. He told her that he couldn’t answer 
the phone because he was busy in calling his friends to explain to them 
what had happened, and he was not hiding any other relationship with 
other girls. After this episode, they also had a serious argument when 
she asked him why he had two Facebook accounts, and he didn’t want 
to reply because the reason had to do with alliances and fights between 
his family and another, and was nothing related to love and girls. But she 
thought that he was using the second account to flirt with girls or to have 
a parallel relationship. They also had arguments whenever he did not 
reply to her WhatsApp messages as soon as he saw them.
In their romantic relationship, social media clearly had a major role: 
first Facebook and then WhatsApp, though Facebook remained import-
ant as a public space, as they were not publicly acknowledged as a couple 
with anybody except me and Zozan’s best friend. It is this co-presence of 
very public and very private spaces that makes social media a cause of 
dangerous jealousy. Like Zozan, many other women and men live in fear 
that their partner could cheat on them, helped by this new online archi-
tecture that enables them to create, display and hide relationships. This 
topic therefore requires a section to itself.
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Lack of trust and jealousy
In Mardin, lack of trust characterises relationships between people in 
general, but especially between both unmarried and married partners. 
Doubting the other’s honesty and fidelity is a constitutive aspect of 
romantic relationships – one in which social media plays an important 
role, as it puts people in touch with innumerable others, creating many 
opportunities for infidelity that can always be kept completely hidden 
and secret. This lack of trust is also a consequence of the rapid transform-
ations of recent years, when relationships are now more frequently built 
on individual choices and agreement between partners, and women have 
more autonomy and opportunities to get in touch with men and to express 
their disagreement. Jealousy is probably one of the most widespread 
feelings among young women and men in Mardin, and social media and 
mobile phones are seen as both the cause and the solution to it.
When I asked the reason for sending 500 WhatsApp messages every 
day to his girlfriend, an 18-year-old man replied in this way:
Everybody is so jealous in Mardin. People send each other many 
messages every day, continuously, non-stop. In Mardin people don’t 
trust each other, there is no trust. For example, people imagine that 
if you simply sit near a person of another sex, you might be thinking 
of having sex. If a girl goes out, her boyfriend would start asking her 
on the phone ‘Where are you going? Who are you spending time 
with?’ He will start calling her on the phone and sending her mes-
sages. There is always lack of trust. But it’s not just among young 
people, it’s among married adults too. For example, my cousin’s 
wife does not trust him and always calls him on the phone to con-
trol him. She even opened a Facebook account to control what he 
does and with whom he spends time. In Mardin, whether you are 
teen, an adult or an elderly, you don’t trust your partner … Look 
at me, for example! I was behaving in the same way. I was send-
ing hundreds of messages to my girlfriend. But then I changed after 
I saw how people in the west [of Turkey] behave. In Mardin people 
are not developed, and they will never develop!
As a proof of devotion and commitment to the relationship, several 
young adults involved in premarital romances asked their partners to 
share their Facebook password or to unfriend people of the opposite 
sex. Many young women had only female friends as Facebook contacts, 
especially when they had met their current boyfriend there. Whereas 
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demonstrations of love among married and officially engaged couples 
had to do more with the display of a profile picture portraying the 
couple together, in this case, the goal was to keep away people of the 
other sex.
Deniz
One afternoon I went to visit Deniz, who became one of my best friends 
in Mardin. She was an architect originally from Batman who moved to 
Mardin to work. Deniz was 26, smart, well educated, beautiful and from 
a ‘middle-class’ family. She was courted and flattered by a young Kurdish 
man who was popular in Mardin because of his success in painting and 
maintaining good social relationships with different kinds of people in 
the town. He first saw her in a cafe, discovered that she was the friend 
of a friend, and then he started to court her on Facebook. They then met 
once, twice, fell in love and they started to have a romantic relationship 
that was lived also offline face to face, and on the phone several times a 
day. Because they were both living far away from their respective home 
towns, they had more opportunities to meet each other and were less 
concerned about her respectability. Unlike single women originally 
from Mardin who live with their family, Deniz could more easily live her 
premarital relationship in the semi-private spaces of the town. She only 
had to be discreet and prudent. She often told me: ‘I wouldn’t be able to 
live this relationship if I was in Batman, but luckily I am in another town 
now and I can live it more freely.’
Deniz and I had been meeting at least three or four times a week 
before the relationship started, but afterwards our encounters became 
rarer. She started to hang out with the man and the man’s friends, and 
to have fewer interactions with her female friends, me included. Their 
romance was intense, their interactions very frequent, and Deniz’s auton-
omy gradually started to disappear. She changed her behaviour in pub-
lic, she became more self-confident and she began to wear more elegant 
clothes that were more suitable for a ‘woman’. One afternoon I  went 
to visit her at her house because she had an urgent desire to talk with 
a friend, and when I  arrived there she was crying, desperately crying. 
When the phone rang, she left the room and talked on the phone for half 
an hour, shouting and crying. She had had a fight with the boyfriend after 
he became completely mad at the sight of some male strangers ‘liking’ the 
pictures she posted on Instagram, even if only one of those photos por-
trayed her face. He wanted her to close her Instagram account or make it 
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completely private. He didn’t accept that other male strangers could ‘like’ 
her photos out of his control. ‘Why do you want other men to look at your 
pictures and like them? Why? I can’t understand why you have the need 
to be ‘liked’ by other men!’ he shouted at her on the phone. While crying 
and in tears, she moaned about him being always jealous: ‘He is always 
jealous. All men are always jealous. Why do they behave in this way? 
He has a Facebook account, and his female friends “like” what he posts, 
and I am fine with that. Why doesn’t he allow me to have an Instagram 
account? I can’t deal with that.’
I found myself in the middle of a tragedy:  the man’s phone calls 
came one after the other, and finished with shouts and screams. The con-
flict reached his family too: his mother called Deniz and apologised for her 
son’s grumpy behaviour. I then became aware that in the past the man had 
been cheated on by his ex-girlfriend, who had a relationship with another 
man she met on Facebook; he discovered this through her Facebook chat 
when she left the room with the computer on to go to the bathroom. So 
now Instagram was feared as the cause of another possible betrayal.
Social media and secret premarital relationships
So far, this chapter has explored some cases of young women’s 
engagement with social media and premarital romances. However, none 
of these portraits correspond to the stories of teenagers and young adults 
who completely rely on social media to communicate with people of the 
opposite sex while hiding from families and relatives. During the ethno-
graphical research there were many such stories of considerable variety, 
some of them quite extraordinary, so that it is impossible to incorporate 
them properly into this text. Instead the chapter will provide some more 
general portraits of the ways social media are currently used during the 
different stages of premarital romances, from courtship to breaking up. 
These stories of teenagers and very young adults are supplemented more 
rarely by those from middle-aged informants.
Courtship
Facebook is the platform more commonly used by men to court women, 
whether they met offline and knew each other before or not. In the 
previous stories of Leyla, Zozan and Deniz, we saw that Facebook was 
used by men to start communicating with women they had previously met 
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offline in different circumstances. In this case, Facebook has increased the 
opportunities and frequency of courtships and accelerated the evolution 
of a first contact into regular conversations. On the other hand, among 
young people from conservative families where gender segregation is 
more pervasive and youngsters don’t have opportunities to get in touch 
with people of the opposite sex in the offline world, it was common to 
use Facebook to meet strangers and start flirting with them. Interviews 
in high schools revealed that female teenagers from religious and con-
servative backgrounds often had several strangers as Facebook friends. 
After school they sat at home, and to stave off boredom they spent long 
hours on their smartphones or computers, if they had one, trying to get 
in touch with people living in different parts of Turkey or abroad. For 
example, one teenager loved to practise her English talking with Korean 
boys, because she was a keen fan of Korean soap operas. Another was 
using Facebook to find a boyfriend in western Turkey, as she didn’t like 
boys from the southeast. Another 20-year-old girl who was not working 
or attending university loved to chat with boys from Mardin she met on 
Facebook and to flirt with them, until she found one who fitted her tastes 
and those of the family, and he asked to marry her. I also came across a 
few married women trapped in unhappy marriages with violent and con-
servative men, who were using social media to communicate with the 
external world, as their husbands didn’t allow them to have interactions 
with other people out of their control. One of them found a man with 
whom to carry on a secret affair and cheat on her husband.
A common way to meet new people was also through online gam-
ing. Some games, such as Okey, Criminal Case and Tavla, were often 
played specifically with this purpose. People could start conversations 
with other players, offer teas and make gifts online. Other games, such 
as Candy Crush Saga, could facilitate flirting between people who were 
already Facebook friends. Occasionally women from lineages with a 
lower status and bad reputation, who for this reason couldn’t easily find 
men out of the family to marry, used social media to meet their future 
husbands. This was also the case of women who were becoming ‘too old’ 
to get married. Facebook was used like a dating website, which were also 
quite common in the region. In some other cases, Facebook facilitated 
the encounters and courtship between friends of friends who then ended 
up being together; they were not strangers, nor friends, but something 
in between. They could probably also have met without Facebook, but 
Facebook facilitated the process.
Some male teenagers tried to achieve fame by friending a lot of 
women on Facebook. Others used Twitter only to interact with women. 
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For example, one 17-year-old boy was following 1,750 women, mainly 
from other cities in Turkey, and only 10 men. Other young men had long, 
romantic relationships with girls from Mardin that were lived only online, 
and when they met in the street they did not even say hello to each other.
During the first few months of my field work, I came across so many 
couples who had met on social media that I wanted to discover whether 
these relationships turned into serious involvements or not. I also met a 
middle-aged woman who, more than 15 years previously, had met a man 
on MSN and then got married to him. So I added a new question to our 
questionnaire:  ‘Do you directly know engaged or married couples who 
met on social media?’ Around 50 per cent of the answers were yes, but all 
respondents knew many couples who had met online whose relationships 
had not evolved into marriage. In addition, as far I could understand from 
the ethnographical research, a lot of people met on social media and then 
got married, but the marriage was not publicly presented as the outcome 
of a social media encounter. It was also difficult to distinguish courtships 
on social media, offline or arranged by relatives, as these were often three 
different stages in the establishment of a relationship. Young couples 
would meet on Facebook and start secretly and sporadically to meet face 
to face in the park, until the boy’s family went to the girl’s house and asked 
for her hand. They could get engaged and then married, and officially pre-
sent the relationship as an arranged marriage. We can argue that social 
media has multiplied the opportunities for premarital romances, but it 
has also diversified the way young people of the opposite sex meet and get 
to know each other before choosing their future spouse.
Traditionally, couples met through match-making:  the groom’s 
mother or older female relative would be in charge of finding a suitable 
bride for him and then ask his opinion, which was often taken into account, 
other times less so. This was also the case for the woman. Then, in order to 
get to know each other, suitors used to meet in the presence of other rela-
tives, and they would ask for information about them from relatives and 
friends in common. Social media has changed match-making, as it has 
become a wonderful tool to access information about the proposed per-
son. An uneducated 25-year-old woman was looking for a husband, and a 
neighbour gave her the name of a man who was searching for a wife and 
might be interested in marrying her. As soon as she knew his name, she 
immediately went to study and examine his Facebook profile, his friends, 
his ‘liked’ pages, but above all his pictures and appearance. Because she 
liked him on the public Facebook, she sent him a private message and 
started talking before anybody else knew about it. Facebook was used 
to gain knowledge about potential partners. If in the past match-making 
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occurred mainly between relatives or family friends, with the bride and 
groom getting information about the other person through word of 
mouth, now it more often occurs between strangers, and Facebook is used 
to supply all the information that can’t be obtained from others.
For many young, unmarried women and men, Facebook was a pub-
lic showcase for performing a self appropriate to being liked by people 
of the opposite sex. In courtship, as in other areas already discussed, 
Facebook worked simultaneously on two different levels: the very public 
and the very private. It is the ability to shift instantly between these two 
that has revolutionised the way young people now meet, date and start 
love relationships. A male friend in his mid 30s explained to me:
Before Facebook courting a girl was more complicated. You had to 
first meet her face to face, being nice, ask her phone number, and 
in most cases they were refusing to give it to you. Now this pro-
cess is easier and smoother. If I like someone, I just look for her on 
Facebook, I look at the pages she likes, at the pictures she posts, and 
in this way I can understand many things about her political views 
and her social background. If I  like it, I  write her a private mes-
sage in the private chat. It’s very easy to start a conversation with 
a woman whether you knew her before or not! Before Facebook it 
took months. Now we can do it in one hour.
Courtships can start with very simple words. Men write: ‘Hello, How are 
you?’ (Merhaba nasılsın?), or ‘What are you doing?’ (Ne yapıyorsun?). 
Using simple words for starting a normal conversation with a friend is 
considered the best strategy so as not to look like a stalker or too pushy. 
The women can either decide to answer and continue the conversation or 
instead unfriend or block the person.
Social media has become so ordinary among courting people that 
a 19-year-old man started writing letters on paper to impress and charm 
his sweetheart. He told me: ‘Social media is for everybody. It’s ordinary. 
Girls don’t care any more. I now write one letter every day and I give it to 
her every morning as soon as I meet her at school.’
Premarital relationships: Love is… sending  
600 messages to your girlfriend every day
Social media also constitutes a very important space where young 
couples who are neither married nor officially engaged can secretly 
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or semi-secretly live their romance. In this case, it is the private space 
of communication that becomes pivotal. Young couples spend many 
hours every day chatting on their smartphones. They can send up to 
600 WhatsApp messages a day, and they make daily video calls on 
Tango or Viber; on Facebook private chat they share and comment on 
pictures portraying them together during the few times they meet face 
to face. Facebook was central in the beginning of these relationships, but 
SMS, WhatsApp, Tango and Viber become more important during the 
romance. Sending text messages in the night, and staying up all night 
to chat with the object of one’s love, was considered a heroic and brave 
declaration of love and a proof of commitment. ‘This is love’, I was told 
several times. People could choose the platform that best fits their need 
for money, discretion, secrecy and the connections available. Phone 
calls were mainly used when people didn’t have to hide themselves from 
parents or other people, but texts were favoured to keep secrecy.
I use messages because they are more immediate. Even when she 
sits at home with her parents she can reply, but this is not possible 
with phone calls. She can’t always answer the phone, but she can 
always send a message. And this is true with me as well. My parents 
know that I have a girlfriend, but they don’t know who she is and 
I don’t want them to discover it.
Teenagers and university students switched from WhatsApp or Viber to 
SMS after they had used up their internet credit. Alternatively, moving 
the other way round, they switched from SMS to WhatsApp or Viber as 
soon as they found a free wireless. They always tended to use the cheap-
est media available.
Romantic relationships were built on continuous and incessant 
communications between the two partners. A general inclination to have 
intense relationships with others (as with family members), but also jeal-
ousy and lack of trust (see above) contributed to this unending exchange of 
messages. Also, in as much as they were not recognised by society, romantic 
partners needed ever more constant and endless demonstrations of love.
Given the prevalence of jealousy that was discussed in the previ-
ous section, some teenagers were convinced that they needed to stop 
using Facebook after starting a relationship. Others had to delete all their 
friends of the other sex. I was told by an Arab girl: ‘My boyfriend obliged 
me to delete all my male friends from Facebook. He did well. I only have 
female friends now. We are Turks and we don’t want to lose morality. This 
is our tradition.’
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Aylin had to negotiate with her boyfriend the kind of pictures 
she could post on Facebook. She was from a bajarili family,13 and thus 
more modern and liberal than Hasan, who was originally from Kabala, 
a more conservative and less modern town in the Province of Mardin. 
So as not to disappoint Hasan’s relatives, she couldn’t post pictures of 
herself taken at a wedding where she wore a low-necked dress. She 
wanted to gain the respect of his family, as she knew that they would 
be looking at her Facebook wall. As a result, she made public those 
images in which she appeared more modest and decorous, but kept 
completely private those photos that could have damaged her repu-
tation in Hasan’s circle. She did her best to appear beautiful and be 
appreciated by her boyfriend and his family. She was well aware of all 
Facebook privacy settings, and she accurately changed them in every 
different circumstance. Her intricate uses of Facebook’s privacy set-
tings were probably much more elaborate than those envisaged in Palo 
Alto in California.
The break-up
When premarital relationships are in crisis, social media is often 
involved, either as a cause of the difficulties, as a tool for revenge or to 
calm down the situation. Many people discovered that they were being 
cheated on by their partners on Facebook and as a result decided to 
break up. Others, such as Hüner and her boyfriend, used Facebook to 
hurt each other, until they reached the point of breaking up. The couple 
had started to have problems and had struggled a lot since she came to 
study at Mardin University from another town of the region. He didn’t 
want her to leave the town. He preferred a less educated woman that 
could live next to him. As jealousy was the main problem between the 
two, and because they knew each other’s Facebook password, one day 
Hüner deleted all his female friends from his Facebook account and 
changed his name on his profile. Two days later, he did a similar thing 
to her account: he removed from Facebook all her pictures, he changed 
her name and blocked all her male friends. When the Facebook pages 
were restored after a few days, he gave her notice that he didn’t want to 
talk with her any more. As revenge, she published on his Facebook wall 
one photo with her face, something that made him annoyed because 
other people could now discover his private life and make comments 
about her and her appearance. He then changed her Facebook password 
for the second time, and her email password too. When she could open 
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her Facebook again, she saw that all her male friends were unfriended, 
including two cousins he was very jealous of. In the end they broke up, 
they unfriended each other from Facebook and decided not to talk and 
interact any more.
After breaking up, everybody usually unfriends their ex-partner 
from Facebook or Twitter. Keeping them there is considered extremely 
shameful. The presence of ex-partners on social media can be seen as 
reflecting the desire to gaze at them, but it also leads to fears that that 
they might take some stupid revenge. Also, new sweethearts might think 
that the two ex-partners desire the continuation of the old romance, with 
the creation of new jealousies and difficulties. In some cases, after the 
end of a relationship, people decide to close their old social media pro-
file and open a new one with new friends and get rid of common friends, 
without explaining the reason for doing this.
Conclusion
In Mardin the life of women is not easy. We can’t go out in the eve-
ning and we can’t go to cafes freely like men. This is the reason why 
we spend a lot of time on social media; it’s the only way we can 
communicate with the world. On Facebook I am freer. I don’t add 
my relatives there because I want it to be a free space. But for men 
it’s a different story…
In this chapter I have shown how social media has been used to satisfy 
desires and wishes for romantic relationships14 in a society undergoing 
significant social transformation. Social media, along with new schools, 
universities, cafes, shops and malls, is a new, mixed-gender space 
where women and men can meet and communicate more frequently 
than in the past. All spaces above have facilitated the diffusion of new, 
mixed-gender friendships, romantic love and premarital relationships. 
It could be argued that the ongoing social change is a movement away 
from a traditional, kin-centred society based on arranged marriages and 
Muslim morality towards a more modern and secular social organisation. 
However, the contrasts between the secret social relationships enabled 
by social media and the public presentation of the online self suggest 
that alongside these new, modern forms, new conservative values and 
public social norms have emerged. The broad awareness of what hap-
pens secretly and privately has led people even more carefully to perform 
relations and selves that conform to public discourses of honour and 
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Islam. And this happens in a period of Turkish history characterised by 
the increased visibility and influence of Islam in shaping public culture 
and public life.
As soon as I  arrived in Mardin, I  was told by a 20-year-old male 
friend:
In Mardin everything happens secretly. There are so many things 
going on here, but they happen secretly. For example, unmarried 
young couples usually meet to have sex,15 or they kiss each other, 
but everybody pretends that this has never happened. Young cou-
ples go to the cinema in the mall, they sit on the back corners and 
when nobody is looking at them they do what they have to do. They 
also go to the mosque. I know you will never believe it, but I have 
friends who went to the courtyard of the mosque in the evening to 
spend time with their girlfriends. Young couples may also meet in 
their houses, whenever parents and relatives are away.
This shows that also in the past premarital couples could meet secretly, 
but they had very few options:  the cave, the courtyard of the mosque, 
and the castle (now closed to the public and used as a military zone). 
More recently, there is also the shopping mall, and the many modern 
cafes in the periphery of the expanding city – areas which still demand 
discretion and caution. By contrast Facebook, WhatsApp, SMS, Viber, 
Tango and the phone are highly accessible alternatives, and the result is 
unprecedented. Social media has created a unique and pliable architec-
ture moulded by its users secretly to live, and not just imagine, their love 
stories, and yet keep them strictly hidden.
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The wider world: Politics, the  
visible and the invisible
What are the political implications of social media? Does social media 
have any political effect? This chapter will discuss whether and how social 
media has transformed everyday political life in Mardin. Most accounts 
of the internet and politics have been informed by Western models of 
the democratic state, public sphere and civil society, which have often 
neglected cultural differences and proposed reductionist models.1 On the 
other hand, anthropology has never taken for granted the meaning of the 
word ‘political’. Since the 1970s anthropologists have tended to include 
within the category of the ‘political’ aspects of everyday and ordinary 
life that were not traditionally included by earlier anthropologists and 
political scientists.2 For example, this included power relations between 
genders, classes, cultures or ethnic groups, whereas more recently 
anthropologists of politics have proposed grounding their analyses 
ethnographically, and starting from what people imagine and describe as 
‘political’.3 My research draws on these last contributions and discusses 
whether social media has changed the way Mardinites experience politics 
and what they regard as their political domain. The analysis starts from 
the close observation of what people posted on their public social media 
over the 15 months of my research and contrasts these materials with the 
several comments and conversations I had with them and with the way 
‘politics’ is experienced in the offline world.
My central argument is that social media has introduced new ways 
to imagine and conceive the political domain in Mardin. Social media 
has promoted notions of the political as expressive and performative 
action that is always under the threat of State and social surveillance. 
Social media has facilitated the public expressions of political identities 
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and ideas, but at the same time it has heightened the risks and dangers 
that come with it. As a consequence, some topics, themes and political 
ideologies have had more visibility, while others have been completely 
concealed. On the public social media, boundaries between the visible 
and the invisible have been redrawn; some discourses have become more 
prominent, while others are kept even more hidden.
In Mardin, politics is traditionally discussed mainly in private 
houses, while political references are often absent from public spaces. 
People were reluctant to talk about politics in public spaces because this 
would disturb their coexistence with inhabitants from different ethnic, 
social and religious backgrounds, which had different roles in the con-
flicts that afflicted the town. The anthropologist Biner borrowed the 
concept of ‘public secrecy’ from Taussig4 to describe the public silence 
surrounding public life in Mardin. ‘Know[ing] what not to know’ and 
‘know[ing] when not to speak’5 is necessary to the coexistence of the 
inhabitants in a divided town where State violence has created opposing 
social forces. In the new city where Kurds and Arabs live in even closer 
proximity and share the same buildings and streets, social interactions in 
public spaces are ruled by politeness, respect and indifference. The long 
history of political violence has resulted in experiencing politics with fear 
and terror. This has also contributed to producing a new generation of 
youth that is more disengaged from the political, and more often desires 
an ordinary life free from politics.6 When I directly asked teenagers and 
young adults to tell me their opinions about politics, their reactions were 
complete silence and indifference or spontaneous exclamations such 
as: ‘Are you crazy? Do you want me to die young? I am not interested in 
politics because I do not want to die young.’
As discussed in Chapter 1, Mardin is situated in the Kurdish region 
of Turkey, which has experienced a long history of conflict between the 
Turkish State and the Kurdish minority. The conflict escalated in the 
1980s and ’90s, developing into an ongoing war between the PKK and the 
State. In those years, State forces evacuated, burned and destroyed thou-
sands of villages, as part of a strategy to break relations between villag-
ers and PKK guerrillas.7 Villagers had to choose between fighting against 
the PKK or leaving. In Kurdish cities such as Diyarbakır the situation was 
no easier, because the detention, violence and murder of civilians by the 
police were part of ordinary life. As a consequence, many of my Kurdish 
friends in Mardin have family members who were killed or tortured by 
State forces. The situation in the city of Mardin is also complicated by the 
presence of the Arab population, which has always been loyal to the gov-
ernment and opposed any form of Kurdish nationalist movement.
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The effects of the political violence of those years and the persist-
ence of a collective trauma8 has played an important role in shaping the 
political domain in Mardin, which is made up of contradictory images 
and discourses. Politics is represented as the possible actualisation of 
higher values, coming either from State discourses of Turkish Muslim 
nationalism or from discourses of social justice, equality and human 
rights of the Kurdish movement. On the other hand, the political domain 
is also defined as dirty (pis), immoral and ruled by personal interests and 
opportunism, violence and corruption. These negative connotations are 
spread both among government supporters and Kurdish nationalists. 
A follower of the BDP, who publicly portrays himself as a Kurd motivated 
by values of equality and social justice, claimed in a more confidential 
situation:
Do you think that everybody is motivated by high ideals? People 
also do their own individual interests. Look at me. I am helping the 
party during the electoral campaign also because I hope that they 
will give me a job once they win. Of course, I am Kurd, but this is not 
the only reason why I support BDP.
The political domain in Mardin is complex and contradictory. Corruption, 
networks of alliances and influential contacts are entangled with moral 
discourses and political ideologies. As we will see, social media has 
facilitated the public expression of the latter, but contacts and social 
relations have played their role too, along with State surveillance.
The Turkish State’s efforts to control the internet are continuous 
and consistent. Turkey is ranked 154th out of 180 countries in the 2014 
Reports Without Borders World Press Freedom Index.9 In January 2010 
the OCSE (the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) 
reported that in Turkey 3,700 internet websites were blocked,10 and in 
October 2014 engelliweb.com stated that 53,542 internet websites were 
inaccessible.11 Law No. 5651, ‘Regulation of Publications on the Internet 
and Suppression of Crimes Committed by means of Such Publication’, 
was approved in 2007 to address the problems of pornography and 
drugs,12 but over these years it has been widely used to block websites 
and social media pages, especially those supporting the Kurdish nation-
alist movement. In March 2014, during the municipal election, Twitter 
and YouTube were banned to stop the leaks of audiotapes showing proof 
of the corruption of the Prime Minister Erdoğan and other ministers. 
Furthermore, the ruling party has been trying to pass a bill that author-
ises the government to block the internet without court permission.
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Most recent scholarship on social media and politics has tran-
scended the approaches of both media optimists13 and media pessimists.14 
Researchers have investigated the role played by digital and social media 
in the mobilisation and organisation of protests, such as the Arab Spring 
in 2011, Occupy Wall Street in 2012 or Gezi Park in Turkey in 2013, or in 
digital campaigning, governance and digital democracy.15 What all these 
works have in common is the investigation of the effects of digital media 
in relation to specific events, and the negation of their role in everyday 
life. My research was situated within 15 months of ethnographical study 
and took into account what is regarded as political by the inhabitants 
of the town to the extent that this surfaced in their lives. This depth has 
made possible a broader understanding of the role of the State in the 
moulding and limiting of online political participation.
Surveillance, control and political violence
Internet and communication technology are a new form of tor-
ture. In the 1980s and in the ’90s they were using physical torture. 
Now they use communication technologies. Twenty years ago they 
were torturing us to have information, now they can simply use 
the phone and the internet. Between 2009 and 2013, almost 8,000 
people involved in KCK16 have been arrested after having been fol-
lowed on the phone and on the internet.
With these words Bilal, a man in his early 50s and an active member of 
the local section of the BDP, started to describe the internet and social 
media. We sat at the end of a tea room (çay bahçesi), far from everybody 
else, and we had a long conversation that I couldn’t record. He was at 
first reluctant to talk to me, although I had been introduced to him by 
my research assistant who knew I was doing research for the university, 
but then he started to tell many stories about his life. In the 1990s Bilal 
was arrested three times and sent to prison in Diyarbakır17 and Mardin. 
Each time he was tortured by the prison guards. Compared to other men 
I  met who had been victims of torture in Turkish prisons at that time, 
Bilal was extremely lucid: he described digital media as a new advanced 
stage in the technology of surveillance at the service of states and govern-
ments, which in Turkey has been used to track the activities of BDP and 
KCK members and supporters. Some 8,000 KCK members were charged 
under the Anti-Terror Act of ‘being a member of an illegal organisa-
tion’, and the proofs were thousands and thousands of communications 
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recorded on phone calls, SMS messages and emails, which in many cases 
were completely fabricated. He also mentioned to me the case of the law-
yers of Abdullah Ocalan, whose conversations with Ocalan were unlaw-
fully recorded by Turkish authorities during their meetings, phone calls, 
emails and by ‘bugging’ of the defendant’s offices and homes. This evi-
dence was obtained by breaching the confidentiality of the communica-
tion between lawyers and their defendants.
From the long conversation we had together, it was immediately 
clear how self-censorship was influencing the way Bilal used social 
media. The effect of the political violence he had suffered in the past and 
that he was still experiencing in new forms even then was an attitude of 
suspicion and distrust towards any kind of mediated public presence. He 
did not send emails to arrange meetings. He didn’t use Facebook to dis-
cuss politics, nor to support a political candidate, nor to openly criticise 
the government. He felt as if he was under the continuous watch of the 
State.18 His Facebook account was used under a fake name that was a 
creative combination of the name of Che Guevara and Deniz Gezmis .19 
This was the only strictly political reference publicly shared with others. 
Before his current Facebook account, Bilal had had another one with his 
real name, the password of which was stolen by members of the Turkish 
nationalist party (MHP), who started to post MHP emblems to ridicule 
him in front his network of friends. Public derision was a threat to his 
honour, a weapon often used in Mardin after the arrival of social media 
to damage people’s reputation. After this episode, he decided to use 
Facebook only with an anonymous account, with no pictures and no real 
names. He knew that this (partial) anonymity would not prevent a State 
agency from identifying the owner of the page, but it mainly protected 
him from the nasty jokes of other people with malicious intentions. The 
fake profile allowed him to be recognised by his Facebook friends as a left 
wing Kurdish activist and at the same time remain anonymous in front of 
the majority of Facebook users and potential authorities. The choice of a 
fake account was not only the result of a coherent and rational political 
evaluation, but also the consequence of a deep sense of distrust towards 
others and State institutions.
On his Facebook he had friends from Mardin and from other towns 
in Turkey with different political ideas, and they very rarely talked about 
politics. He repeated to me that he used Facebook to maintain and pre-
serve social relations with people, no matter what their political views 
were. He had good relations with friends and relatives from Mardin who 
supported the AKP and other political parties. On social media he talked 
with them about everything, but not about politics: ‘Politically I am with 
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BDP, but socially I am with everybody. And Facebook is a space for social 
life, not for politics.’ Discussions about politics in such a divided context 
would have damaged his social relations. In Mardin, just as in the rest 
of southeast Turkey, family connections and relations of patronage and 
friendships are central to access to resources, jobs and favours. Facebook 
was used to extend and maintain these local networks of social support, 
and this limited the expression of political ideas.
The story of Bilal shows that social media is and is experienced by 
Kurdish dissidents as a place of fear under the control of the State, and as 
containing a potential threat from political enemies. In the end, this has 
not prevented Bilal from using the media, but rather has forced him to 
develop a particular style of usage: the political component was limited 
to his fake profile picture and name. In this way he expresses his political 
identity, but at the same time he limits the repercussions that might come 
with it.
The second story is about Savas, a 55-year-old man employed as 
a state teacher in a high school. Despite his age he uses Facebook a lot, 
mainly to read and share news and to keep in touch with old students. So 
he was using a Facebook account with his real name and picture. He is also 
a sympathiser of the BDP and the Kurdish movement: in the 1990s he lost 
his job in the public schools because of his political views, and he had to 
work in his father’s shop for 10 years before being able to go back to work 
at school again. Public employees in Turkey were and continue to be con-
strained in their freedom of expression. One day in 2013 Savas  received 
a call from the local police officer, who accused him of defamation for 
having published on Facebook a negative comment about Adnan Oktar. 
Oktar is a controversial and powerful public figure in Turkey. Author and 
showman, he is known for being the propagator of theories of Islamic 
creationism, a promoter of Holocaust denial and the founder of Islamist 
groups that were politically close to the AK party and Erdoğan. Oktar is 
also known as the ‘Islamist sex cult’ as he was accused of sexual abuse 
and was widely talked about and criticised for showing images of sexu-
alised, half-naked women in his programmes on TV channel A9. Savas  
wrote ‘Namussuz’ (immoral, without principles) as a comment on a video 
circulating on YouTube and Facebook, where Oktar was surrounded by 
sexy blonde women. He told me: ‘He portrays himself as the perfect pious 
Muslim, but he is always close to these naked TV showgirls. I only wrote 
that he was “Namussuz”. Look at what happened! Facebook is not a safe 
space in Turkey and Turkey is not a free country!’ Savas was prosecuted 
for defamation and had to pay TRY  600 (GBP  150). Several critical 
voices rose up on social media and the internet to deride Adnan Oktar as 
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immoral and disgusting. Oktar, on the other hand, in collaboration with 
the government, had already been responsible for the blocking of several 
websites that were critical about him, including WordPress.com, the sites 
of the newspaper Vatan and that of the left-wing trade union of teachers 
and education workers Eğitim-Sen.
The story of Savas  is one of many examples showing the degree 
to which social media and the internet are under governmental con-
trol in Turkey, and how people do not feel safe to express their own 
opinion there.
The third story is about S ukru, a 21-year-old Kurdish university stu-
dent enrolled at Mardin Artuklu University. He was born and grew up in 
Adana,20 after his parents moved there from their village in the Kurdish 
Province of Bitlis to escape the violence that afflicted the region in the 
1980s. He chose to attend Mardin Artuklu University as he wanted to live 
some years of his life in the Kurdish region of Turkey. He was sharing a 
flat with other university students, but he stated that they were not politi-
cised enough and were too unconcerned about important topics. Sukru 
had an old Nokia smartphone that he was using 24 hours a day to check 
his Facebook page, send email, talk on Skype, read news and do some 
research about various issues on Google. He was using his phone as a lap-
top because he couldn’t afford a real one. He had one Twitter and three 
Facebook profiles: two with a fake names and no photos, where he mainly 
had friends with fake profiles, and one with his real name and profile pic-
ture, where he mainly had friends with real profiles. He had opened his 
Fig. 6.1 Meme with Adnan Oktar. Translation: ‘Versace Muslims! 
Times met the ‘pussies’ of Adnan Oktar!’
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first Facebook account when he was a high-school student, mostly to have 
access to political news that was not broadcast on mainstream media. He 
was a loyal reader of RedHack,21 Aleyhtar,22 Sosyalist Besıktas23 and Haber 
Enstitüsü.24 He used Facebook and Twitter as a source of alternative news 
that was not available on television or in the newspapers. But he could 
take part in this ‘counter public sphere’ only by using an anonymous pro-
file under a false name. This choice seemed so obvious and normal to him 
that in the interview he frequently exclaimed:  ‘Are you joking? Do you 
mean that in Italy and UK nobody uses fake profile? Really? Seriously 
I can’t believe that!’ Sukru also used Facebook to write and share poems 
in Kurdish,25 his native language that he spoke with his family, but which 
he was not able to write properly because in Turkey it was banned from 
schools; nor, until a few years ago was it allowed to speak the language 
in public spaces. Writing and publishing on Facebook in Kurdish, indeed, 
was claimed as a very important political act. In addition, he was using 
Facebook to keep in touch with three cousins living in his home village 
in Bitlis, which he used to visit only once every three years, and a dozen 
other cousins living in Ankara and Istanbul, most of whom he has never 
met face to face. For Sukru, social media constituted a very important 
political tool: it was used as a source of alternative news, as a channel to 
disseminate the Kurdish language and as a way to keep in touch with his 
extended family that was dispersed around the country. Just like Bilal, 
Sukru also used anonymous fake Facebook accounts as a way to escape 
State surveillance. But unlike Bilal, he was less concerned about the 
potential derision of social media friends with different political ideas, as 
he was not originally from Mardin.
The fourth story is about Hamdye, Esra, Okan and Berat, four 
Kurdish teachers who work in different schools around the Province of 
Mardin. They are all Kurds in their early 30s, unmarried and without 
children. They are all originally from the Province of Mardin, Diyarbakır 
or Batman, who now live in the new city like many other state employees. 
All of them, like thousands of other memur (civil servants) all around the 
country, cannot publicly express their political ideas because they could 
lose their jobs. My four friends lived their childhood during the 1980s 
and ’90s when the conflict in the region was characterised by violence 
and terror. They had all experienced having parents, uncles, cousins or 
friends arrested, killed and tortured by State forces. For example, Esra 
was always talking about her mother, sisters and brothers, but she never 
mentioned her father to me. One night, after drinking a bottle of wine 
together in the terrace of her house, she started to tell me the traumatic 
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story of her family. Her father was a school teacher, and back in the 1980s 
when she was a child they all lived together in a village in the Province 
of Mardin where he was assigned to a school. One day, with no warn-
ing or notice, the Turkish gendarmes entered the village, killed animals 
and people and burned everything, houses, fields and schools. The only 
option for the villagers, and Esra’s family as well, was to run away. On 
the way the gendarmes arrested her father and took him to the prison in 
Diyarbakır, where he was detained for a few weeks and also tortured. 
Esra, her mother, brothers and sisters arrived in their home town alone, 
and had no news about the father. They asked a rich uncle for help, who 
then paid the police in Diyarbakır to release him. When the father left 
the prison he appeared a completely different person, as the torture had 
disfigured him physically and psychologically. He remained jobless for a 
while, but was eventually employed again as a state school teacher and 
sent to work in a town in the Black Sea region which was famous for the 
high density of Turkish right-wing nationalists, also called ‘Grey Wolves’, 
known for their involvement in violent attacks against the Kurds. And 
indeed, he began to be constantly threatened by three men who used to 
go to his house to destroy everything and intimidate him with guns. He 
decided to go back to his home town, get his gun and take it to his new 
house in the Black Sea region to use for self-defence. When the group of 
men came back again to his house, he took the gun and he killed them. 
He was sent again to the prison in Diyarbakır, where he spent eight years. 
When he left prison none of his sons, daughters and relatives could rec-
ognise him. He had become insane and extremely violent with his wife 
and daughters. At that point Esra’s mother decided to divorce him and 
move with the children to another house. They have never seen him 
again, nor have they had any news about him.
These kinds of stories are very common in the Kurdish region 
of Turkey, and those who were in their 20s and 30s at the time of my 
research had had a childhood marked by these episodes of violence and 
tragedy. For Hamdye, Esra, Okan and Berat, like many other people 
I  became friends with, bad memories surfaced whenever they heard 
the sounds of police sirens or people arguing in the street. They don’t 
talk too easily about these traumatic experiences, but they are a consti-
tutive part of their way of being in the world, and on social media too. 
The State continues to be their main object of fear,26 both offline and 
online, and this often prevents them from easily creating relationships 
of trust with others. On social media this sense of fear reaches even fur-
ther because control is more widespread and diffuse than offline. They 
all now have decent jobs guaranteed for life, the money to get married, 
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to have children and to build a family, but they are not free to express 
their political ideas and feelings, and their Facebook walls reflect these 
limitations: they don’t post anything overtly political, nor ever criticise 
the government nor post anything related to the Kurdish issue in Turkey. 
On the public social media, they fluctuate between their desire to be seen 
and recognised as Kurds and the fear that comes with the public dis-
play of that identity. In the offline world, people move between different 
spaces inhabited by different people and can modify their performances 
according to those they are interacting with, but on public social media 
any form of political expression is potentially visible to everybody and 
can become evidence to be used against them.
These four cases showed different ways of using social media by 
Kurdish people that have been affected by the violence of the State and 
continue to be subject to its control. Although past and present political 
violence has produced suffering, pain and fear that reinforce the effects 
caused by the actual governmental control of the internet, many Kurdish 
dissidents find strategies to express themselves in one way or another.
The networked mediated public
Having considered the effects of State surveillance, it is important to 
also investigate the role of social relations in shaping political expression 
on social media. As noted in the introduction of the chapter, public life 
in Mardin is characterised by lack of political discussion and reference 
to sensitive issues. Peaceful coexistence in the streets and other public 
spaces is guaranteed by silence around delicate topics and the respect of 
ordinary norms of education such as ritual greetings. On the more public 
social media the situation is pretty similar and people follow a list of rules 
to avoid conflicts with others: they often do not post images and news 
that might attract negative comments and reactions from other people 
with different political views, and when this does happen Facebook 
friends often try not to reply. Being contradicted in public can be seen 
as a serious insult, and people are cautious about doing so. People are 
concerned about ‘not losing face’, which also leads them not to share 
material in support of their favoured political candidates, because if that 
candidate loses the election the person would be publicly recognised as 
a loser by everybody. Challenges and responses are often avoided on the 
public Facebook, as these might have deeper effects and become serious 
issues because they are indelible. When someone contradicts another 
person, the argument may easily lead to unfriending someone. Seventy 
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per cent of Q1 respondents claimed to have unfriended someone on 
Facebook because of a political posting they made. Facebook is ruled 
by reciprocal acts of pleasing others and gaining their explicit support, 
sustained through ‘likes’ or positive comments of approval. Probably 
more than in the offline world, any comment or post that creates conflict 
is potentially detrimental to a person’s reputation. The political silence 
that characterises public spaces offline is reproduced on social media, but 
with some important differences. Visibility and invisibility are not equally 
distributed between those who support the government and those who 
do not. Political material backing Prime Minister Erdoğan and the ruling 
AK party is more visible than pro-Kurdish content.
A left-wing and atheist27 Kurdish teacher was using an anony-
mous Facebook account to follow atheist, agnostic and Marxist Facebook 
groups. She explained the reason for this in this way:
I had a problem with a colleague who was jealous of my success 
with the students. She was Arab and I am Kurd. One day we had an 
argument about work, she took her revenge and went to talk with 
the local officer of education to tell him that I was doing Kurdish 
propaganda with the students. I was called by the public officer to 
justify myself. Luckily he was smart enough not to give too much 
importance to the event. If that man was more nationalist and dis-
liked the Kurds, he could have used this excuse to fire me. As a Kurd 
and atheist I  feel continuously threatened by the Arabs. Can you 
imagine what could happen if I openly share atheist or pro-Kurdish 
posts on Facebook? I would live under threat even more!
On the other hand, the Arabs and those who adhere to the ideological 
and religious project of the ruling AK party take advantage of the new 
opportunities and become even more visible than in the offline world. 
Arabs do not usually display Turkish flags in the streets, but they do this 
on Facebook. Government supporters do not proclaim their political 
beliefs in the cafes, but they often share pro-government images and 
memes on Facebook. On social media they feel protected and powerful, 
and they can express their political ideas even more easily than offline. 
Social media not only reproduces existing political inequalities, but also 
reinforces them.
The next section will examine how visibility and secrecy are played 
out in political events with different spatial and geographic dimensions. 
On social media people tend to express their points of view more through 
events of international and national politics than through local politics, 
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but again with significant differences between government supporters 
and opponents. The former more overtly express their ideas and take 
part in discussions on issues of national interest to support the ruling 
AK party and the then-Prime Minister Erdoğan, but Kurds are limited in 
the public expression of political ideas that support the Kurdish cause 
in Turkey. However, Kurds will express their support for Kurds living in 
Syria and Iraq under the attack of the Islamic State, and the Arabs for the 
Palestinians in Gaza under the attack of Israel.
Other studies on the political effects of social media and the inter-
net have shown how these have transformed local politics.28 Here I rather 
highlight that social media is mainly used to express local political aspi-
rations through reference to issues and events outside of the local area. 
This argument will be supported by three different case studies: the local 
election of March 2014; the Gezi Park demonstrations and the protests 
that exploded in Turkey after the death of Berkin Elvan, a 15-year-old 
boy hit by the police while he was going to buy some bread during the 
anti-government demonstrations in Istanbul; and the occupation of the 
cities of Sinjar and Kobane by the Islamic State and the Israeli attack on 
Gaza, both of which happened in summer 2014.
The local election 2014
The local elections held on 30 March 2014 came after months of national 
protests started in Gezi Park in June 2013, and for this reason they were 
seen as a test of popularity for the government. The local campaign was 
very heated at both local and national levels. In December 2013 ministers 
and their family members were arrested by the police after the eruption 
of corruption scandals. The alliance between the government of Prime 
Minister Erdoğan and the clan of Fethullah Gülen,29 on which was built 
the success of the AKP government, was broken for the first time. This 
series of corruption scandals also led to the ban of Twitter and YouTube 
that was claimed as necessary for reasons of national security, and 
served to stop the circulation of videos that were damaging Erdoğan’s 
integrity and popularity. In southeast Turkey and Mardin as well, the 
elections were strongly contested. It was felt that the results might affect 
the peace process as well as the development of the relationship between 
the BDP and the government. Participation in the presidential election 
in August 2014 was minimal compared to that in the local election. In 
many towns in the Kurdish region the results were partially predictable, 
but in the city of Mardin they were not. With the recent migration of 
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Kurdish people and the split of the Arab support between two different 
political parties (AKP and Saadet),30 the results were uncertain until the 
last moment. The three parties competing for the majority of the votes 
were the AKP, BDP and Saadet, and the campaign was particularly heated.
From the beginning of February 2014 flags of the political parties 
covered streets and the walls of houses and buildings.
Fig. 6.2 Flags flying in the old city
Fig. 6.3 Flags flying in the new city
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And the town was full of political posters.
Fig. 6.4 AKP poster
Fig. 6.5 BDP poster
Fig. 6.6 Saadet poster
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New party offices (seçim bürosu) were opened, and from late 
afternoon until night people sat there to talk, gossip, dance and listen 
to music. I could hear halay music coming from the offices of the BDP, 
nationalist Turkish music from the offices of Saadet and AKP songs from 
the offices of the AKP.
Fig. 6.7 AKP party office
Fig. 6.8 BDP party office
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All day long political parties’ cars and vans were going around the 
streets of the town to announce the names of the competitors and invite 
people to vote for them, with music in the background.
Fig. 6.9 Van supporting Ahmet Türk
Almost every day candidates and members of the parties met 
potential voters, visited public and private offices, shops, streets, neigh-
bourhoods and villages surrounding the city. The political campaign was 
built on face-to-face communication between the candidates and their 
voters, as this is traditionally the favourite communicative channel in the 
creation of relationships of trust between the people and their political 
representatives.
During almost two months of political campaigning, the lack of pol-
itical discussions that characterised the public domain over the rest of the 
year was suddenly broken. Spaces and sounds in every single moment of 
the day referred to the aggressive competitions between the candidates, 
their political parties and their supporters. What had been kept private 
and out of people’s sight and mind until that moment suddenly came out 
and dominated the public life of the town. Thousands of people gathered 
in the party offices to express their support to their candidates and par-
ties, and people indulged in spontaneous acts of anger or happiness. I saw 
middle-aged, religious Arab women aggressively pulling BDP posters from 
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the walls of the town, and young BDP supporters jumping on the roofs of 
cars and shouting from happiness once they knew they had won the elec-
tions. Kurds took part in the celebration of Newroz31 10 days before the 
elections, and danced to Kurdish halay music with a level of passion and 
excitement that had never happened before in Mardin. The public life of 
the city was suddenly transformed: Mardin was not the same place I had 
seen in the previous 12  months. What was normally suppressed blew 
out with such intensity and force that I finally could understand the rich 
world of feelings and emotions that are usually kept hidden. The tension 
reached its climax on the last evening before the election, when thou-
sands of people gathered in the parties’ offices to express passionate and 
enthusiastic support for their political parties and leaders.
Throughout those two months, the public space continued to be 
divided between areas that were used for politics, mainly streets and party 
offices, and those that were not, such as shops and cafes. Here people con-
tinued to meet and talk like any other day of the year, apparently heedless 
of what was happening. But in the party offices and in private houses, 
talks and rumours about the results of elections and the political cam-
paign were frequent and attracted people’s attention:  ‘This family will 
vote for this party, that family for that party … This candidate will win 
in this neighbourhood, that candidate in that neighbourhood … Saadet 
party buys votes for $1000 a family, AKP buys votes with coal …’
What happened on social media? Just like the rest of the year, the 
‘public’ Facebook continued to be a place where local politics was not 
discussed and not debated. With only a few exceptions, people tended to 
follow their party’s and candidate’s page, to ‘like’ it, but not to share any pol-
itical material, news or memes on their walls. People’s Facebook page could 
reveal their political affiliation, but not how active they were in supporting 
one party or the other. This was true equally for AKP, BDP and Saadet sup-
porters. Facebook continued to be the place to maintain and preserve good 
relationships with others and not pursue political goals or overtly express 
political ideas. People also did not want to expose themselves because, in 
the case of defeat of their candidate, the damage to their reputation would 
have been too significant. A Facebook page full of posts and images support-
ing the defeated party would have been inadmissible for the local norms of 
honour and presentation of the self, and it would have exposed the indi-
vidual to the mockery and derision of the winners. For this reason, social 
media users who were not originally from Mardin (such as students or pub-
lic employees) tended to be more politically active, as they did not have to 
maintain relationships with other Mardinites, and they were more likely to 
have people with similar political views on Facebook.
 
145The wider world :  PoliT ics,  v is ible and invis ible
Fig. 6.10 Photo posted on Facebook during the political campaign. 
The caption under the images said: ‘In Mardin this time also the flags 
are so beautiful. You will endure them. You will respect them. You 
will not ruin them, you will not break them.’ (Mardin’de Bayraklarda 
bir arada çok güzel. Tahammül edeceksiniz. Saygılı olacaksınız. 
Yıkmayacaksınız, kırmayacaksınız)
Up to 10 March, 20 days before the elections, only 10 of my 200 
Facebook friends living in Mardin had publicly posted any content 
regarding the local elections:
•	 One photo portrayed different parties’ flags twisted one over the 
other after a storm. The image received 100 ‘likes’ and more than 
30 comments.
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The following comments made fun of the abilities of Mardinites to be 
close to and support each other.
•	 Three memes were funny and ironic about the electoral process, 
politics and politicians, as in Fig. 6.11.
Fig. 6.11 Electoral process meme. Translation: ‘ATTENTION… Before 
voting. After voting.’
•	 Three memes announced the arrival of Prime Minister Erdoğan in 
Mardin, while there were no memes portraying the local AK party 
candidates.
Fig. 6.12 Meme announcing the arrival of Prime Minister Erdoğan 
in Mardin. Translation: ‘Wait for 9 March! Prime Minister Erdoğan 
will give a talk!’
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•	 One picture portrayed a candidate for the head of the neighbour-
hood (Muhtar), who was never officially affiliated to any party. The 
picture had around 50 tags, most of whom were relatives of the 
candidate living in the same quarter.
•	 Two pictures posted by two university students depicted them with 
the candidates of the BDP, one during a political gathering, the 
other during a tour in the old city.
Fig. 6.13 BDP candidates talking to Mardinites in the old city
Fig. 6.14 BDP candidate with university students
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Political posts about the campaign and the election didn’t increase in the 
following days. The heated and passionate participation offline didn’t 
have an equivalent online. Social media were used for one-to-many com-
munication by the political candidates. Yet this attempt by candidates to 
foster an online presence was not too successful either. Their posts were 
a mere description of what they were doing in the offline campaign, and 
were not updated regularly. On their Facebook and Twitter pages, and 
in those of their parties, there were very few comments or discussions 
and no references to any political programme. Some candidates had only 
one Facebook account and others had both Facebook and Twitter, but 
they never had more than a few hundred followers and there were no 
significant differences between the political parties. The only exception 
was Ahmed Türk, an important Kurdish political figure in Turkey; he was 
already a member of the parliament, and was then elected as mayor of 
the Mardin Metropolitan municipality (Büyüksehir Belediyesi).32 His 
social media presence was rich and meaningful and his Twitter and 
Facebook profiles were carefully updated every few hours, and followed 
by supporters all around Turkey and not only Mardinites.
Why didn’t candidates use social media actively and successfully? 
In Mardin, local elections are a matter of families; votes are often decided 
by older male members of the family, and then followed by women and 
younger members. People believed that in the last few years young men 
and women were voting more autonomously, mainly as a consequence 
of a higher level of education, but this was certainly not the norm, and 
traditional practices continued until the 2014 elections:  older family 
members sit, discuss, make decisions and the rest of the family follows. 
One day I went to visit a friend living in a Kurdish neighbourhood with a 
majority of BDP supporters. Streets and walls were full of BDP flags, but 
from the balcony of a building that was inhabited by the same extended 
family was hanging a big and shining orange and white AKP flag. I was 
surprised and I asked my friend for clarification. She explained that two 
brothers had had a big fight for reasons related to trade and business. One 
of them got very angry with the rest of the family and, to take revenge, 
he had taken down the BDP flag and hung up the AKP one. The display 
of this flag was so shameful for the whole family and the neighbourhood 
that they all tried to persuade him to take the flag down, and eventually 
he did. Voting behaviour in Mardin continues to be based on alliances 
between old members of the family, patronage and patron–client rela-
tions. For example, on another day, a ceremony celebrated a new alliance 
between the BDP and a large Arab family that had previously been loyal 
to the governmental party. The ceremony took place in the BDP party’s 
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office with the participation of some party members and around 40–50 
male members of the family. The event was even tweeted and posted on 
the party’s official Facebook page. This was not an isolated case, as sev-
eral Arab families started to support the BDP when they knew it might 
have more chance of winning this election.
Fig. 6.15 Arab extended family in BDP office
In Mardin, local elections are a game played by middle-aged and 
old men, who are not usually keen internet users and see social media 
as a tool for young men to have fun, play games and flirt with women, 
and not suitable for politics. Local politicians aim to communicate with 
them more than with the young population. In addition, some party 
members, both in AKP and BDP, did not see social media in a positive 
way; they associated it with the loss of traditions, and with the image 
of the small nuclear family, where people spend time in different, 
adequately heated rooms of the house, in front of the television. And 
they regretted that the large family of the past, where every member 
spends the night in the same small room of the house, was disappear-
ing:  ‘Social media stops social communication and social relations!’ 
Another reason for the limited use of social media by local politicians 
was the lack of internet connections in the villages around the city of 
Mardin, whose inhabitants constituted a good percentage of the voters 
for the Metropolitan municipality. Also, the creation of trust relation-
ships continues to be based on face-to-face communication and rituals 
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of hospitality, to such an extent that the duty of hosting and receiving 
guests in their party offices was felt as too demanding by some young 
party politicians. The few materials posted on social media gave visibil-
ity to this offline practice, and most of the Facebook and Twitter posts 
showed offline public gatherings that were going on during the day.
During the political campaign, many inhabitants of the town took 
part in the competition very enthusiastically. They gave free rein to their 
feelings that couldn’t be expressed during the rest of the year, and they 
did so in the space and in the time assigned for it. But social media was 
not part of this. At the end of the election, a Kurdish woman, a ‘mother 
of martyrs’, whose son was killed by the Turkish army a few years earlier 
during a battle between Turkish soldiers and PKK, told me: ‘BDP won, but 
my life will start to be so boring again. The elections are over and my life 
will become meaningless!’ For the first time in the history of Mardin, the 
elections were won by the BDP. The Arabs, who have always considered 
themselves the older inhabitants and the custodians of the city, found 
themselves without control and with less power. The night after the 
results of the elections became public, AKP supporters didn’t leave their 
houses as they started to digest their big defeat. The political campaign 
for the local elections had a transformative role in the life of the town and 
of its inhabitants, but social media was excluded from this process.
National politics: Gezi Park and beyond
On social media, Mardinites tend to avoid the public display of content 
on issues of local politics, but the situation was quite different regarding 
matters of national interest, such as the Gezi Park protests in June 2013, 
and the protests that erupted 10 months later after the death of a boy 
shot by a policeman while he was going to buy some bread in the middle 
of the Gezi protests.
The Gezi Park protests, which started in Istanbul and spread around 
the country, didn’t reach Mardin and the southeast region. I found out 
about the beginning of the demonstrations from the alarmed and wor-
ried emails and messages from friends living in Europe. I  had been 
spending a few days in the home village of a family who had migrated 
into the new city, but there was no internet and only a bad phone con-
nection there. I  looked at my phone on my way back to Mardin while 
I  was still digesting the lamb’s liver they offered me, and only at that 
point did I find out what was happening in Istanbul and in other Turkish 
cities. I had a look outside to see if anything was going on, but I saw the 
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usual peaceful, hot, dry sandy rocks with no people around, because the 
extreme hot weather prevented human beings from standing or sitting 
in the sun.
Kurds living in the southeast didn’t participate actively in the wave 
of protests. They saw it as a struggle of middle-class urban Turks, who 
were rebelling against the status quo and finally experiencing the vio-
lence and the brutality of the State that the Kurds had been suffering for 
so many decades. Some of them even admitted to being happy to learn 
that Turkish activists in the west were being hit by gas and bullets, as it 
meant that Turks too were finally becoming aware of what State forces 
can do. In addition, the peace process between the PKK and the ruling AK 
party, which had started a few months earlier, prevented political leaders 
of the BDP from officially taking part in the demonstration. In Mardin, 
like in the rest of the Kurdish region of Turkey, many Kurds didn’t identify 
with the protesters’ cause. The visibility that Turkish activists had within 
Turkey and at international level also produced a widespread sense of 
further frustration. A common comment was:
When in December 2011 a Turkish airstrike killed a group of civil-
ians, mostly teenagers and children, who were smuggling cigarettes 
on the border with Iraq, nobody within Turkey and in the world 
reacted. Nobody knew about the Roboski massacre.33 Now because 
of some tear gas, the international community and everybody in 
Turkey is criticising the government.
Social media were perceived as contributing to this unfair situation, as 
they were used to give visibility to ‘wealthy urban Turks’, visibility that 
the Kurds had never achieved, even when the State murdered dozens of 
children and civilians. During the protests, the majority of the Kurds were 
looking at the events without being emotionally and practically involved, 
with the exception of a few university students. A Kurdish female friend 
in her late 20s told me:
During the protest I have been following a lot the news on Facebook. 
Because of social media I  was very well informed and I  knew 
every detail of the protests and of the police repression in western 
Turkey,34 but I was not sharing anything. I use Facebook for politics 
only when I am very angry and I feel that I have to do something. 
But definitely this was not the case. Turkish protests already have 
too much visibility.
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On the other hand, several Arab Mardinites supported the government 
and actively shared and distributed contents on Facebook that opposed 
the protests, reproduced government propaganda and preserved police 
fairness. Figure 6.16 is an example of the anti-Western conspiracy theory 
propagated by the government during the Gezi Park protests.
Fig. 6.16 Meme propagating anti-Western conspiracy theory. 
Translation: ‘You will be shocked. The places where most of the tweets 
about Gezi Park originated from! According to this map, ENGLAND 
is the country that sent the majority of tweets; GERMANY is number 
two?? Thus, those who are directing the activists in Taksim are not 
Turkish, they are all foreign. What do they have to do IN TURKEY? Did 
they come for the environment?:))) DON’T YOU SEE THIS CURRENT 
DARK SCENARIO?’
The sources of pro-government posts and memes were various, 
and included the pages of the AK party, the Turkish police and informal 
Facebook groups of government supporters. Although the government 
started to demonise social media and later also banned it, governmental 
and state institutions engaged with social media pretty actively and used 
it as a tool of propaganda.
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On 12 March 2014 a new wave of protests erupted all around 
Turkey:  huge demonstrations started in many Turkish cities after the 
death of Berkin Elvan, a child who had been shot by the police while he 
was going to buy bread during the Gezi protests in Istanbul some months 
before, and had lived in a coma until then. All around Turkey, social 
media became a very important channel to commemorate the death of 
the child and protest against police brutality. In Mardin there were no 
demonstrations, though, and that same day the then-Prime Minister 
Erdoğan visited the city as part of his pre-election tour. The city was mili-
tarised and thousands of people attended the Prime Minister’s speech. In 
the streets of Mardin, nobody expressed solidarity with the child killed 
by the State, but a few people did so on Facebook by posting his photo as 
a profile picture.
Fig. 6.17 Meme used as profile picture to commemorate the death of 
Berkin Elvan
On the other side, pro-government supporters employed social 
media to criticise once more the population of Gezi Park and to wel-
come the visit of their beloved Prime Minister Erdoğan (see Figures 6.18 
and 6.19).
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Fig. 6.18 Pro-government meme. Translation: ‘People don’t buy bread 
in this way / This is the way.’
Fig. 6.19 Pro-government meme. Translation: ‘Great master, welcome 
to Mardin.’
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In both the protests of Gezi Park and those following the death 
of Berkin Elvan, in Mardin, government supporters used social media 
quite actively to express their ideas and spread governmental propa-
ganda. This was the result of the strategy of the ruling party at a national 
level actively to use social media, which also led to the recruitment of 
a few thousand volunteers and to the opening of social media teams 
and offices.35 State institutions, government offices and the AKP used 
social media more frequently and more efficiently on the national than 
on the local level. This also explains to some extent why supporters 
of the government were quite active on social media on the occasion 
of events of national interest. But the expression of ideas on issues of 
national politics was also possible since it did not compromise relation-
ships with other inhabitants so much. Public support to the govern-
ment does not involve a direct attack or defence of any person living 
in Mardin, nor does it challenge local norms of honour. In addition, on 
Facebook Mardinites more often discuss political issues with ‘friends’ 
from other towns in Turkey. For example, a Kurdish friend, Apo, once 
exchanged his ideas on compulsory military service on the Facebook 
wall of a Turkish nationalist man he had met a few years before on 
holiday on the western coast of Turkey. They enjoyed the conversa-
tion for a while until they both got disappointed and unfriended each 
other. Apo criticised the friend’s views, but he would never have had 
the same kind of discussion with someone from Mardin. Mardinites 
more often chat about politics with people who live far away, because 
even if the conversation becomes problematic the consequences will 
be less compromising.
Regional and international politics
Mardin is close to the border with Syria and Iraq, and around half of its 
inhabitants are Kurds, an ethnic group that is divided between Turkey, 
Syria, Iran and Iraq and does not have its own state. The events involving 
the Kurds in these countries have significant repercussions in the lives of 
the Kurds in Turkey and in Mardin as well – especially at the time of my 
research, which saw the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and its continuous 
attacks on the Kurdish populations of Syria and Iraq.
When the Syrian war erupted in spring 2011, the government of 
Assad, in order to have more energy and resources to fight in the rest 
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of the country, decided to close down the military front with the Kurds 
that had initially taken part in the uprising. In July 2012 the Kurdish 
Supreme Committee was established as the governing institution of the 
Kurdish region, which in Kurdish is called Rojava (this means west and 
stands for ‘Western Kurdistan’). For the Kurds living in Mardin and in 
the rest of Turkey, the autonomy of Western Kurdistan meant a lot in the 
context of the Kurdish struggle for independence. The autonomous gov-
ernorship also had a significant impact in the geopolitics of the region 
and has been much feared by the Turkish government. The political 
forces at the head of Rojava are ideologically and politically close to the 
Kurdish movement in Turkey, and the PYD (Democratic Union Party), 
the Kurdish party ruling the new government of Rojava, is an affiliated 
group of the PKK. Events in Rojava became better known internation-
ally when ISIS attacked and occupied the city of Kobane. The city was 
then liberated thanks to the Kurdish resistance, while Turkey refused 
to attack the ISIS positions and did not allow Turkish Kurds to cross the 
border to support the resistance.
Before the attack on Kobane by ISIS, another tragic event filled the 
front pages of international newspapers and mobilised people in Mardin 
and in the Kurdish region of Turkey: in July 2014 ISIS attacked the town 
of Sinjar and killed thousands of civilians belonging to a Kurdish religious 
minority called the Yezidi, while many others fled into Turkey and some 
arrived in Mardin too. The formation of the autonomous government 
of Rojava, the occupation of Sinjar by ISIS and the arrival of the Yezidi 
refugees and the occupation of Kobane were the three most-discussed 
events on social media by the Kurds living in Mardin. Compared to the 
lack of political posts about the Kurdish cause in Turkey, the peace pro-
cess and relations between the AKP and BDP, expressions of solidarity 
with the Kurds living in the nearby countries were quite common on 
Facebook.
During 2013 and 2014, before the rise of ISIS, a lot of Kurds in 
Mardin used a meme with the word Rojava as a Facebook profile pic-
ture or background. For many, this was the only political content of their 
public Facebook page. When ISIS attacked Sinjar and many Yezidi ref-
uges arrived in Mardin and the nearby villages, different organisations 
started a campaign to collect money and clothes (Figure 6.21). Facebook 
was one of the most important channels of communication used to 
organise the collection, mobilise public opinion against ISIS and spread 
news that didn’t have enough visibility in mainstream Turkish media.
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Also, when ISIS occupied Kobane, the Kurds from Mardin used 
social media to express their opposition to it. On Facebook they shared 
pictures, articles and memes to support the Kurdish population under 
occupation, and some started to use the image of Kobane as their 
Facebook profile picture.
Fig. 6.20 Rojava
Fig. 6.21 Campaign to help Yezidi refugees
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The atrocities in Kobane led Kurds who had never previously used 
Facebook for political content openly to express their anger about what 
was going on and to criticise the Turkish government for not allowing 
any support to reach the Kurdish fighters in Kobane. However, once 
again on Facebook the mobilisation was influenced by self-censorship, 
and criticism towards the Turkish government was expressed mainly in 
quiet tones. The Turkish government was considered the main accom-
plice in this human and political disaster because it had prevented the 
Turkish Kurds from crossing the border, but had allowed militants of 
ISIS to cross the country undetected in past years. However, its respon-
sibilities were not widely debated on social media. Most of the pictures 
and comments publicly posted on Facebook addressed the issue from 
a ‘humanitarian’ perspective and not from a political point of view. 
A  30-year-old Kurdish friend told me:  ‘On Facebook I  share content 
about the Kurds in Turkey only with a small group of relatives. I tend 
not to post in public news about Kurdish politics. But I did it when ISIS 
attacked Sinjar because this is a humanitarian disaster; everybody 
agrees that civilian men, women and children don’t have to be killed by 
these crazy men!’
(a)
(b)
Figs. 6.22a–b Memes in support of the Kurdish population in Kobane
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Although he had a clear view about Turkey’s responsibilities in sup-
porting ISIS and in not giving aid to the Yezidi refugees, this was not the 
first object of his public posts. The public Facebook was not the place 
to criticise the government, but to receive ‘likes’ and agreement from 
friends. He rather tried to get approval and support from a larger number 
of people and not to create divisions among his Facebook friends. He pre-
ferred to condemn these events in a ‘universal’ language understandable 
by everybody, and nothing is more universal than the visual language of 
photos of dead innocent civilians. Self-censorship on social media led to 
the spreading of images portraying wounded children and dead bodies, 
and this had the effect of ‘de-politicising’ the public discourse to some 
extent.
None of my AKP-supporting Facebook friends posted anything 
about the occupation of Mount Sinjar or Kobane by ISIS. They were not 
concerned about the murder of thousands of Kurdish civilians, but they 
were quite active in condemning another massacre. In July 2014 Israel 
started a new operation against Gaza and killed almost 2,200 Palestinian 
civilians. Arab Mardinites shared a lot of memes and news to denounce 
Israel and express solidarity with the Palestinians. They became polit-
ically active as they had never been during the rest of the year because 
mainstream media also gave quite a lot of visibility to the Israeli war 
against Gaza.
(c)
Fig. 6.22c Meme condemning the Israeli war in Gaza
In summer 2014 the political content posted on the public-facing 
Facebook was polarised between Arab AKP supporters and Kurdish BDP 
supporters: the first posted about the attack on Gaza, the second about 
the occupation of Sinjar, and both ignored the other ongoing disaster. 
This division reflected the Turkish government’s critical position towards 
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the State of Israel and Kurdish autonomy in the region, and in turn the 
different positions of Mardinites towards the Turkish government. Yet 
the cases of the Yezidi in Sinjar and Palestinians in Gaza could both be 
seen as humanitarian tragedies that could be regarded as undeserved 
by everyone equally in Mardin and in Turkey. It was therefore ‘safe’ to 
express one’s concerns since these would not impact upon local social 
relations.
Conclusion
In Mardin, the political mostly belongs to the domain of public silence: the 
coexistence of different groups that share a history of reciprocal violence 
has led to the formation of a ‘public secrecy’36 and diffusion of norms of 
respect and indifference that make daily life in the town possible and 
peaceful. This invisibility is partially reproduced on Facebook too: people 
tend not to be too politically active and not to publicly share political 
posts that break the norms of ‘public secrecy’. However, Facebook is a 
space with its own affordances and architecture, one in which boundaries 
between public and private take new forms and appearances in the 
political domain too. Sometimes the lack of activity online is in essence 
a reflection of the lack of activity offline. But not necessarily. During the 
elections of 2014, the two domains were different from each other.
Overall, in respect to politics, as in the previous discussions of gen-
der, the public-facing social media tends towards a greater degree of 
conservatism than is the case for offline life. Conservative is the appro-
priate term, because political surveillance and control by the State has 
produced an online public sphere dominated by the governing political 
forces, but also because ancient concerns over honour and shame that 
have dominated anthropological discussion of the region’s traditions 
have led to a lack of online discussion and critique. In this chapter, as in 
previous ones, the emphasis upon maintaining good social relations with 
people and avoiding negative repercussions on one’s personal reputation 
and social status actually triumphs over the desire to express one’s pas-
sionate beliefs.
Firstly, Facebook has strengthened local norms of honour and pub-
lic secrecy which traditionally prevented people from publicly criticis-
ing other Mardinites, and made them fearful of exposing opinions that 
might lead to public ridicule. The result of this has been a reluctance to 
post in regard to local politics. But at the same time social media has 
opened up a new space of political participation in issues of national and 
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regional interest, where people can more freely express political feelings 
because they don’t directly address local issues and local politics. The 
comparison between local politics (the local election) and regional pol-
itics (the solidarity campaigns with Palestinians attacked by Israel and 
with the Kurds under occupation by ISIS) is the primary evidence for 
this argument.
Secondly, another equally critical factor shaping online political 
participation is the impact of the State.  On the one hand, opponents 
of the government felt themselves to be even more under the threat of 
State surveillance when expressing themselves online than they were 
offline, and evidence suggests that they are entirely right to be fearful 
in that regard. On the other hand, the Turkish government and its sup-
porters took advantage of the new increased opportunities of visibility 
created by social media and started actively to produce and share online 
content. The effect of these two factors has led pro-AKP supporters to 
be much more visible than pro-BDP, who have learnt by now that they 
must continually act only in accordance with internalised principles of 
self-censorship. In this sense, we can argue that Facebook has strength-
ened the political inequality between those who adhere to the ideological 
model of the Turkish nation and those who do not.
These conclusions are an important corrective to much of the cur-
rent academic and public debates about the relationship between social 
media and politics. These have mostly focused separately on the uses of 
social media for activism and protests, on State surveillance and propa-
ganda, or on the uses by political candidates for their political campaigns. 
My research has instead concentrated on the daily life of ordinary inhab-
itants of a town, in order to find out whether social media has changed 
the way people are involved in what they consider political. Political sci-
entists or scholars in the field of media and communication studies will 
always find political commentary on social media if they look for it; but 
there is a danger in assessing this material outside of an ethnographic 
context which can determine whether postings, or absences of them, are 
typical or unusual, and what the causes and consequences of it are.
In all sectors of private and public life, the evidence provides 
examples of continuity with prior offline norms, but also shows up trans-
formations and unprecedented possibilities. There is therefore little evi-
dence to support academic and public arguments that social media in and 
of itself has had a major impact upon people’s political conscience or pol-
itical activism. The key point is that the reasons for the presence of polit-
ical postings on social media, or their absence, lies in their consequences, 
not for politics, but for people’s safety and their social relationships with 
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others in the town. In that respect, many of the points made here resonate 
with those made in the previous chapters about topics such as love and 
romance; and this consistency across these chapters, and with respect to 
quite disparate topics, leads to the conclusions of the book.
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Conclusion: What kind of social 
change?
A moral panic surrounding Facebook spread in Mardin during the course 
of the research: people were using special applications to steal Facebook 
user names and passwords in order to damage the reputation of other 
people. These anonymous impostors derived much pleasure from posting 
shameful words, images and videos on other people’s walls. Misuses 
also included the modification of photos of female friends into sexually 
explicit images, or requesting sexual acts from female friends and money 
from male friends. There were many cases of people affected by these 
kinds of pranks, and teenagers and young adults in Mardin lived with the 
fear that something like this could happen to them as well. A local police 
internet crime specialist, as well as local lawyers, remarked that reports 
of pornographic videos or sexual images posted on Facebook walls by 
strangers were quite common. These account abusers damaged their 
victims’ honour and reputation and those of their friends. They created 
major anxiety and fears that led several women to refrain from posting 
photos of themselves and caused several men and women to close their 
Facebook account or not to open one.
This anxiety was also fostered by the campaign demonising social 
media by the incumbent Prime Minister Erdoğan and his government.1 
Erdoğan became aware of the power and dangers of social media for 
his government during the Gezi Park protests that started in June 2013. 
A few months later, during the electoral campaign in 2014, he also faced 
a big scandal in which recordings of conversations circulating on YouTube 
proved his involvement in corrupt operations. He adopted the strategy 
of blaming and demonising social media and presenting it as a ‘force of 
evil’,2 a threat to the unity of the nation, the unity of the family and to 
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women’s integrity and morality, all values that are at the core of Turkish 
national identity.3 The demonisation campaign went along with a ban 
on Twitter and YouTube in March 2014 which, among other official rea-
sons, was also justified by the case of a Twitter account used to distrib-
ute pornography under the false identity and name of a real housewife. 
Anxieties and fears about social media clearly originated both from the 
bottom and from the top. In the tension of the political campaign for the 
local election in February and March 2014, the theft of social media pass-
words was frequent, and this seems to have perfectly served the Prime 
Minister’s strategy of demonising social media. But what matters most 
for this book was its effects on the lives of the people I spent time with 
in Mardin: a general feeling of anxiety associated with the diffusion of 
social media.
These pranks represented the spectre of what social media could 
potentially do to its users:  the public revelation of what has to remain 
absolutely hidden and private. They could be seen as the extreme end of 
a spectrum of cases which mainly consist of far more ordinary episodes 
that still create some sense of shame and embarrassment:  among oth-
ers, the public display of photos that portray women standing close to 
men or wearing inappropriate clothes; or photos of men in silly postures 
with grimaces on their faces, or while drinking alcohol. In Mardin, shame 
is a very common emotion that originates when the public presentation 
of the self does not conform to the expectations of society. By increas-
ing exposure, social media makes the self even more vulnerable, and 
Facebook, more than any other social media, produces the general feel-
ing of not being in control of one’s own public image, in an online space 
that is imagined as constantly under the gaze of others. And this creates 
shame.4 This is not just a characteristic of Mardin. The concept of honour 
and shame, and the public observance of codes of honour for men and 
values of modesty for women are at the core of the way anthropologists 
have characterised Mediterranean and Middle Eastern societies over sev-
eral decades of research, so in a sense this returns us to the most founda-
tional or classic issues discussed within regional anthropology.
Furthermore, social media has not only increased the chances of 
making public what has to remain hidden or private: it has also expanded 
the opportunities for secret and private forms of communication and 
relationships that do not have any legitimacy in public space. It is the 
combination of these two elements that could turn the use of Facebook 
into a significant threat. By expanding at the same time ‘very private’ 
and ‘very public’ spaces, social media in Mardin has also forged different 
moralities and values appropriate to these two very different settings: it 
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has extended individualistic inclinations and romantic desires, while at 
the same time making people even more concerned with the public per-
formance of traditional values of honour and modesty. Social media in 
Mardin has also created different kinds of ‘semi-private’ and ‘semi-public’ 
spaces, such as closed groups on WhatsApp or Facebook; however, the 
most prevalent use of social media has to do with either the super-public 
(the public-facing Facebook, Instagram and Twitter), or the super-private 
(one-to-one chat on WhatsApp, Facebook, Viber, Tango or WeChat). 
Social media in Mardin has expanded the influence of two opposite set-
tings; it has not simply multiplied the spaces with the different degrees of 
privacy and sizes of groups that is typical of scalable sociality.5
The anxiety expressed in the episodes of moral panic mentioned 
above people’s apprehension and interest in talking about Facebook or 
WhatsApp reveal that social media is having a major impact in people’s 
lives. As I have shown throughout this book, and as I will develop further 
in this conclusion, social media has indeed changed things in Mardin. It 
has reproduced social and cultural patterns of the offline world, but it has 
also created new practices, new aspirations and new fears. What kind of 
social change has been facilitated by social media?
The expression ‘social media and social change’ can be a bit tricky. 
Trying to determine the degree of social change is a task often carried out 
by development and humanitarian projects, which develop programmes 
based on the deterministic assumption that the use of horizontal and 
participative technologies facilitates democratic transformation.6 In 
post-colonial countries of the Arab Middle East, these kinds of interven-
tions have been frequent. This deterministic assumption has also shaped 
North America’s ideas of democratic intervention in the region,7 as well 
as several journalistic narratives. This book has little to do with those 
assumptions about communication technologies and social change. My 
findings also have little to do with the way scholars have traditionally 
studied digital media in the Middle East. Especially after the Arab upris-
ing in 2011, social scientists and media scholars have studied the field of 
organised politics, activism, power, resistance and the transformations 
going on in the public sphere;8 these studies are sometimes based on 
reductionist notions of ‘politics’, seen as a domain divided from the rest 
of people’s lives.
My research, instead, has moved to the holistic perspective of the 
anthropological point of view that looks at the entirety of human beings 
in their daily and ordinary lives. Fifteen months of ethnographic study 
afforded the opportunity to see how domains commonly thought of as 
separate from and pertinent to ‘politics’, ‘kinship’, ‘marriage’ or ‘love’ were 
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intertwined with each other. From this position of participation and 
observation, I  discovered that the most significant consequences of 
social media have to do with the redrawing of the boundaries between 
private and public in all these different domains of people’s lives. 
Moreover, the investigation of these boundaries brought us exactly into 
the core of the culture I studied, in this particular historical moment. 
For this reason, in order fully to understand the implications of social 
media in southeast Turkey, we must temporarily put aside what we 
know about social media in Milan, London or Palo Alto. We also have to 
forget our understanding of private and public in Italy, England or the 
USA. We will start better from the understanding of what ‘private’ and 
‘public’ mean in Mardin.
Indeed, it may be more helpful to see the results of my field work as 
the opposite of those described by Miller in his volume within this series, 
Social Media in an English Village.9 While we both use the concept of scal-
able sociality, the key consequence of this in Miller’s case is to populate 
the middle ground of suburban English values with forms of moderation 
and an avoidance of extremes, for example, his Goldilocks strategy of 
keeping relationships ‘just right’, neither too close nor too distant. As we 
can see from the study of Mardin, however, the rise of social media as 
scalable sociality with a wider range of both privacy and size of group can 
also have the opposite effect. Instead of populating the middle ground, 
we see the extension of extremes: an ultra-conservative public space that 
goes beyond that found offline, and a greater freedom in private spaces 
that also goes well beyond what is visible offline.
The issue of what is private and what is public has also been one 
of the most debated topics in the studies of the Muslim Middle East. 
Many anthropologists and social scientists have described Muslim socie-
ties as characterised by a gendered division between private and public. 
Bourdieu, for example, described Kabyle society as organised around 
the oppositions between the private world of female life and the male 
world of the city.10 Janet Abu-Lughod described the Islamic city as accom-
plishing the need of Islam to divide ‘functions and places on the basis of 
gender and then of creating a visual screen between them’.11 She also 
challenged the dichotomy between the female private and the male pub-
lic and recognised more fluidity of gendered behaviour with the intro-
duction of the category of ‘semi-private’.12 From the mid-1980s scholars 
have started to criticise the private/public dichotomy and preferred to 
emphasise the pluralities of spaces and gendered domains. The litera-
ture on this issue is extensive. The practice of ‘veiling’, that is of women 
wearing headdresses to cover all or parts of their head or face, has also 
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been understood by scholars as a way to protect women’s privacy from 
the gazes of men in public spaces, and therefore as a reproduction of 
the female-private / male-public opposition.13 Certainly ideas and prac-
tices relating to the private and public in the Muslim world are multiple, 
and they change from one place to another and under different political 
forces in different historical times.
In Turkey, contemporary imaginaries and ideas of private and 
public have to be understood as the result of the processes of modernisa-
tion and secularisation undertaken by the Turkish State. When Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk came to power and founded the Turkish Republic from 
the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, his main concern was to delineate the 
basis of the new secular and modern nation, opposed to the ‘backward’ 
Muslim and pre-modern Ottoman Empire. The definition of a new sec-
ular public sphere, ruled by the principle of European democracy and 
modernity, was also part of his programme. Therefore, throughout the 
history of modern Turkey, different ideas drawn from secular or Muslim 
sources have competed to define the appropriate notions of private and 
public. For example, Nilüfer Göle14 proposes viewing the public sphere 
in contemporary Turkey as a stage for the performance of the modern 
subject, where visual and corporeal aspects are explicitly worked out and 
are the result of a conscious and intentional performance. She proposes 
understanding public presences and behaviours in the context of a State 
that has silenced religious signs and practices to develop a modern public 
sphere that is defined against the Muslim segregated social organisation. 
Yet the last years of the AKP government were marked by a new rein-
terpretation of secularism and new attempts to introduce Muslim defini-
tions of public and private. The public presence of women has become 
an important terrain where different interpretations of Islam and society 
battle, and the public sphere becomes a place where people actively and 
publicly perform through their own bodies their idea of modernity, Islam 
or secularism.15 Notions of public and private, in Turkey, have always 
been at the centre of political battles and competition between different 
visions of modernity, religion and morality.
Sertaç Sehlikoğlu16 describes the meaning of private in Turkey 
through the concept of mahremiyet, an ‘institution of intimacy’,17 consti-
tuted by the two components of gazing and hiding and specific notions of 
privacy and public.
[Mahremiyet] is a non-translatable word into English as it simul-
taneously refers to multiple words in English including privacy, 
secrecy, and domesticity and derived from the word ‘mahrem’, 
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which literally means forbidden. The word in Turkish, commonly 
denotes a private, often sexual realm in the lives of individ-
uals, couples, or families and is therefore confined by normative 
boundaries … It always denotes confidentiality that the insider is 
expected to preserve and an outsider is expected not to violate.18
Mahremiyet refers to the intimate and domestic space inhabited not only 
by women, but also by the men of the family, and it is understood ‘as 
a border-making mechanism that creates border between spaces, indi-
viduals, and within the body of the same individual’.19 As we will explain 
further, social media in Mardin has changed the culture and institutions 
of intimacy as imagined and lived spaces, but also the idea of public as 
a space for visual expression of different ideas of modernity, Islam and 
secularism.20
The new online public
In her attempt to explain to me the usage of Facebook in Mardin, a 
young woman mentioned what she considered a strange and inexplic-
able episode:  ‘On Facebook strange things happen. I  have a religious 
friend with covered face that posts photos of herself with her husband 
hand in hand!’ Mardinites continuously mediate between what Facebook 
initially encouraged them to do – disclose many details from their daily 
lives – and what they consider appropriate to display in public which is 
very few moments from their daily lives. For example, posting pictures 
of family members inside the private spaces of the house, or images of 
married couples, or the display of conversations about private topics was 
often described as sinful and shameful. Indeed, few people did it. As a 
result, the variety of pictures and conversations displayed on Facebook 
is significantly reduced compared to what we are used to seeing on the 
Facebook walls of many other people in Europe. What the studies in 
the ‘West’ describe as the ‘disclosure effect’ of Facebook in Mardin was 
experienced as a severe threat to people’s social world. However, despite 
people’s attempts to keep things private, social media has created a point 
of entrance for the intimate into the public domain. Desires for visibility, 
social affirmation and fame have sometimes been more powerful than 
existing normativity around the private sphere. As we saw in Chapter 3, 
images from private life promoted in public were those that increased 
people’s reputation and fame, and created the image of a more educated, 
wealthy, moral and successful person.
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Mardinites pursue different strategies to mediate between the con-
trasting desire to protect the intimate and private and at the same time 
achieve fame and visibility. For example, in Chapter 3 I noted that when 
dinners occur in a public space with friends, they more often show the 
faces of the dining companions, but when feasts are consumed at home 
with relatives they often avoid including the faces of the people and the 
details of the house, and they rather focus upon images of food. Also, 
the intimate zone of the house, such as bedrooms and bathrooms, never 
appears on the public Facebook, but the display of sitting rooms is more 
common. As a result, semi-private spaces of the house become pub-
lic and are seen by a wider audience. Also, people always select formal 
and posed photography to eliminate traits of intimacy and familiarity. 
Chapter 3 also revealed how, in these games of negotiation, the winners 
are those who can display enough to achieve fame, but not so much to 
lose morality and honour. Despite people’s mediations, negotiations and 
resistance to disclosure, social media has partially transformed domestic 
intimacy into an object of others’ gaze.
Secondly, the gendered composition of the online public space has 
changed as women have achieved a new visibility. This is a very signifi-
cant consequence of the uses of Facebook in Mardin, and it has produced 
several conflicts between partners, parents and daughters, brothers and 
sisters, since control of women’s presence and movement in public space 
is one of the main sources of men’s honour and a family’s respectabil-
ity. The online presentation of the self in public among women varies 
significantly across social classes and levels of education, and between 
secular or religious families, and it reveals different ideas and notions 
of modernity. But in every case, even when women use social media 
through fake names and identities, they participate in a new public life 
and this is locally considered as modern; the public performance of the 
secular or rather religious woman always occurs in this new, modern, 
online public space. This transformation runs parallel to wider economic 
and social changes going on offline: women in Mardin have new access to 
education, the job market and new, modern mixed-gender public spaces.
Thirdly, on social media women have become careful observers of 
men, and this has led to a new gender composition and direction of the 
gaze. Traditionally in the offline world the male gaze is directed towards 
women. In the streets of Mardin this is immediately clear, as women are 
constantly the targets of men’s attention and have to defend their moral-
ity by looking down and not around. On Facebook, a new inverted rela-
tionship between gazes has surfaced. Men continue to look at women, 
but they have also increasingly become the object of the gazes of women, 
 
 
Social Media in SoutheaSt turkey170
who have become tenacious and determined observers of other peo-
ple’s images and appearance online. Women very commonly look at 
men’s Facebook walls and pictures, and men are quite derisive and criti-
cal about it. For example, one young man criticised Facebook itself as 
the cause of his derision. A friend filmed him dancing in a funny way in 
the corner of the salon at a wedding party and circulated the video on 
Facebook. In the days that followed, all of his peers, including female 
friends, laughed at him. Women were actually the primary observers of 
the video, which reinforces the finding that Facebook is used by women 
to observe the behaviour of men and gossip about them. This was one of 
the main raisons d’être of Facebook use by women.
These three elements described above lead to a break with the tra-
ditional gendered boundaries between private and public. However, it 
is exactly in this very new public space that people perform traditional 
social relations and selves that conform to traditional social norms. The 
public Facebook is a hyper-conservative place where people appear as 
they do in the official gatherings of the extended family. They perform 
selves and social relationships that in the offline world have been under-
mined by processes of urbanisation, modernity and economic develop-
ment. Yet, instead of performing a limited set of actions as they do in 
wedding ceremonies offline, they now appear in a larger assemblage of 
activities:  meals with family members at home or at restaurants, holi-
day trips, work events, leisure time with children. Despite differences 
between secular and religious and progressive and conservative families 
in the way women are portrayed and domestic events are displayed, a 
high degree of conservatism is shared by everybody. To avoid shame and 
the damaging of reputation, nobody goes beyond the limits of what is 
jointly considered to be an appropriate presentation of the self in the new 
online public.
Social media has indeed largely been used to maintain relationships 
with members of the extended family dispersed around the country and 
abroad and to strengthen kin ties. It has also enabled intense connectiv-
ity between members of the nuclear family. The hyper-conservatism of 
the new online public is the result of the specific settings and situations 
created by social media,21 but it is also interwoven with the wider cur-
rent religious and conservative turn that Turkey experienced under the 
impact of the AKP government. In Mardin the making of the new ‘mod-
ern’ city came along with the new conservativism promoted by Erdoğan; 
for example, new mixed-gender places such as cafes and shopping malls 
developed at the same time as new Islamist politics, which regulate and 
limit relations between sexes. But public social media goes beyond this. 
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The key point in Chapter 3 was that Facebook is by no means simply a 
reflection of the conservative aspects of offline life, since so much that 
can be seen offline does not appear online. It is rather in its own way 
creating a unique ultra-conservative space that has no offline equivalent.
The new online private
The transformation of the public sphere arrived with the creation 
of new private online spaces that facilitate secret communications 
and relations between people of different sexes, to an extent that was 
not even imaginable until a few years ago. This led to the spread of 
premarital love and romance, which also had an impact on the institu-
tions of marriage and family, and on the meanings of love. The expansion 
of these new individualised forms of communication seems to confirm 
Barry Wellman’s theory of networked individualism, which argues that 
mobile phones, social media and ‘personalised’ technologies are part of 
a shift towards societies organised around individual personal networks. 
However, these networks do not have legitimacy in the society and they 
coexist with public ideologies which legitimise arranged marriages, 
traditional family organisation and the traditional role of women within 
it. These premarital relations are also constantly threatened by the possi-
bilities of public disclosure facilitated by social media. The emergence of 
these individual-based relationships exist at the same time as the repair 
and strengthening of family-bond social relations, lineage and tribes that 
have declined owing to greater geographical dispersal, and this shows 
an orientation to traditional groups which is the exact opposite of the 
trajectory documented by Rainie and Wellman.22
Nonlinear social changes
The social change brought by social media does not follow a linear route, 
but it is rather the result of two apparently opposite shifts. The spread 
of premarital love and romance, the individual choice of partners, the 
creation of new friendships with strangers and the increased autonomy 
of women and young men in deciding about their ties are all considered 
to be part of the new, the secular and the modern. Yet the production of 
individual-based social relations occurs in parallel with the maintenance 
of ties with the extended family, tribes and lineages, and the rise of 
neo-conservative religious values.
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The tension between the new and the old also operates at the level 
of each individual. During cultural change, conflicts are the norm and 
people’s sense of their moral weight is stronger.23 In those cultures where 
values are in conflict, people become conscious of making choices and 
feel a ‘heightened sense of moral concern’.24 In Mardin, the affirmation 
of moral values was visible and imperative in every moment of daily life. 
It was constantly invoked by young and old, women and men; and it was 
often displayed on the online and offline public scene, not least through 
the development of the memes discussed in Chapter 3. I  see this com-
pulsory and conscious performing of a new public moral self as a reac-
tion to the ongoing social changes. Chapter 4 introduces a story that well 
exemplifies the usage of social media publicly to affirm morality and vir-
tue. A man started obsessively to post pictures of himself together with 
his wife after he had cheated on her. He did this in order to dispel gos-
sip and publicly to reaffirm his moral credibility. In the modern Turkish 
Republic, male polygamy is not recognised by law and it is socially con-
demned. Even in the Kurdish region it is considered immoral, although 
it is widely practised in the form of betrayal. With the recent increased 
economic opportunities, a higher number of divorces and the spread of 
social media, it has become more common for men to have a mistress and 
to cheat on their wives. Social media has facilitated these practices con-
sidered immoral, but it has also allowed the public display of the happy 
married couple. Pictures portraying the couple together hand in hand, at 
a restaurant during a romantic dinner or on holiday allowed the man to 
affirm his formal sense of morality, through bringing pieces of his ordin-
ary intimate life into the new public space. The public disclosure of con-
jugal life was necessary to reaffirm his presumed morality and correct 
conduct in public.25
The new public presence of women even more clearly illustrates 
this double dynamic of change that results in a public exposition of mor-
ality. Some women posted as profile pictures images of themselves with 
sober clothes; others posted images from the Koran; others performed 
their religiosity by showing beautiful and fancy veils and clothes; others 
portrayed themselves as devoted mothers; others used fake profiles with 
false names and unrecognisable profile pictures to preserve anonymity; 
others displayed their beauty and attractiveness. They all entered the 
new online public space and reaffirmed in these different ways their ideas 
of proper conduct and their notions of modernity, secularism or Islam. 
These are public performances of moral selves, which are based on the 
re-appropriation of religious or secular values and models. As pointed 
out by Deniz Kandiyoti,26 in Turkey women’s bodies have always been 
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considered a marker of change. The reinvention of the public self also 
reflects a wider trend in Turkey that has been documented by scholars 
who explored how the public sphere has changed under the influence 
of Islamic politics, economic development and neoliberal processes.27 In 
Mardin online bodies and faces of Arab and Kurdish women also express 
different visions of modernity, secularism and Islam. Non-religious 
urban Arab women represent their modern ideal of beauty with the use 
of make-up, coloured hair or Western fashions, whereas urban Kurdish 
women prefer to appear with a sober Kurdish look. They are less con-
cerned with fashion and fancy clothes, while rural Kurdish women 
more often don’t exhibit their body at all and use fake profiles and fake 
pictures.
Finally, the redrawing of the boundaries between private and pub-
lic, displayed and hidden, is central also to the political domain. Once 
again, social media has brought us to the core values of the society being 
researched. In a place that has witnessed and experienced several epi-
sodes of political violence, such as the Armenian genocide, the Kurdish 
uprisings, the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish State (that has 
restarted again while I am writing this book) and the fleeing of refugees 
from Syria, Syrian Kurdistan and Iraq, the division between what is dis-
cussed in public and what is not is clear and neat. Violence has produced 
a list of themes that in the offline world are ‘not said’ and ‘not discussed’. 
Social media has reproduced this, but it has also shifted the limits 
between the publicly visible and invisible. The internet is a place under 
State and social surveillance that limits the visibility of those who don’t 
conform to the ideological model of the State and enhances the visibility 
of those who do.
The social changes produced by social media are contradictory, 
nonlinear and non-uniform. The switching of boundaries between the 
private and the public, and the spread of new forms of secret and ‘for-
bidden’ social relations, came along with a new public re-appropriation 
of moral values and the strengthening of family and kin relations. These 
are themes that have been touched upon throughout this book. The first 
chapter introduced the city of Mardin, a place that is undergoing signifi-
cant transformations. The process of urbanisation and the expansion of 
the new city constitute an example of the effects of the investments under-
taken by the AKP government in the building sector over the last decade. 
Construction has been placed at the centre of economic growth, and in 
those areas of the southeast that were an AKP stronghold the impacts 
of this planned urbanisation are significant. Urbanisation has led to 
nuclear households, a new public presence of women and new relations 
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between genders – and it came along with an increased level of education 
and economic expansion.
The first chapter thereby establishes a principle that new spaces 
constructed in new ways in and of themselves facilitate changes in social 
relations, such as the shift from extended to nuclear families; but at the 
same time we see another set of new spaces, which have no material 
manifestation and no basis in political policy. These are the new online 
spaces represented by social media and its creation of scalable sociality. 
Here the shift is not from extended to nuclear families, but towards a 
more extended field of sociality. This can be still more conservative and 
far more liberal at one and the same time, as seen in the increased indi-
vidual personal networks described in Chapter 2, the normative public 
spaces of Facebook walls described in Chapter 3, the repair of the rupture 
created by geographical dispersal of families and wider units such as the 
tribe described in Chapter 4, the new intimate worlds whose remarkable 
transformations are the subject of Chapter 5 and, finally, the new polit-
ical world with its unexpected online absences and presence that make 
it far from merely a reflection of offline politics, as noted in Chapter 6.
Throughout this book the intention has been to adhere to the ethos 
of an ethnographic study. Such a study tries to avoid taking issues of 
politics and gender as abstracted from the context of the everyday lives 
of the people themselves, their understanding of gender roles and their 
experience of politics, ranging from the national scene to the issue of not 
offending one’s next-door neighbour.
This study has hopefully brought us to the heart of what matters in 
the lives of the people of Mardin, and has tried to describe empathetically, 
often through stories, how they experience the constraints, possibili-
ties, consequences and moralities of new social media. But the ultimate 
aim is not parochial. The reason for putting aside the wider debates and 
entering as deeply as possible into the experience and perspectives of 
Mardinites is to thereby make a more authentic contribution as an aca-
demic anthropologist to those same global debates. In conclusion, all 
these findings that have illuminated our understanding of this specific 
context are entirely available for the purpose of shedding light on the 
two grand narratives that have described the impact of social media at a 
global level: the narrative of disclosure28 and the narrative of networked 
individualism.29 As I  have described throughout this book and in this 
conclusion, elements of both these processes have been found in Mardin 
too. However, they also appeared with their opposites: the disclosure of 
private lives came together with a strong concern about the protection of 
old and new private spaces and new public conservative performances 
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of the self, whereas networked individualism moved along with forms of 
online group and family-based sociality. The outcome of this juxtaposi-
tion of large global narratives and a localised ethnography is not to dis-
miss the global and academic debate. It is rather to enrich it by pointing 
out contradictions, extensions and consequences that we as academics 
may not have imagined, but which the people of Mardin have clearly real-
ised in their everyday usage of social media. Only from the knowledge of 
these many contradictory and opposite uses and consequences, and of 
the way they are entangled with one another, can we grasp the specific-
ity of the social change brought by social media in Mardin and its impli-
cations for our understanding of what social media has the potential to 
become in our contemporary world.
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Notes
Chapter 1 
1 To protect privacy, all the names in this book are pseudonyms.
2 The AKP (Justice and Development Party) is the religious and conservative party that has 
governed Turkey since 2002. See Chapter 6 for more about the political situation in Turkey.
3 Friday is the Muslim holy day when the most important worship is held at noon. In many 
Muslim countries Friday is a bank holiday, but this is not the case in Turkey, which has followed 
the Western Gregorian calendar since 1927. However, in Mardin, especially in the old parts of 
the city, shops often close around noon on Fridays.
4 See Rainie, L. and Wellman, B. 2012. Networked. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press; and Rainie, L. and 
Wellman, B. 2013. ‘If Romeo and Juliet had mobile phones’, Mobile Media & Communication 
1(1): 166–71.
5 Rainie and Wellman, Networked, p. 6.
6 There is much research on the role of social media in the organisation of protests in Turkey and 
the Middle East. For a more comprehensive presentation of the literature, see Chapter 6.
7 An important recent contribution to the understanding of digital technologies in Turkey in 
the English language is Akdenizli, B.  ed. 2015. Digital Transformations in Turkey. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
8 Miller, D. 2016. Social Media in an English Village. London: UCL Press.
9 Miller, D. et al. 2016. How the World Changed Social Media. London: UCL Press.
10 More accurate data on the ethnic composition of the town is not available, because there has 
been no census on linguistic minorities since 1965. This is part of a strategy to diminish the 
significance of minorities and emphasise national homogeneity.
11 The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is a guerrilla group that was founded in 1978. Conflicts 
between the State and the Kurds started in the 1920s and ’30s with the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic and its assimilation policies built on the idea of the modern, secular and 
homogeneous Turkish nation. The suppression of demands for recognition of national and 
cultural rights through legitimate channels led to a radicalisation of the conflict, to the 
foundation of PKK in 1978 and to the beginning of the armed struggle in 1984.
12 The Artuklu were a Turkish people who arrived in Mardin in the eleventh century and governed 
for a few centuries before the arrival of the Ottomans.
13 For general accounts on Kurdish nationalism within Turkey, see, among others:  McDowall, 
D. 1996. A Modern History of the Kurds. London: I.B. Tauris; Jabar, F. A. and Dawod, H. eds. 
2006. The Kurds:  Nationalism and Politics. London:  Saqi; van Bruinessen, M.  1992. Agha, 
Shaikh, and State:  the Social Political Structures of Kurdistan. London:  Zed Books; van 
Bruinessen, M.  1998. ‘Shifting national and ethnic identities:  The Kurds in Turkey and in 
the European diaspora’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 18(1): 39–52; Houston, C. 1998. 
Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation State. Oxford: Berg; Kiriflçi, K. and Winrow, G. 1997. The 
Kurdish Question and Turkey. London: Frank Cass; Olson, R. ed. 1996. The Kurdish Nationalist 
Movement in the 1990s:  Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East. Lexington, KY:  University 
Press of Kentucky.
14 On the history of Mardin and the relationships between its ethnic and religious minorities, 
see Biner, Z. Ö. 2007. ‘Retrieving the dignity of a cosmopolitan city: contested perspectives on 
rights, culture and ethnicity in Mardin’, New Perspectives on Turkey 37: 31–58.
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majority. I  never came across any significant or open collective violence against refugees, 
whereas in other Kurdish towns fights between groups of local Kurds and Arab Syrians were 
more frequent.
17 Aydin, S., K.  Emiroğlu, and O.  Özel 2000. Mardin:  As iret, Cemaat, Devlet. Istanbul:  Türkiye 
Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfi.
18 Aydin et al., Mardin.
19 Sari, E. 2010. Kültür, Kimlik, Politika: Mardin’de Kültürlerarasılık. Istanbul: I letisim Yayınları.
20 Aydin et al., Mardin.
21 Biner, ‘Retrieving the dignity’.
22 Biner, ‘Retrieving the dignity’.
23 At the time of writing in summer 2015, the political situation in the region is significantly 
different from the time of the field work in 2013 and 2014. Clashes between Turkish troops 
and PKK militants have again started to become a daily occurrence, reaching heights of conflict 
similar to those of the 1990s.
24 BDP, the Peace and Democracy Party (Barıs ve Demokrasi Partisi), is the Kurdish political party 
that in 2014 joined HDP, the People’s Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi).
25 Oktem, K. 2005. ‘Faces of the city: Poetic, mediagenic, and traumatic images of a multi-cultural 
city in Southeast Turkey’, Cities 22(3): 241–53.
26 Biner, ‘Retrieving the dignity’.
27 The population in Mardin Province increased from 745,778 in 2007 to 779,738 in 2013.
28 Atalay Günes , Z. N. 2012. ‘Theorising “trust” in the economic field in the era of neoliberal-
ism:  the perspectives of entrepreneurs in Mardin’. Phd Thesis submitted to the Graduate 
School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University, Turkey.
29 Atalay Günes, ‘Theorising “trust” ’.
30 Atalay Günes, ‘Theorising “trust” ’.
31 Stokes, 2010. The Republic of Love:  Cultural Intimacy in Turkish Popular Music. Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press. He writes: ‘To be lousy lovers, on the other hand … a truly sorry 
state of affairs! But one, at least, that everyone – Islamist and secularist, leftist and rightist, 
Turk and Kurd – might be persuaded to agree is a real issue. Discursively speaking, it evokes 
common ground, core values, Herzfeld’s “assurance of shared sociality” ’ (p. 33).
32 For a more detailed account of Kurdish and Arab kinship in Mardin, and the role of social 
media in it, see Chapter 4.
33 In patrilineal descent groups people belong to their father’s kin group and not their mother’s.
34 www.turkstat.gov.tr
35 Horst, H and D. Miller, 2012. Digital Anthropology. Oxford: Berg.
Chapter 2
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academic literature. Among others, see: Abu Lughod, L. ed. 1998. Remaking Women: Feminism 
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2 As noted by Roland Barthes in Barthes, R. 1977. ‘Rhetoric of the image’. In Image-Music-Text, 
Sel. and Trans. Stephen Heath. New York: Hill and Wang, pp. 32–51.
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Transformations in Turkey.
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7 See, for example, Eickelman, D. F. and Anderson, J. W. eds. 2003. New Media in the Muslim 
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11 Kızıltepe is a town in the Province of Mardin inhabited mainly by Kurds, located 20 km from 
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18 Chambers, Social Media and Personal Relationships; Broadbent, L’intimité au Travail.
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L. 1989. ‘Zones of theory in the anthropology of the Arab world’, Annual Review of Anthropology 
18: 267–306.
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2 Miller, D. et al., How the World Changed Social Media.
3 See Abu-Lughod, L.  2000. Veiled Sentiments:  Honour and Poetry in a Bedouin Society. 
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5 Marsden, ‘Love and elopement in Northern Pakistan’, p. 92.
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10 On Arabesk music in Turkey, see the work by Martin Stokes (Stokes, M. 1989. ‘Music, fate 
and state: Turkey’s Arabesk debate’, Middle East Report 160: 27–30; Stokes, M. 1992. ‘Islam, 
the Turkish state and arabesk’, Popular Music 11: 213–27. Stokes, M. 2010. The Republic of 
Love: Cultural Intimacy in Turkish Popular Music. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.) 
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to the traditional Turkish coffeehouses in Istanbul, see Kömeçoğlu, U. 2006. ‘New sociabili-
ties:  Islamic cafes in Istanbul’. In Amman Islam in Public: Turkey, Iran and Europe, edited by 
N. GÖle, 163–90. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press.
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muscle men’s bodies or male sexual organs; and gay online dating applications such as 
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‘Language and the body: Transactions in the construction of pain’. In Social Suffering, edited 
by A.  Kleinman, V.  Das, and M.  Lock, 67–91. Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press; 
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Shirky, C.  2010. Cognitive Surplus:  Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age. 
New York: Penguin.
14 The main exponent of this is Morozov, see Morozov, E. 2011. The Net Delusion: The Dark Side 
of Internet Freedom. New  York:  Public Affairs; Morozov, E.  2013. To Save Everything, Click 
Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism. New York: Public Affairs.
15 Postill, J.  2012. ‘Digital politics and political engagement’. In Horst and Miller, Digital 
Anthropology.
16 KCK is the acronym for the Koma Civakên Kurdistan (Union of Communities in Kurdistan). It 
was founded during the reorganisation of the PKK within the framework of the principle of 
democratic federalism suggested by Abdullah Ocalan in his 2004 book Bir Halki Savunkam 
(Defending the nation). KCK works like an executive organ coordinating the PKK and the 
other parties and organisations operating in the other Kurdish regions in Iraq, Iran and 
Syria. It is often defined by Turkish media and authorities as the political wing of the banned 
PKK (Çandar, C. 2012. Leaving the Mountain: How May the PKK Lay Down Arms? Istanbul: 
TESEV).
17 After the coup d’état of 12 September 1980, the prison in Diyarbakır is remembered as the 
cruellest place in the history of the Turkish Republic. The extremity of its brutalities, tortures 
and crimes has led several prisoners to commit suicide and burn themselves (Aras, The 
Formation of Kurdishness).
18 On internet surveillance in the Kurdish region of Turkey, see also Çelik, B. 2015. ‘The politics 
of the digital technoscape in Turkey’. In Akdenizli, Digital Transformations in Turkey.
19 Deniz Gezmis was a Turkish Leninist political activist in the 1960s, who was sentenced to death 
by the Turkish government. He then became an icon among the leftist movement in Turkey. 
However, in order to protect the privacy of my informants, in this book even fake Facebook 
names have been changed.
20 Adana is a town in south Turkey that became one of the main destinations for Kurds fleeing 
their villages and home towns.
21 Red Hack is a Turkish Marxist-Leninist hacker group considered a terrorist organisation by the 
Turkish government. It was defined as an ‘armed separatist terrorist organisation’ during a 
public prosecution. They have a website, a Facebook profile and a Twitter account where they 
circulate news.
22 Aleyhtar, which in Turkish means ‘opponent’, is an online newspaper promoting anarchist and 
libertarian ideas and values.
23 Sosyalist Besıktas is a left-wing fan group.
24 Haber Enstitüsü is a left-wing online journal.
25 The Kurdish language was banned in Turkey after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 
1923. Kurds were not allowed to speak their native language in public spaces, offices, schools 
and streets, and even speaking the language in the home was under threat. Under pressure 
from the European Union in 1991 the ban was slackened, and the AKP lifted restrictions on 
Kurdish rights and the use of their language. Now Kurds are no longer arrested for speaking 
Kurmanji (the most widespread Kurdish dialect in southeast Turkey) in the streets, and in 
the last few years some institutions around Turkey have started to teach Kurdish languages. 
Mardin Artuklu University is one of these.
26 Aras, The Formation of Kurdishness.
27 In Mardin, publicly defining oneself as an atheist can lead to serious repercussions. Although 
atheism is not considered a crime under Turkish law, people in Turkey don’t easily admit to 
being atheist. The current Law 216 on hate speech makes it illegal to insult religious values, 
and this has been used to prosecute intellectuals who write online comments seen as offensive 
towards Islam.
28 See, for example, Postill, J.  2011. Localising the Internet. An Anthropological Account. 
Oxford: Berghahn.
29 Fethullah Gülen is the founder and leader of a movement that synthesises Turkish nationalism 
and Islam, which derives from the Sufi-inspired scholar Said Nursi. Despite ideological 
differences with the AK party, there was reciprocal support between these two major Turkish 
Muslim forces. In the last few years, however, divergences and accusations have arisen 
between the two, eventually evolving into the corruption scandals of December 2013.
30 Saadet is a small, minor conservative Islamist party in Turkey that took the votes of the 
followers of Fethullah Gülen in the 2014 local elections in Mardin.
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31 Newroz is the most important Kurdish celebration of the beginning of the new year and 
coincides with the traditional Iranian new year. This celebration has a great significance for 
the Kurds and Kurdish identity in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran.
32 In March 2014 the inhabitants of Mardin voted for both the larger Mardin Metropolitan 
Municipality and the local Mardin Municipality.
33 On 28 December 2011 two Turkish jets killed 34 Kurdish civilians, most of them children, who 
were trading cigarettes and petrol on the Turkey–Iraq border near the village of Roboski in the 
district of Uludere. This massacre was considered one of the worst recent Turkish State crimes 
against Kurdish civilians before the events of summer 2015 and the bomb in Ankara on 10 
October 2015.
34 Social media played a pivotal role in giving news about the Gezi Park protests because coverage 
in the mainstream media was completely insufficient and biased. The major Turkish TV 
channels completely ignored the events. The case of CNN Turk became famous: it broadcast a 
documentary on penguins while millions of people were protesting in Istanbul and other cities 
in Turkey and international TV channels around the world reported the events.
35 See, for example, these two journalistic sources:  http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142
4127887323527004579079151479634742 and http://www.dailydot.com/news/turkey-  
twitter-gezi-akp-propaganda/
36 Taussig, Defacement.
Chapter 7
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3 On the new Turkish nationalism, see also White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks.
4 For a discussion on shame and mediation, see Madianou, M. 2012. ‘News as a looking-glass: 
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privacy trainwreck; Boyd, D. 2011. ‘Social network sites as networked publics: Affordances, 
dynamics, and implications’. In A networked Self:  Identity, Community, and Culture on Social 
Networking Sites, edited by Z. Papacharissi, 39–58. New York: Routledge; Boyd, D. 2014. It’s 
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